A study of an Extended Lunar Orbital Rendezovous /ELOR/ mission.  Volume 1 - Technical analysis  Final report by Carpenter, R. B., Jr.
SD 68-850-1 
Extended 
Lunar Orbital Rendezvous Mission 
VOLUME I - TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19690008396 2020-03-12T07:18:05+00:00Z
S D m850- 1 
A STUDY OF AN EXTENDED LUNAR ORBITAL 
RENDEZVOUS M I S S I O N  (ELOR) 
FINAL REPORT 
Volume 1 
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
January 1969 
~ 
Contract NAS2-4942 
P r e p a r e d  by 
Study Manager 
SPACE DIVISION 
NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 

SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
FORE WORD 
This is Volume I of a three-volume repor t  recording the resu l t s  of a 
study of the Application of Data Derived under a Study of Space Mission Dura-  
tion Extension Problems to an Extended Lunar  Orbital Rendezvous Mission, 
hereaf te r  r e fe r r ed  to as ELOR. 
follows : 
The ti t les of the three volumes a r e  a s  
Volume I Technical Analysis 
Volume I1 Supplemental Data 
Volume I11 Summary of Results 
This document contains a description of the technical analysis of the 
ELOR mission.  
Management Department of the Space Division, of the North American Rock- 
well Corporation. 
The analysis was performed by the Systems Engineering 
The study was performed for the Mission Analysis Division of the 
Office of Advance Resea rch  and Technology (OART), National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, Ames Research  Center,  Moffett F i e l d ,  California, 
under Contract NAS2-4942. 
The work was per formed under the direction of Roy B.  Carpenter ,  J r . ,  
the Study Manager. 
following subcontractors  and personnel thereof,  who provided the data a t  no 
cost  to e i ther  this study o r  the ea r l i e r  baseline study: 
Substantial contributions were made to this study by the 
1. A .  C .  Electronics  A1 Lobinstine . 
2 .  Aerojet  Generai* C. Teague 
3 .  A i r  Research  Division of Garre t t  Corp. Joe Riley 
4. A l l i s  Chalmers* John Hallenbeck 
5. Allison Division of G.  M. 9J J . C .  Schmid 
6. Bell  Aerospace Systems* T.  P. Glynn 
*Data supplied for baseline study. 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
7. Collins Radio R.  Albinger 
8. Dalmo Victor Gorp.* R.L. Straley 
9 .  Eagle Pi tcher  Corp. Jeff Willson 
10. General Time Gorp.*< F r e d  Schultz 
11. Grumman Aircraf t  Corp. **< Hart  Wagoner 
12. Hamilton Standard Div. of UAC R.  Gredorie 
1 3 .  Honeywell Corp. J e r r y  Mullarky 
14. ITT Industrial  Prod. R. L. Weir 
15. Marquardt Corp. 96 
16. Motorola Corp 
J . B .  Gibbs 
Bill Crook 
17. Northrop -Ventura T .  Kanacke 
18. P r a t t  and Whitney Div. of UAC Jay Steadman 
19. Raytheon Mfg. Co. *< H . A .  Prindle 
20. RCA Corp (Camden and Burlington) J .  Heavey/S. Holt 
2 1 .  Radiation Inc. Wally Adams 
2 2 .  Simmonds Precis ion Prod .  zc W . E .  Nelson 
23. Westinghouse Corp. C . W. Chandler 
The study was based on data derived f rom the baseline study, a 
company-funded effort ,  documented under NASA Contract NAS2-4214, and 
f rom the mission systems design derived by the Lockheed Missi les  and 
Space Company (LMSC) under Contract NAS8-21006. 
*Data supplied for baseline study. 
-Work funded under NAS 9-6608 
- iv - 
SD 68-850-1  
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
CONTENTS 
Section Page 
ILLUSTRATIONS v i i  
TABLES . xi 
GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS . x v  
1 INTRODUCTION . 1 
1 .1  Background 1 
1 . 2  Purpose  and Objectives . 2 
1 . 3  Study Approach . 3 
1 . 4  Ground Rules and Assumptions . 5 
2 MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
2. 1 ELOR Mission Description . 
2 .2  Mission Timeline . 
2. 3 Mission System Functional Requirements 
2 .4  System Functional Duty Cycle Est imates  
2. 5 Quiescent Mode Operations . 
2 . 6  Mission Success/Crew Safety and Abort 
2. 7 System Function Downtime Constraints 
2. 8 Environmental Fac tors  . 
Cri te r ia  . 
9 
9 
2 4  
24 
42 
42 
47 
48 
5 9  
3 ELOR MISSION SYSTEM . 6 3  
3. 1 Design Approach . 6 3  
3. 2 Command Module Configuration . 6 3  
3. 3 Service Module Configuration . 72 
3.4 LM Ascent Stage . 72 
3.6 Lunar Shelter Interface . 76 3. 5 LM Descent Stage . 75 
4 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS , 85 
' 4. 1 Command Module Systems . 85 
4.2 Service Module Systems . 161 
4. 3 Lunar Module Ascent Stage Systems . 201 
4 .4  Lunar Module Descent Stage Systems . . 253 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . 277 
5. 1 ELOR Mission Capability . . 277 
5.2 Mission System Weight Inferences . . 286 
5.3, Maintenance and Repair (M&R) Requirements 
and Ramifications e . 286 
5.4 Development Requirements and Constraints . 289 
5.5 Conclusions 291 - 
REFERENCES 293 0 . I . . . 
- v -  
SD 68-850-1 

SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure  
1-1 
1-2 
1-3 
2-1 
2 - 2  
2 - 3  
2-4 
2 - 5  
2 -6  
2-7 
2-8 
2 -  9 
2-10 
2-11 
2- 12 
2-13 
2-14 
2-15 
3-1 
3 -2  
3-3 
Page  
Study Logic, ELOR 4 
Logic f o r  Availability Analysis . 6 
Identifying Crew-Sensitive Functions and Elements  . 7 
Apollo/ELOR Design Reference Mission Plan  . 1 0  
Functional Flow Logic, Top-Level Lunar Exploration 
Second-Level Functional Flow, 6 . 0  - P e r f o r m  Lunar 
Third-Level Functional Flow, 6 .8  - CSM Unattended 
Third-Level Functional Flow, 6. 10 - P e r f o r m  LM 
Third-  Level Functional Flow, 6.11 - Conduct Lunar 
Third-Level  Functional Flow, 6. 18 - Transfer  Crew 
Third-Level  Functional Flow, 6. 1 9  - CSM Departure 
Space Mission Maintenance Activities and Considerations ’ 25 
Second-Level Timeline,  CSM Lunar Area  Operations, 
Second-Level Timeline,  LEM Lunar Area  Operations, 
Effects of Dormancy Concept on the Probability of Safe 
Cabin Depressurization/Pressurization Rates,  
Carbon Dioxide Concentration a s  a Function of Removal 
Recommended ELOR Spacecraft Configuration as Modified 
Recommended ELOR Commaad Module Modifications 
Modification f o r  Alternate ELOR Apollo SM (Fuel Cell 
Missions 1 2  
A r e a  Operations , 13 
Operations . 15 
Storage Operations . 16 
Base Operations . 17 
to CSM . 19 
Prepara t ions  e 23 
Top-Level Timeline,  ELOR Mission . . 27 
ELOR Mission . 28 
ELOR Mission . t 29  
Return,  No Maintenance o r  Repair . , 46 
Apollo CSM . I 53 
Function Downtime . . 56 
f r o m  Apollo Block I1 (SD RTG Concept) . . 65 
(SD RTG Concept) . 67 
Concept ) 75 
- vii - 
SD 68-850-1  
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
Figure  
3-4 
3-5 
4- 1 
4- 2 
4-3 
4-4 
4-5 
4-6 
4-7 
4- 8 
4-9 
4-10 
4-11 
4-12 
4-13 
4-14 
4-15 
4-16 
4-17 
4-18 
4-19 
4-20 
4-21 
4-22 
4-23 
4- 24 
4-25 
4- 26 
4-27 
4-28 
G ener a1 Arrangement,  Three  -Man, Ninety- Day Lunar 
Inboard Profi le ,  Three-Man, Ninety-Day Lunar Module 
CSM Elec t r ica l  Power System Block Diagram, 
EPS Crew Safe-Return Logic . 
Apollo CSM Environmental Control System for  ELOR . 
Reliability Diagram for  Apollo ECS in Semiactive Status 
G&N AV Modes 
G&N Ear th  Ent ry  Mode . 
Proposed ELOR Stabilization System (ESS), Dormant 
Proposed ELOR Sun Sensor,  Location, and 
ELOR Quiescent-Phase Stability Control Reliability 
Modified ESS and Resulting Reliability Logic 
Baseline ELOR Communications and Data Subsystem . 
Baseline ELOR C&D Subsystem Reliability Logic Diagram 
Up-Data Link, Function Requirements . 
Reliability T r e e ,  Up-Data Link . 
Central  Timing Equipment, Functional Block Diagram 
Est imated CSM Power Requirements in Lunar Orbit 
(LMSC Est imates)  . 
Elec t r ica l  Power Plant System ( E P P )  Schematic With 
SM EPS Radiator Cooling . 
PC8B- 1 Cell Schematic 
Bootstrap Star t  Data  for PC8B-1 Power Plant 
Reaction Control System Schematic, Service Module 
Posit ive Expulsion Tank Assembly . 
Positive Expulsion Tankage, Functional Block Diagram 
Reaction Control Engine Reliability a s  a Function of 
Service Module Reaction Control Quad Reliability Logic 
Command / Service Module Propulsion System Schematic 
Reliability Logic Diagrams fo r  Engine Start and Steady- 
Reliability Logic Diagram f o r  Engine Shutdown Operations 
Reliability Logic,  Propellant Gaging Function 
Module . 
Functional Level . 
for Ninety-Day Unmanned ELOR . 
Mode Only , 
Charac ter i s t ics  . 
Logic . 
. 
(SM RCS) . 
Usage . 
State Operations . 
and Cost  Per iods  
Page 
77 
79 
87 
91 
94 
103 
106  
1 0 7  
118 
119 
121 
122 
133 
138 
144 
147 
149 
1 6 2  
164 
165 
169  
175 
176 
177 
179 
182 
184 
185 
186 
191 
- viii - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
Figure  
4-29 
4-30 
4-31 
4- 32 
4-33 
4-34 
4- 35 
4-36 
4- 37 
4-38 
4-39 
4-40 
4-41 
4-42 
4-43 
4-44 
4-45 
4-46 
4-47 
4-48 
5-  1 
5 -2 
5-3 
Page  
Antenna Subsystem (DSA), Reliability Logic f o r  Ful l -Time 
Operation . . 194 
ELOR Mission LM ECS Flow Diagram . . 205 
Revitalization Section , , 207 
RTG Heat Pipe . 210 
Vehicle The rma l  Prof i le ,  Storage Phase  . , 211 
Environmental Contr ol Subsystem, Atmosphere 
Reliab il it y Log ic  D ia g r am, LM - E C S , Heat - T r ans  p o r  t 
P r i m a r y  Guidance and Navigation Subsystem Block 
Apollo LM Communications Functional Diagram . . 227 
Proposed LM CSS Configuration and Interfaces fo r  ELOR 
Loop Modified f o r  ELOR . 214 
Diagram.  . 217 
Mission (Prel iminary)  . 231 
LM Vehicle Quiescent-Phase Checkout Configuration , . 235 
LM/CM Command/Data Link . . 238 
Typical Thermal  Shield Support A/S  Cabin , 248 
Three-Man, Ninety-Day LM Quiescent-Storage Power 
Profi le  for  One Lunation (28 Days), RTG/Battery 
Configuration * 257 
Three-Man, Ninety-Day LM Stored Energy Requirement 
Versus RTG Output Power . 258 
G ener  at o r ,  Heat -Receiver Configuration . . 262 
Proposed LM Quiescent-State Solar Ar ray  . . 264 
Candidate Descent Propulsion Tank Designs . . 269 
SNAP-27 Power Supply . 259 
Tank Feed  Line Modification . * 270 
Tank Helium Line Modification . * 271 
Assessing ELOR Mission Safety , * 272 
ELOR Mission Safe Return as Affected by Design 
Concept and Stay-Time . . 285 
ELOR Vehicle Development P r o g r a m  290 
- ix - 
SD 68-850-1 

SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
TABLES 
Table Page 
30 New Mission Functional Requirements 
CSM System Functional Requirements,  Ninty-Day 
LM System Functional Requirements Ninety-Day 
Lunar  Shelter Functions, CSM and LM for  ELOR 
CSM Function Duty Cycle Es t imates ,  Operating 
LM System Function Duty Cycle Es t imates ,  
Abort Cr i t e r i a ,  CSM Dormant in Lunar Orbit 
Orbit Cr i t e r i a ,  LM Stored on Lunar  Surface . 
Command Module Recommendations and Effects 
Summary , 
Service Module Recommendations and Effects 
Summary 
Lunar  Module Ascent Stage Recommendations and 
Effects Summary 
Lunar  Module Descent Stage Recommendations and 
Effects Summary 
En t ry  Elec t r ica l  Power Cri t ical  Components 
Analysis . 
Development Status of ECS Components Added to 
the LOR Configuration 
(Part I) CM G&N System Functional Profile for  
Boost, Trans i t ,  and Entry . 
(Part 11) CM G&N System Equipment Usage Times 
Based on ELOR Functional Requirements 
CM G&N System Fai lure  Rates 
CM G&N System Mission Probability of Success,  
CM G&N ELOR Mission Probabili ty of Success, 
CM G&N System Ps a s  a Function of Various 
Storage in Lunar Orbit 
Storage on Lunar Surface . 
Time in Hours 
Operating Time in  Hours , 
. 
Normal  Apollo Operational Concepts 
Modified Standby Operations 
Sparing Elements , 
2-1 
2 - 2  
32 
2-3 
33 
34 2 -4  
2 -5 
36 
2 -6  
43 
49 
49 
2 -7 
2 -8 
3-1 
69 
3 -2  
71 
3 -3 
3-4 
81 
82 
4-1 
90 
4-2 
104 
4-3 
1 0 9  
4-3 
110 
111 4-4  
4-5 
1 1 2  
4-6 
113 
4-7 
114 
- xi - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
Tables 
4- 8 
4- 9 
4-10 
4-11 
4 - 1 2  
4-13 
4-14 
4-15 
4- 16 
4-17 
4-18 
4-19 
4-20 
4-21 
4-22 
4-23 
4-24 
4-25 
4-26 
4-27 
4-28 
4 -29  
4-30 
4-31 
4-32 
4-33 
4-34 
4-35 
5-1  
CM G&N System Subassembly Reliability Breakdown, 
Operation Only, LM Components as Spares  for 
Return T r i p  , 
Improvement Steps . 
Summary of CM G&N System Reliability, 
ELOR Stabilization System Tradeoffs * 
Apollo Block I1 C&D Subsystem Equipments , 
ELOR C&D Subsystem Reliability Improvement 
C&D System Status 
Gross  Failure Modes and Effects ELOR-ELS . 
Results of Reliability Analysis . 
Fuel Cell Assembly Relative Unreliability 
Engine Reliability for Discrete  Duty Cycles 
Estimates of Component Reliability for  All 
Mete or  oid Shi elding Analy si s , 9 0 - Day 
LM Qui e s c ent - Pha s e Temper atur e - C ont r o l  
LM G&N System Equipment Usage Times Based 
LM G&N System Fai lure  Rates 
LM G&N ELOR Mission Probability of Success, 
LM G&N System Probability of Success, 
Summary of LM G&N System Reliability . 
Anal y s i s 
(Allis - Chalmer s Data) 
. 
Per iods  of SPS Engine Firing 
ELORCSM . 
Requirements . 
on ELOR Functional Requirements . 
. 
. 
Normal Apollo Operational Concepts . 
Breakdown With Spares . 
LM Communication Functions P e r  Mission Phase  . 
Quie scent - State Monitoring Points, Bit 
PCM Low Bit Rate 
LM CSS Component Criticality . 
Summary of ELOR Communications Pa Alternatives 
Electr ical  Energy Requirements, Descent Stage LM 
Three-Man, 90-Day Quiescent LM Requirements 
Alternate RTG LM E P S  Weight Est imates  
Weight Estimates for the Fuel-Cell System . 
Alternative LM QEPS Tradeoff Data . 
Command Module Requirements for  Crew Safe 
Requirements,  LM Vehicle 
for Electrical Power (LM QEPS) . 
Re turn Assurance 
- xii - 
SD 68-850-1 
. 
Page 
114 
115 
123 
137 
139 
141 
155 
156 
171 
180 
187 
197 
208 
219 
221 
221 
222 
223 
226 
233 
236 
243 
244 
254 
255 
256 
265 
266 
27 9 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
Tables Page 
5-2 
5 - 3  
5 - 4  
Return Assurance . 285 
5-5 ELOR Concepts Weight Comparison . 287 
Service Module Recommendations for Crew Safe 
LM Ascent Stage Requirements for Crew Safe 
LM Descent Stage Requirements for  Crew Safe 
Return Assurance . 280 
Return Assurance . 283 
- xiii - 
SD 68-850-1  

SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
LIST O F  ABBREVIATIONS 
This foldout presents  the abbreviations and 
symbols that a r e  general  in character  and used 
throughout the report .  
Those abbreviations and symbols that re la te  to 
specific subsystems a r e  covered by foldouts a t  the end 
of the sections on major  spacecraf t  modules. 
- xv - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACF, DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
NASA 
OART 
NR 
SD 
LMSC 
ELOR 
DRM-.2A 
KSC 
MTC 
M&R 
GSE 
EVA 
MSFN 
sc 
FMEA 
MTBF 
MCBF 
MTTR 
ISM 
p90 
PS 
Pa 
RTG 
R 
AES 
AAP 
CSM 
CM 
GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Office of Advanced Resea rch  and Technology 
North American Rockwell Corporation 
Space Division of NR 
Lockheed Missi les  and Space Co. 
Extended Lunar  Orbital  Rendezvous (Mission) 
Design Reference Mission of Apollo. 
Kennedy Space Center 
Maintenance Time Constraint  
Maintenance and Repair 
Ground Support Equipment 
Ext  r ave hi cula r Ac ti vi t ie s 
Manned Space Flight Network 
Spacecraft  
Fa i lure  Mode Effects Analysis 
Mean Time Before Fa i lure  
Mean Cycles Between Fa i lures  
Mean Time to Repair 
In-Space Maintenance ,, 
Probabili ty of 90-Day Stay and Safe Return. 
Probabili ty of Safe Crew Return. 
Probabili ty of an Abort Occurring. 
Radioisotope Thermoelectr ic  Generator 
Reliability 
Apollo Extension System 
Apollo Applications P rogram 
Command Service Module as Integrated Unit 
Command Module 
Used to  refer to this study. 
number of a .particular DRM. 
2A is the 
Systems of CM 
E PS Elec t r ica l  Power System 
- xvi - 
SD 68-850-1 
ECS Environmental Control System 
G&N Guidance and Navigation System 
scs Stability Control System 
C&D Communications and Data System 
RCS Reaction Control System 
UDL Up-Data Link 
CTE Central  Timing System 
ELS Earth Landing Sys tem 
SM Service Module 
Systems of SM 
EPP Electrical Power Plant 
RCS Reaction Control System 
SPS Service Module Propulsion System 
ADSA Apollo Deep-Space Antenna 
cs Cryogenic Storage System 
CSMS Command and Service Module Structure 
LM Lunar Module 
LM-AS Lunar Module Ascent Stage 
Systems of LM-AS 
AE P 
ECS 
G&N Guidance and Navigation 
scs Stability Control System 
RCS Reaction Control System 
cs 
APS Ascent Propulsion System 
LM-DS Lunar Module Descent Stage 
Systems of LM-DS 
Ascent Stage Electrical Power 
Environmental Contr ol Sys tem 
Communications and Status Sys t em 
QE P Quiescent Electrical Power 
DPS Descent Propulsion System 
DSS Descent Stage Structure 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1 . 1  BACKGROUND 
The extended space mission has  been the subject of many studies, some 
All 
With 
Unlike Apollo, many of the sys tem functions 
with the moon a s  an objective but most  involving planetary exploration. 
had one thing in common: they were to be attempted well in the future.  
the Apollo project nearing fruition, however, the t ime has come to make 
plans for  the next ma jo r  effort, 
required for an extended mission a r e  developed to the point where they will 
satisfy existing requirements .  
logical use of available hardware is an  important s tep  in the next space mis- 
sion milestone. 
In an environment where economy is essent ia l ,  
The key question is then "What can we do with what we have?"  This 
study is aimed a t  identifying the capabilities of existing space hardware a s  
applied to a specific extended-duration mis sion. 
a r e  constrained by two basic  factors :  
Extended-mission durations 
1. The ability to provide required consumables in a habitable 
environment 
2. The increasing probability of a cr i t ical  malfunction 
The l a t e r  fac tor  has  turned out to be the dominant one for the n e a r - t e r m  
missions,  par t icular ly  where efficient utilization of available technology is  
desired,  Therefore ,  means of minimizing the malfunction hazard for a 
specific mission were  given special  consideration in this study, 
Some of the activitiies which led to this study a re :  
Availability concept development -NAS9- 3499 ( 1964-65) 
I Apollo Extension System Studies-NAS9-5017 NR SD and NAS9-4983, 
Grumman (1965-66) 
Availability applied to mission systems-SD Funded (1966-67) 
- 1 -  
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Availability applied to extended-life subsystems-Subcontractor 
Funded (1966-1967) 
Documentation of SD and subcontractor studies -NAS2-4214 
(1 966 - 1967) 
Baseline Mission Study 
Lockheed definition of the ELOR m i s  sion-NAS8 - 2 1006 
In pursuance of a planetary mission study under NAS9-3499, the avail-  
ability concept was developed by SD for  application to extended manned 
missions.  
could be identified during the planning stages and dealt with in the sys t em 
design s o  that the haza rd  level could be reduced to any desired level. 
It provided a mechanism through which the potential malfunction 
The "availability concept" is a technique that facilitates the determination 
of an optimum sys tem and mission design. This is achieved through estab-  
l ishment of a safe and reasonable balance among sys tem and mission perform- 
ance, reliability, maintenance, operability, and controlled utilization. The 
resu l t  is  a mission sys tem with an exceptionally high probability that its 
functions will be available when and where required.  
t ical  technique is presented in F igure  1-2  of Volume I. 
The logic of this analy- 
The extended lunar orbital  rendezvous (ELOR) mission seems to present  
an economical candidate when compared with the more  ambitious lunar o r  
planetary missions.  
studied an improved lunar cargo and personnel delivery sys tem (NAS8-21006) 
which resul ted in the definition of the ELOR mission.  It provides for a three-  
m a n  crew on the lunar surface for up to 90 days. The crew is to  be housed 
in a d i rec t  lander shel ter  and the CSM and LM a r e  to be dormant with a 
minimum of functions operating. The hardware requirements  a r e  based on  
maximum use of existing systems and minimum development cost. 
The Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) 
A s  in the contract  NAS2-4942 effort, SD studies indicate that the ELOR 
miss ion  as a personnel c a r r i e r ,  together with one of severa l  logistic miss ions ,  
provide a n  a t t ract ive combination for extended lunar explorations using a 
minimum of new hardware.  
c a r r i e r .  
The subject of this study is  the ELOR personnel 
1 . 2  PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
This study was conducted to establish the feasibility of the ELOR concept 
a s  a .personnel del ivery sys tem for  post- 1975 lunar exploration programs.  
- 2 -  
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It is to define the sys tem hardware used f rom the Apollo program, identify 
new development requirements ,  define the recommended operational concept, 
and identify the associated support  requirements.  Uninhibited use of main-  
tenance and r epa i r  technology is considered where i t  is considered both 
desirable  and feasible within the constraints established by  the bas ic  design. 
Modifications were to  be held to an  absolute minimum. 
Specifically, the objectives included - 
1. Testing the feasibility of extended duration manned space miss ions  
through application of the availability concept to mis s ion / sys t em 
de s igns . 
ELOR miss ion  capability using contemporary hardwar e (Apollo 
command, se rv ice ,  and lunar modules). 
Development of a quantitative assessment  of the following fac tors  
as they affect achievement of a probability of safe r e tu rn  of 0 .99 :  
2, 
. -  -_ - ._ - ._ . 
3 .  
a. 
b. 
C .  
d. 
e .  
f .  
Space miss ion  extension capability as a function of the opera-  
tional concept and through the application of maintenance and 
repa i r .  
The quantity of maintenance and repa i r  actions to  be expected 
and prepared  for .  
The type of maintenance and r epa i r  actions required of the 
c r e w  as they affect extravehicular activit ies.  
The weight penalty imposed on the mission sys tem by the 
necessity of having to  per form maintenance actions o r  by 
added redundancy. 
The optimum operational concept as it affects c rew safe re turn.  
The effects of potential design improvements.  
4. Determination of the ramifications of the recommended concept 
into the development program.  
1 .3  STUDY APPROACH 
The study was conducted as indicated by the study logic of Figure 1 - 1. 
A sys t ems  engineering approach was selected,  even though subsystem requi re  - 
ments  were  defined by the LMSC effort. A detailed independent analysis was 
- 3 -  
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I 
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I 
I 
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I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
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accomplished through the functional flow process .  A s  a resu l t ,  functional 
requirements  were  derived by miss ion  phase f r o m  which duty cycles,  down- 
time, and operational constraints were  defined. The Apollo design re ference  
miss ion  (DRM-2A) provided much of the required data.  
These data, together with the data f rom the fo rmer  SD study (NAS2- 
4214), permit ted a complete definition of the mission requirements  and con-  
s t ra in ts ;  however, only the lunar  area operations were  s t r e s sed ,  since all 
other Phases  a r e  the same a s  the Apollo mission. 
The subcontractors  previously l is ted were  given these data and 
requested to  - 
1. 
2.  
Define the subsystem design details .  
Conduct the availability analysis as defined by the logic in 
F igure  1 - 2 .  
t rea ted  as i l lustrated i n  Figure 1-3. 
The crew-sensit ive functions a r e  identified and 
Upon completion of the subcontractor analysis and that conducted by SD, 
the subsystem data were  compiled and r eas ses sed  in  terms of the effects on 
the overall  mission. 
requir  erne nt s defined. 
A final concept was recommended and the support 
1 .4  GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The study was based on the LMSC study "LOR Personnel Delivery, 
3 Men up to 90 days, Operational 1975" mission as conducted under NAS8- 
21006 and reported in June 1968 prel iminary report .  
Da ta  generated under NAS2-4214 (Reference 1-1) was used to 
In addition, much of the systems data therein 
establish c rewmen capability, sys tems logic, maintenance technology, and 
potential a l ternate  solutions. 
is direct ly  applicable to the support requirements  definition. 
The following assumptions were  applied: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
The miss ion  actually provided 90 days in the lunar a r e a  (a wors t  
ca se  condition for  operating systems) .  
The Apollo profile (DRM-2A) was applicable to a l l  mission phases 
except those in the lunar  a rea .  
A lunar  shel ter  was already successfully landed reasonably near  
the LM si te  (within 1000-foot radius).  
Abort m a y  be required at any t ime and i s  only constrained by  the 
rendezvous window or the t ransear th  injection window. 
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TYPIC 
5. Design goals mus t  equal o r  exceed Apollo c r i te r ia .  
6. Maintenance and r epa i r  were permitted where an  identified 
requirement  existed. 
7 .  Existing hardware m u s t  be used to satisfy new functions required 
where possible. 
8. The CSM was parked in a lunar orbit  and rotates  around the ro l l  
axis which is  maintained perpendicular to the suns rays.  
9.  The LM and shel ter  could be anywhere on the lunar surface.  
10. The recommended LMSC designs (NAS8-21006) could be changed 
o r  replaced where safety assurance could be improved. 
11. The Apollo hardware was considered qualified for  the DRM-2A. 
ALTERNATE 
OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL 
EQUIPMENT IDEN IFY h 
PERFORM WEAK LINK MISSION 
FOR MISSION 
CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
TIME LINES (REITERATE AS NECESSARY) N O  
PLOT 
EQUIPMENT USE 
I 
OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS 
PRELIMINARY 
(Hz 0. 02. FOOD) 
CONSIRAINTS 
ADD 
IMPR0VT SYSTEM REDUNDANCY 
DESIGN (FIRST ITERATION 
ONLY) 
PERFORM 
REDUNDANCY 
IRADEOFFS 
DESIGN IMFUOVEMENT 4 
SPARES, OTHER 
MATERIAL NEEDS 
Figure  1 -2. Logic f o r  Availability Analysis 
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2. MISSION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
2. 1 ELOR MISSION DESCRIPTION 
The ELOR miss ion  wil l  be conducted in much the same  manner  as the 
usual  Apollo LOR mission in a l l  phases except those in the lunar area.  
lunar orbit  injection to t r ansea r th  injection, the missions profile will  be- 
somewhat different, 
sented in Figure 2-1. The Apollo design reference mission, DRM-2A 
(Reference 2-1) was  used as the baseline, 
F r o m  
A car ica ture  of the proposed mission profile i s  p re -  
2. 1. 1 The Design Reference Mission 
The miss ion  begins with the rollout of the Saturn V space vehicle f rom 
the KSC Vert ical  Assembly Building approximately 20 days pr ior  to liftoff. 
Like the Apollo lunar mission,  DRM-2A, a parking orbit  of approximately 
100 nautical mi l e s  i s  f irst  established. Translunar  injection establishes 
a f ree- re turn  circumlunar  t ra jectory,  After as many as three  midcourse 
correct ions and approximately 61 -1 /2  hours la te r ,  the lunar orbit  inser t ion 
resul ts  in a polar orbit  of approximately 80  nautical  miles above the lunar 
surf ac e. 
After approximately 3- 1 / 2  orbi ts  of about 2 hours each, the LM with 
the three  astronauts  aboard separa tes  f r o m  the CSM and initiates t ransfer  
orbit  insertion approximately 23 minutes la ter .  After coasting to per i -  
cynthion the powered descent is initiated at  approximately l -3 /4  minutes 
p r io r  to touchdown on the lunar surface. The outbound leg is completed 
a f t e r  a total  of t h ree  days. 
The LM remains  on the lunar surface for  the ent i re  t ime the c rew is  
During the Apollo Mission, one man  remains with the LM. on the surface,  
During the ELOR Mission, it i s  immediately placed in a quiescent mode. 
Following the liftoff and powered ascent  burn  of the LM ascent engine, 
three t ransfer  maneuvers  and two midcourse correct ions,  all using LM-RCS, 
a r e  used to bring the LM to the terminal  rendezvous maneuver,  which begins 
about 2-1/4 hours  a f te r  lunar  liftoff. Manual takeover for LM docking begins 
approximately 25 minutes l a t e r ,  and final LM-CSM contact occurs,  The 
docking maneuver is  completed within a single orbi t  if the launch and rendez- 
vous windows coincide, otherwise some phasing may  be required. During 
the next orbit ,  the LM is jettisoned, and t r ansea r th  injection is  accomplished 
during the subsequent orbit. 
- 9 -  
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The t r ansea r th  coast  phase has a duration of approximately 88 hours. 
During this phase,  up to three midcourse correct ions may  be accomplished. 
Entry occurs  when the command module attains an altitude of approximately 
400,000 feet above the ear th ' s  surface.  
12 minutes la te r  and splashdown occurs  about 15 minutes la ter .  
pickup of the command module takes place one hour la ter ,  thus completing 
the lunar landing mission. 
The drogue parachutes a r e  deployed 
A nominal 
2. 1. 2 ELOR Mission Pecul iar i t ies  
The a r e a  of par t icu larconcern  in this study i s  the lunar a r e a  operation, 
Function 6. 0 of Figure 2-2. These operations a r e  expanded to the second and 
third levels i n  Figures  2-3  through 2-7. 
ca l l  f o r  placing the CSM in a quiescent mode (Function 6. 2, Figure 2-4 )  in an 
80-nautical-mile lunar polar orbit  and all  th ree  crewmen descending to the 
lunar surface in a modified LM in the same manner as  for Apollo. 
ELOR operations in the lunar a r e a  
Prior to leaving the CSM, the crew will  don their  spacesuits and se t  
up the CSM for the quiescent mode. 
to have a minimum of system functions operating. 
simulate the shelf or storage conditions the subsystems were  designed for,  
p r ior  to installation in the spacecraft .  Under these conditions, available 
reliability data will  provide an accurate  measu re  of the dormant-time effects. 
These conditions ca l l  f o r  the spacecraf t  
The situation is to 
The CSM conditions recommended include the following: 
1. Internal temperature  limited to between t40" and $100" F. 
2. Internal p r e s s u r e  limited to about 0,  5 psia. 
3. Even external  heating/cooling. 
4. No extreme uncontrolled motion. 
To satisfy the las t  condition, it i s  recommended that the CSM be placed 
in a slow spin mode around the ro l l  axis (axis of symmetry),  which should be 
perpendicular to the sun's rays  to a s su re  even heating of a l l  exposed surfaces.  
Upon arr iving on the surface,  the crew wil l  place the LM in i ts  dormant 
s ta te ,  not to be reoccupied until departure,  except in an emergency, 
activities a r e  described by Function 6.10 and depicted in Figure 2-5. 
These 
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The LM stored s ta te  is in some respects  less  severe on the systems 
than that of the CSM, because no stability control is required in the LM; 
however, the extreme contrast  between the lunar-day heat and the lunar- 
night cold could present  other problems. The LM storage cal ls  fo r  - 
1. Internal temperature  limited to between t 4 0  and $100 F. 
2. Internal p r e s s u r e  limited to about 0. 5 psia. 
3. Prevention of fuel  freezing. 
Upon leaving the LM, the crew wi l l  make provisions f o r  monitoring 
i ts  s ta tus ,  thenmove to, and activate, the lunar shel ter ,  
The lunar shel ter  i s  planned to be sent ahead by direct  lander. The 
Abort requirements associated with the 
stay-time on the surface i s  to be up to 90 days, shortened only if some 
unforeseen event requi res  abort. 
lunar shel ter  malfunctions o r  the exploration program a r e  considered 
beyond the scope of this study; however, the supporting functions a r e  
presented in Figure 2-6. 
One additional requirement pertains to abort  capability: The LM will 
be ready to abort as  required,  limited only by the constraints imposed by 
the CSM/ LM rendezvous window and any maintenance action considered to 
be a necessary pa r t  of the mission concept. Fo rmer  studies indicate the 
actual l imit  w i l l  be imposed by the rendezvous window f o r  any nonequatorial 
landing site. Use of a lunar polar orbit i s  recommended, since any point 
on the surface can be reached by a Saturn V mission; however, the rendezvous 
windows may be a s  smal l  a s  1. 5 hours in length and limited to two in any 
30-day period. 
The stay-time on the lunar surface i s  to continue to 90 days if no 
situation occurs that cannot be circumvented by crew action and/or ear th-  
based command. To facil i tate notification of impending emergency, a status 
monitor and a la rm system is required for both the orbiting CSM and the 
s tored LM. 
the quiescent conditions, and control system. 
environmental conditions have exceeded their  respective boundary values 
and/or  when those functioning elements a r e  degrading to the point where 
fai lure  seems imminent. 
These functions need only evaluate a few operating functions, 
They must  indicate when the 
Studies and tes t s  have shown (Reference 2-2) that it i s  safer  and that 
In s0m.e cases ,  this operational concept depends on mainte- 
it leads to  a m o r e  reliable mission when the systems a r e  left off until they 
a r e  required,  
nance and repa i r  (M&R) actions to reestabl ish normal  operations after the 
extended downtime in t ime to meet the mission commitment. Given that 
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t ime is allowed for  M&R activity pr ior  to LM launch and/or  CSM t r ansea r th  
injection, this operational concept should introduce no deleterious effects 
on mission success  or crew safety. The CSM and LM status will  be a s ses sed  
periodically, at  l eas t  once a day; and if malfunctions occur during the lunar 
s tay t ime on ei ther  the CSM o r  LM, every attempt will  be made to  offset the 
effect of the failure by use of the command link to the CSM or  M&R action on 
the LM. 
anticipated that no abort will  be attempted; in fact, M&R may be a s a f e r  
alternative,  par t icular ly  for the LM. 
Where these actions can  sat isfy the abort  o r  safety c r i t e r i a ,  i t  is 
At the end of the 90-day stay-period, or sooner if abort  is required,  
the 3-man exploration par ty  will shut down the lunar shel ter  operations and 
re turn  to the LM, conducting the functions as indicated in Figure 2-3. The 
first operation will  involve activation and checkout of the LM; any cr i t ica l  
malfunctions a r e  to  be corrected (where possible) pr ior  to launch. Provis -  
ions for  the required spa res  must  be made in the LM or in conjunction with 
lunar shelter.  These provisions a r e  identified in Section V of this report .  
The remainder  of the LM mission to the point of rendezvous is expected 
to p rogres s  a s  normally planned for Apollo except for  a potential wait in a 
lunar phasing orbit  to permit  compensation f o r  g ross  differences in the CSM/ 
LM orbi ta l  parameters .  
tion 6. 16), however, there  may be considerable difference in the required 
activities. 
and the ability of the LM crew o r  MSFN to control i t  via the command link, 
The alternatives a r e  presented in Figure 2-7. 
After the LM rendezvous with the CSM (Func- 
The subsequent events depend on the kinematic s ta te  of the CSM 
If the CSM is stabilized as planned, a normal  docking operation will 
be accomplished; however, if it  remains in the spin mode o r  is in uncon- 
trolled motion, other alternatives as indicated must  be attempted. Fa i lure  
to gain access  to the CSM would requi re  rescue  from ear th  and the available 
t ime would greatly limit this alternative, Indications a r e  that the CSM would 
not be undergoing any severe  motion. Under the expected conditions, either 
the LM could synchronize with the CSM, or the E V A  crewman could probably 
gain access  and/or  a r r e s t  any motion to permit  completion of the docking 
operation. 
Once the c rew has t ransfer red  to the CSM, a l l  the fuel cel ls  will  be 
s tar ted up and other CSM functions subsequently activated and checked out 
as indicated in F igure  2-8. 
could be considered; however, for the purposes of this study M&R is con- 
s idered the most  logical alternative where possible. 
involved are presented in Figure 2-9 and will  be discussed in detail  under 
a subs e quent section. 
In the event of any malfunctions, four alternatives 
The considerations 
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Once the CSM has been checked out and/or  res tored  to  normal  
operating conditions, the LM can be jettisoned. 
will be accomplished as in the DRM when the injection window i s  properly 
aligned, 
Transear th  injection (6. 21) 
The mission subsequently will  be completed as in the DRM. 
2. 2 MISSION TIME LINE 
The mission has been described in the pr ior  section; the significant 
events a r e  very  much like those for Apollo except in the lunar a rea .  
timing provides the data necessary  to identify specific functional require-  
ments and the associated duty cycle, 
Event 
Figure 2- 10 provides the top-level mission timeline, while Figures  
2-11 and 2-12 present  the second- and third-level of activities for  the CSM 
and LM, respectively,  within the lunar a r e a  operations. The phase duration 
for  operations within the lunar a r e a  a r e  based on their  maximum expected 
value, since such factors  as  descent, launch, and rendezvous windows can 
vary  from hours to days depending on the selected site. In any case,  it was 
assumed that the maximum time to be spent in the lunar a rea ,  Function 6 . 0 ,  
would not exceed 90 days. 
2.3 MISSION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
NOTE: It was assumed that the mission functional require- 
ments f o r  all  phases,  exclusive of lunar a r e a  operations, 
6 .  0, have been satisfied by the existing Apollo systems 
and w i l l  remain  substantially unchanged. 
A s  previously indicated, the systems engineering approach to definition 
of systems requirements  has been applied to this study. It facilitates a 
logical approach to the definition of systems requirements.  
this analysis a r e  tabulated by mission phase in Table 2-1 ,  along with an 
assessment  of the potential source of the hardware that may satisfy these 
requirements.  Again, only the new phases were  assessed.  These 
functional requirements a r e  then grouped by conventional system designation 
and vehicle in Tables 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4. 
2 . 3 . 1  The CSM Functional Requirements 
The resul ts  of 
For the most  par t ,  the following functions a r e  additions, modifications, 
o r  reapplications of the functions already existing within the CSM subsystems. 
(Numbers in parenthesis re fer  to Table 2-2. ) 
(1) The stability control function will provide limited control of the 
CSM during the quiescent mode. Constraints a r e  established by such factors  
as  external  temperature  and resulting uneven heating, l imits on uncontrolled 
motion, the need to communicate with the ear th  and lunar party,  and LM 
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Table 2-1. New Mission Functional Requirements (Sheet 1 of 2 )  
Mission Phase  
6.6 Initiate CSM storage functions 
I 6. 7 LM descent operations 
6. 8 CSM unattended operations 
I 
6. 9 LM landing operations 
6. 10 P r e p a r e  LM for s torage  and 
LM storage ops. 
6.  11 Lunar base operations (CSM 
and LM support only) 
Functional Requirement 
1. Monitor CSM system status  
2. Exercise  CSM remote controls 
3.  Observe CSM response 
4. Set CSM for s torage mode 
5. All other functions - normal  
6. Third-man support 
1. Relay CSM status  to LM 
2. Respond to  LM commands 
3. Provide s torage control 
1. Monitor CSM status 
2. All other functions - normal  
3 .  Third-man support 
1. Course stability control 
2. Internal temperature  limiting 
3 .  External temperature  limiting 
4. Status assessment  
5 .  Status re lay t5 LM ~ ~ ~ 
6. Status re lay to Ear th  
7. Internal p r e s s u r e  limiting 
8. Malfunction a l a r m  
9. Redundancy control 
10. Increased environment protection 
11. Minimum electr ical  power 
12. Remote E. P. control ( s t a r t  op. ) 
1. Third man support 
2 .  Increased landing A V  
3. All other functions 
1. 
2.  
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
- 6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7.  
8. 
9. 
Internal p r e s s u r e  limiting 
Internal temp e r a tur  e limiting 
Status a s s e s  sment 
Status relay to lunar base  
Malfunction a la rm 
Redundant critical functions 
Electr ical  power (descent) 
External temp. limiting (calibratioi 
Maintenance and repair  provisions 
Lunaa base  shel ter  
CSM comm. link 
CSM status display 
LM link* 
LM status  display” 
CSM command link 
Critical events a l a r m  
Maintenance and repair  support 
for LM 
Earth communications link 
6. 12 Terminate  lunar base  
operations 
1. CSM status display 
2 .  CSM command link 
3.  Earth communications link 
Pot  enti a1 
Function Source 
New 
New 
New 
LM 
New 
LM/CSM 
Apollo/new 
Apollo/new 
Apollo lnew 
New 
LM 
New 
Apollo/new 
Apollo 
Apollo 
Apollo/new 
Apollo /new 
Apollo/new 
Apollo 
New 
Apollo /new 
Apollolnew 
Ap 0110 
Apollo /new 
New 
LM/new 
LM 
LM 
LM 
LM Existine 
LM Modified 
or  
New 
Xew 
Kot a part oi 
this s t u d y  
Not a par t  of 
this s t u d y  
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Functional Requirement 
1. P r o p e r  tempera ture  res torat ion 
2. CSM status  display 
3.  CSM locat ion/ t ra jectory 
4. Normal  LM functions 
1. CSM position/timing 
2. Normal  LM functions 
3. Third m a n  support 
1. CSM positionftiming 
2. Normal  LM functions 
3 .  Third man support 
4. Increased AV capability 
Table 2-1. New Mission Functional Requirements (Sheet 2 of 2) 
Pot  entia 
Function So 
New/LM 
New/LM 
LM 
LM 
LM/new 
LM 
LM/new 
New 
New 
Mod, LM 
Mission Phase  
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
6. 13 P r e p a r e  LM for  departure  
New 
New 
LM 
New 
New 
New 
Apollo/new 
Apollo 
Apollo/new 
New 
New 
I 
6. 14 LM launch operations 
1. 
2. Minimum electr ical  power 
3 .  EVA support sys tems 
4. EVA manuevering unit 
6. 
1. Normal CSM functions 
2. Maintenance and repair  capability 
3. CSM/LM interchangeability 
4. Wait-in-orbit capability 
5. Updatelregenerate  computer 
Close stability hold (remote control) 
5. Normal Apollo/LM functions 
CSM provisions for EVA transfer  
memory  
6. 15 LM ascent  operations 
Ap oll o 1 new 
Apollo 
Apollo 
New 
Apollo /new 
Apollo 
New 
Apollo/LM/ 
New 
Ap 011 o /new 
A ~ O L ~ ~ / L M  
I 
6. 16 Rendezvous operations (LM) 
None required 
No change from Apollo 
6. 17 P r e p a r e  CSM for docking 
Apollo I1 
6. 18 Crew t ransfer  operations 
6. 19 CSM departure  preparations 
6.20 Deactivate the LM 
6. 21  Transear th  injection 
1. 
2. 
3. 
CSM command link 
CSM status  display 
Normal LM functions 
LM/CSM command link 
Remote stability control change 
Remote position/velocity control* 
Internal temperature  limiting 
Minimum electr ical  power 
Internal p r e s s u r e  limiting 
Malfunction a l a r m  
Redundancy control (remote) 
I 
*These may be handled a s  a p a r t  of the LM and Visual Inspections 
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Table  2 -2. CSM System Functional Requirements ,  
Ninety-Day Storage in Lunar Orbit 
System IFunction 
1.  Stability control 
2. Internal tempera ture  control 
3. External temp. control (heat-  
shield and RCS) 
4. Pressur iza t ion  of cabin 
5. Status a s s e s s m e n t  
6. Remote control capability 
7. Lunar  orbit  to sur face  link 
8. Elec t r ica l  power supply 
9. Maintenance and repa i r  support  
I O .  Special facil i t ies [EVA support)  
I I .  Up-data reception 
12. Increased  environment 
protection 
Requirements and Constraints 
~ ~~~ ~ .~ 
1)  Limi t  spacecraf t  instabil i ty to  the  safe  l imi t s  for  the anboard equipment 
2)  Provide  required stabil i ty for  docking operation. 
.3) P e r m i t  u s e  oi orbi t  to  sucCace and Ear th  comm. links. 
4) Control orientation with r e s p e c t  to  sun f o r  temp. cont. 
: I )  L i m i t  temp. excursions on cabin wal l  to between t100"F to  t40'F wall tempe. - = a h r e  
' 2 )  Assure  water-glycol temp. is within sage l imi t s ;  i. e . ,  does not freeze.  
'3) Assure  protection of s tab le  platform (IMU), which is considered tempera ture  sensit ive,  even when I /  
: I )  Assure  even barbequing of heat shield to avoid unwarranted s t r e s s  and ready access  through hatch. 
:2) Assure  RCS engines and fuel l ines do not freeze.  
Maintain minimum requi red  a tmospher ic  p r e s s u r e  to prevent decomposition of spacecraf t  m a t e r i a l s  t h l - t ~ u ~ l  
outgassing and sublimation, about 0 . 5  psia. 
_____ ~~ 
~ ~ - 
: I )  Assess  cabin pressure .  
l2) Assess  tempera ture  i n  c r i t i ca l  areas and sys tems.  
[ 3 )  Assess  S/C kinematics.  
(4) Assess  hea t  shield tempera ture  in c r i t i ca l  areas. 
(5) A s s e s s  power plant status.  
16) Assess  fuel reserves, RCS, 0 2 ,  H2, et. al. 
17) Provide for  c r i t i ca l  function Cailure alarm. 
(1) Switch between redundant sys tems and functions thereof where cr i t ica l .  
( 2 )  Provide att i tude and stabil i ty control for the docking function. 
(3)  Provide emergency control of orb i ta l  position and plane. 
(4) Initiate a predet.  checkout or diagnostic routine on command. 
[ I )  Relay a l a r m s  to  craw i n  t i m e  to facil i tate abort. 
12) Relay s ta tus  of sys tems cr i t ica l  to safety to e a r t h  and to  sur face  crew. 
c, 
~ 
. 
Provide e lec t r ica l  power for operating sys tems during storage.  1. 3 to 2 . 5  (LMSC data). 
Be capable of remote  s t a r t  up to  fu l l  power f o r  rendezvous or i n  c a s e  of an impending failure ai an 
operating unit during the s torage  cycle. 
Indicate when Iailure is imminent or probable. 
Minimum 2000 hours life. 
Diagnostic routines to  i so la te  fa i lures  i n  c r i t i ca l  sys tem [unctions. 
Spares  complement to  support  r e p a i r  of identified failures.  
Tools. 
EVA support  system. 
Ability to  u s e  LM sys tem components. 
E a s y  access  to  CM in ter ior  by one EVA crew m e m b e r ,  unassisted.  
Ready a c c e s s  to  0 2  supply v ia  a n  umbilical  a t  point of ingress.  
Handholds on spacecraf t  ex te r ior .  
~ 
( I )  
(2) 
Update a n d l o r  regenera te  guidance computer memory. 
Provide link for remote  control (command link) 
(a) from ear th ,  
(b) from LM, 
(c) f rom lunar she l te r  
(3) Provide timing data f rom earth.  
[ 1) Meteoroid hazard.  
(2) Radiation hazard.  
NOTE: All o thers  s a m e  a s  Apollo. 
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Table 2-3. LM System Functional Requirements, Ninety-Day 
Storage on Lunar Surface 
System /Function 
1. Remote control of CSM 
2. Crew t ransfer  a i d s  
3 .  CSM status monitor 
4. Command link 
5. Provisions for third man 
6. Electr ical  power 
7. Internal temperature  control 
~~~ ~ ~~~~~~ 
8. Internal p r e s s u r e  control 
9 .  External  temperature  control 
~ ~~~ 
10. Maintenance and repa i r  support 
11. CSM tracking/ locator  
12. Data link 
Requirements and Constraints 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3 )  
Provide ability to  control the CSM position in  active 
rendesvous from LM. 
Provide control of storage control systems.  
Provide ability to  remotely control stability for  CSM passive 
r endeavous. 
(1) 
( 2 )  Provide te ther ,  reel ,  and disconnect a t  LM. 
( 3 )  
(4) 
Provide EVA umbilical for  preparatory activity, 
Provide personnel l i fe  support system to handle the EVA 
phase for about 1 hour at a higher work level. 
Provide EVA manuevering unit or a method of capturing the 
uncontrolled CSM. 
Provide minimum monitoring of CSM status for  safety of 
crew for rendezvous operations, ascent ,  and descent. 
Provide a l a r m  as required. 
Provide link to relay remote control commands to CSM 
during LM descent o r  ascent. 
(1)  Seating arrangement .  
(2)  Structural support. 
( 3 )  Fuel and consumables. 
(4) ECLS functions. 
Continuous electr ical  power a t  100 to 200 watts level. 
~~~ 
( 1 )  
( 2 )  
Limit excursions to between +40 to 100 F. 
Assume grea te r  protection of temperature-sensiLivc 
equipment. 
Limit pressure  loss to  not less  t h a n  0. 5 psia. 
( 1 )  Limit aft equipment rack temp. to between t 4 0  and -1 Inn I . 
(2)  Prevent RCS engine freezeup, or  provide lor tha\\-inc. 
( 3 )  Prevent fuel tank freezeup, or  provide for thawiny. 
(1)  Spares required. 
( 2 )  Diagnostic routine. 
( 3 )  Tools, 
( 4) 
(5) Ready access  to failures. 
CSM/ LM component in te r  c hang eabilit y . 
Knowledge of Apollo position without use u f  :\pollo systcnis 
(only ear th  data). 
(1)  Memory restoration data f rom earth. 
( 2 )  Timing data. from earth. 
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Table 2-4. Lunar Shelter Functions, CSM and LM for  ELOR 
2. Alarm sys tems 
3 .  Remote control  
of CSM 
I System/Function 1 Requirements and Constraints 
(2) Provide an  a l a rm system when the abort  
c r i t e r i a  have been compromised, 
Provide a method of notifying all lunar 
par ty  personnel of impending emergency/ 
abort  requirements created by CSM o r  LM 
failures.  
(1) Provide remote control of CSM redundant 
functions for those c r i t i ca l  to CSM 
integrity and crew safe return. 
(2) Provide ability to start up systems 
required for rendezvous. 
(3) Provide startup control of the electr ical  
power source. 
1. CSM status 
readout 
~ 
4. Command link 
5. LM Status 
(1)  Provide an  indication of the s ta tus  of 
l cr i t ica l  orbiting CSM sys tems on at  l eas t  
a go-no-go basis. 
Provide link to facilitate remote control of 
i tems under (3) above. 
Monitor LM quiescent control by hard line, 
data link, or visual inspections. 
(2)  Internal temperature  control should be available to l imit  the wall/  
equipment temperature  to between about +40° and t100 OF t o  maintain the 
storage conditions for  which all  Apollo equipment has been qualified. 
tion, the water-glycol loop must  not be permitted to f reeze,  and the IMU may 
have to be maintained to c loser  tolerances to  prevent i r reparable  damage 
during the quiescent phase, 
(up to one hour per day), it and the te lemetry also must  be cooled. 
In addi- 
During the period that S-Band equipment operates 
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( 3 )  External  heating must  be controlled to a s su re  somewhat uniform 
temperatures  near the back face of the heat shield to prevent the RCS engines/  
fuel f rom freezing and to prevent the space radiators  f rom freezing o r  
inhibiting the flow of coolant. 
from an EVA situation, nothing can be tolerated that would inhibit the opening 
of the access  hatches. 
Because ingress  to the CSM may be initiated 
(4) Cabin pressur iza t ion  w i l l  be allowed to drop to 0. 5 psia  a f te r  LM 
separation and then maintained a t  about that level until crew re turn  and 
ingress.  This procedure will  prevent any mater ia l s  f r o m  outgassing, reduce 
the leakage loss ,  and reduce the f i re  hazard. In fact ,  any leakage makeup 
could be provided by an iner t  gas such a s  helium o r  nitrogen. 
(5) Status assessment  i s  to be accomplished through use  of a minimum 
number of sensors  and a combination s ignal  condi t ioner/alarm generator.  
The data to be a s ses sed  a r e  described in Table 2-5. 
sensors ,  a signal conditioner i s  required to a s s e s s  the sensor  output, convert 
it  to digital information, and initiate an a l a rm i f  the values a r e  outside the 
programmed boundaries. 
In addition to the 
(6) Remote control capability i s  required to control the overall  
operational mode of the CSM while in the quiescent s ta te  and to facilitate the 
re turn  to tight stability control f o r  the unmanned docking and separation 
activities. In addition, there  must  be some control over redundancy and any 
diagnostic requirement imposed by the need to identify fa i lures  and make 
proper use  of redundancy. 
activate the CSM sys tems upon command and to initiate any required velocity 
change necessary  to facil i tate active docking when the LM is  unable to 
perform the rendezvous action. 
docking action, which involves the LM RCS. 
The control function a l so  may be required to 
This requirement does not include the final 
(7) Communications link to the lunar surface and to ear th  must re lay 
any a l a r m  when the CSM i s  within line-of-sight of the surface party or  ear th  
MSFN and must  provide the s ta tus  data on at  least  a once-a-day basis on 
command from ei ther  ear th  o r  the lunar surface.  
(8) Elec t r ica l  power is required to operate the quiescent control 
systems and permi t  communications whenever required. Any failure must 
be such that it is predictable in t ime to take a compensating action pr ior  to 
total  loss.  
quiescent control concept. Where fuel cel ls  a r e  recommended, those on 
standby must  be capable of being s ta r ted  up from the remaining power 
sources;  and at the end of the 90-day period, there  must  be sufficient power 
to a s s u r e  a safe r e tu rn  trip. 
during the quiescent s ta te  to operate the coolant pumps. 
mus t  demonstrate a life of about 2 ,  500 hours.  
The expected power level will  vary  considerably depending on the 
Conditioned power may be required at intervals 
The power source 
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(9) Maintenance and repa i r  support i tems a r e  required to facil i tate 
implementation of the availability concept a s  applied to the manned portions 
of the mission.  The specific requirements include spares ,  tools, diagnostic 
equipment, and a data system. 
(1 0 )  Special facil i t ies /EVA support a r e  also required to facil i tate crew 
safety under the proposed operational concept. 
include such i tems a s  spacesuit ,  maneuvering units, and spacecraf t  design 
fea tures  which facil i tate EVA activit ies and external maintenance. 
These support functions, 
(11) Up-data reception i s  required to per form the functions normally 
expected of the Apollo up-data link and is of par t icular  importance to th i s  
mission because the cent ra l  t imer  and the Apollo guidance computer wil l  be 
shut down during the quiescent state. The data required include timing, 
computer memory  update, and a channel f o r  the command functions that 
dr ive the remote control ler  o r  activate the down-data transmissions.  
(12) Increased environmental protection against meteroids may be 
required to meet the Apollo objectives f o r  the 90-day mission. 
the r i s k  of higher radiation levels must  be considered, 
except the so la r  heat previously referenced, will  not materially affect the 
mission. 
In addition, 
Other environments, 
2 . 3 .  2 The LM Functional Requirements (Table 2-3)  
(1) Remote control of the CSM from the LM, a s  well a s  f rom the 
ear th  and lunar surface,  may be a requirement to maximize mission success /  
crew safety. 
Paragraph  2.3. 1 (6). 
The functions to be controlled a r e  those referenced in 
(2) Crew t ransfer  aids a r e  required to permi t  EVA t ransfer  of the 
crew to the CSM in the event they a r e  unable to hard dock. 
Paragraph  2.3. 1 (10). 
See 
(3)  CSM status  monitoring of some form may be required to provide 
rudimentary information a s  to the CSM condition after separation and pr ior  
to rendezvous. 
by the CSM while the LM i s  in  use. 
requirement. 
In addition, i t  must  respond to any a la rm signal transmitted 
Again, the ear th  link may satisfy this 
44) A command link i s  required to t ransmit  the commands generated 
by the CSM remote controller,  Function (1). 
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(5) Provisions for  a third crewman a r e  required in the LM to bring 
the third man to the lunar surface.  
descr ibed in Reference (2,). 
f unc t i ons , 
This approach has been adequately 
These provisions include both space and support  
(6) E lec t r ica l  power i s  required for  the quiescent period a s  well  a s  
the periods of usage. 
on the use  of paras i t ic  heat. 
depending on the parasi t ic  heat available from the power source. 
the power i s  required to produce heat energy. 
The expected power requirements will  vary  depending 
The power level required will  vary considerably 
Much of 
(7) Internal tempera ture  control will be required for the storage 
mode, which will l imit  the wall  and equipment temperature  to between t40 and 
t100 F, the LM in-flight specifications. Under these conditions, however, 
the water  tanks must be kept f r o m  freezing, and perhaps some control of 
IMU internal  temperatures  must  be maintained. 
(8) Internal p r e s s u r e  control of some form may be desirable during 
the quiescent mode. 
should be about 0. 5 psia. 
As indicated for  the CSM in Paragraph  2 . 3 .  1 (4), it  
This requirement i s  not known to be f i rm.  
(9) External temperature  control may be required to prevent the 
RCS engines f rom freezing (or  to thaw them out pr ior  to usage) and to 
prevent the fuel tanks f rom freezing. The LM vehicle surface temperatures  
a r e  expected to vary between t120 and -260 F according to Surveyor VI  data 
(Reference 2-3).  
(10) Maintenance and repa i r  support w i l l  be required to a s s u r e  
successful  application of the availability concept to the s tored LM. 
nance can be performed any t ime the LM is  on the lunar surface or  in 
t rans i t ;  however, only the systems involved in quiescent control and data 
handling need to be maintained until just  p r ior  to departure. 
ability with the shel ter  systems i s  a desirable  feature. 
a r e  specifically identified in a subsequent section. 
spa res ,  and diagnostic data. 
unless the work can be taken to the lunar shel ter ,  
Mainte- 
Interchange- 
These support i tems 
They include tools, 
M&R actions will be limited to the box level 
(11) A CSM tracking/locator of some form is  required to aid the LM 
Use 
crew in establishing the rendezvous data prior to launch from the lunar 
surface,  and updating it during t rans i t  without aid f rom ear th  (MSFN). 
of ea r th  tracking data should be the normal  mode of operation and may be 
accomplished through use  of the lunar base systems. 
(12) Up-Data a r e  required f rom ear th  and p r io r  to launch to r e s to re  
the LM guidance computer memory  and reestablish the timing base after 
shutdown for the quiescent mode. 
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2. 3. 3 Lunar Shelter Functional Requirements (Table 2-4) 
NOTE: These sys tems a r e  not a. pa r t  of this study. 
The lunar she l te r  i s  to be sent ahead of the ELOR mission to provide 
the living and work quar te rs  for  the extended stay-time. 
provide some support  functions necessary to keep the exploration par ty  aware 
of both the LM and CSM status. 
In addition, i t  w i l l  
These required functions a r e  a s  follows: 
(1) The CSM status  board i s  to provide a visual  display of the CSM 
condition a s  it orbi ts  the moon. 
a day unless a c r i t i ca l  situation was identified and/or  when the abort  c r i t e r i a  
were  compromised. 
Paragraph  2 . 3 .  1 for  data to be monitored. 
It would probably be updated at  least  once 
Data may come direct  f rom the CSM o r  via earth.  See 
(2) An a l a r m  sys tem i s  required to notify a l l  lunar par ty  members ,  
regard less  of where they a r e ,  of an impending emergency and/or  the sub- 
sequent abort  plans in  t ime to respond safely. 
to situations c rea ted  either by LM problems o r  CSM problems. 
The system must  respond 
(3) Remote control of the CSM i s  required to maintain safe  o r  optimum 
storage conditions in the event of some fa i lures .  
should provide the following actions: 
The remote-control link 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
(4) 
Activate normal  CSM stability control mode. 
Command a status review. 
Startup the standby fuel cells ,  
Switch loads to any of the operating cells.  
Shut down a malfunctioning ce l l  i f  used. 
Switch to any redundant function of a system where failure can 
compromise the ability of the crew to re turn  safely. 
A Command link i s  required to provide communications between the 
lunar surface and the orbiting CSM. 
consisting of the commands l isted above. 
Digital data only will be transmitted,  
(5) An LM status board i s  required to monitor the LM in the quiescent 
mode. 
ra ther  than dis turb the LM systems in  the dormant state. 
be transmitted v ia  hard lines o r  on the VHF link, depending on whichever , 
proves to be the more  reliable mode. 
a s  an a la rm.  
It is considered bet ter  to monitor the functions from the shel ter  
These data may 
Emergency situations must  be relayed 
The data to be monitored a r e  a s  indicated under Paragraph2.3.2. 
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2.4 SYSTEM FUNCTION DUTY CYCLE ESTIMATES 
The command and serv ice  modules a r e  expected to function during the 
ELOR mission in  much the same way and f o r  the same periods a s  the 
Apollo LOR mission, except during the lunar a r e a  phases. 
for  this and to determine the actual ELOR mission subsystem duty cycles,  
the Apollo design reference mission (DRM-2A), Reference 2-1, was 
modified to reflect  the changes expected for  ELOR. 
a r e  reflected in  ?able 2-5 for  the CSM system. 
To compensate 
The result ing est imates  
Modified duty cycle es t imates  fo r  the LM used in the ELOR mission 
a r e  presented in Table 2-6.  
l e s s  than those of the normal  Apollo-LOR, except fo r  the dormant control 
functions, because the systems a r e  shut down immediately af ter  landing, and 
the lunar shel ter  provides the required functions while the crew is  on the 
lunar surface.  
These est imates  a r e  actually 25  to 30 percent 
2.5 QUIESCENT MODE OPERATIONS 
. The mode of operations employed during the CSM and LM dormant 
phase is of paramount importance to this study's objectives, since the ' 
mission duration (overall)  is significantly longer (by a ra t io  of more  than 
12 to 1) than that for which the Apollo CSM and LM were  designed. As a 
resul t ,  specific action is  required to minimize the hazard of fa i lure  during, 
this period, To resolve this problem, it is necessary to understand the 
mechanics of fa i lure  and take advantage of any potential control actions to 
reduce the fai lure  hazard before other alternatives such a s  maintenance a r e  
considered, A s  a case  in point, consider the data of Figure 2-13. 
It i s  well known from the basic reliability equation R = e-ht  that a 
fa i lure  hazard ( i t )  i s  time dependent. 
cally the reliabil i ty would remain a s  i t  wa's when it was stopped, 
it would seem that any t ime the systems do not operate they do not accumulate 
t ime or become a hazard to crew safe  return.  
however, t e s t s  have shown that even in the quiescent state,  some components 
may develop fai lures  which a r e  manifested when the system is  turned on. 
In defining this situation, a recent study performed by Martin-Marietta 
concluded that, on the average, the fai lure  hazard was reduced by a ra t io  of 
99 to 1 while the system was s tored in a normal ear th  environment (Refer- 
ence 2-2). 
If the clock can be stopped, theoreti-  
Therefore,  
To a degree this i s  t rue;  
Under "controlled bench" conditions i t  would be even less .  
Given the foregoing and applying it to a comparison between the Apollo 
LOR and ELOR, it was found that the average failure hazard during ELOR 
lunar operations exhibited a factor of 55 less  than fo r  the Apollo mission if 
a l l  equipment was shut down and the aforementioned dormant conditions were  
maintained. Fur ther ,  it  has been shown that systems that a r e  cycled on and 
off can be subject to.higher failure hazards than those operated only when 
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Figure  2-13. Effects of Dormancy Concept on the Probabili ty of Safe Return,  
No Maintenance or  Repair 
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required.  
LM because s torage conditions must  be maintained. 
provide the following basic c r i t e r i a  for the quiescent mode design: 
Obviously this effect cannot be attained for either the CSM o r  the 
It does, however, 
1. Operate the systems no more  than is absolutely required. 
2. Leave off a l l  sys tems functions not required. 
3. Per fo rm the detailed systems s ta tus  checks pr ior  to departure ,  
but allow enough time to perform a l l  required maintenance 
actions . 
2.6 MISSION SUCCESS/CREW SAFETY AND ABORT CRITERIA 
2. 6. 1 Definitions 
Considerable misunderstanding exists regarding the meaning of mission 
success  (MS), crew safe r e tu rn  (CS), and abort  c r i t e r i a  (AC). Fo r  this 
reason,  it is  necessary  to define these t e r m s  within the context of the ELOR 
mission. 
with mission objectives, since it is normally associated with missions and 
sys tems wherein fai lure  of a system cannot be tolerated. With reference to  
the ELOR mission, i t  is a lmost  self-evident that fa i lures  should be expected 
and, indeed, planned for because of the duration and the operational t ime 
f r a m e  (1975). 
potential fa i lures  and determination of the extent of preparation required.  
The t e r m  reliability (R) will  not be used in this study in  connection 
A major  objective of this study is  the identification of 
The following definitions a r e  submitted for  application to the ELOR 
mission: 
1. Probability of Mission Success (P90 ). 
mission will be completed a s  plannex and reflected in the timeline 
profile, That is, the full 90-day stay-time will  be completed 
without compromising the abort  c r i te r ia .  Within this definition 
fai lures  a r e  permitted,  provided that they a r e  repaired and that 
they permit  completion of the mission. 
Pg0 i s  the chance that the 
2. Probabili ty of Crew Safe Return (Ps). 
crew w i l l  re turn  safely to ear th  in spite of any circumstance which 
may a r i s e  during any phase of the mission. These circumstances 
include mission success ,  u se  of any backup modes, and any abort  
requirements ,  but not rescue. (Rescue requirements a r e  a 
separa te  category. ) 
Ps i s  the chance that the 
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3 .  Safe Abort. The c r e w  is returned to ea r th  i n  the CM pr io r  to the 
scheduled time and is recovered safely a t  a preselected recovery 
a r e a  without exposure to  any abnormal environments. This p r o -  
cedure is initiated when the abort  c r i t e r i a  have been exceeded 
and when one m o r e  i r r epa rab le  failure could lead  to c rew los s .  
4. Emergency Abort .  
r e tu rn  to ea r th  at the ea r l i e s t  possible t ime.  It may o r  may not 
be i n  l e s s  t ime than that required f o r  a safe abort .  Under these 
conditions recovery can  be anywhere on ear th  i n  the a r e a  included 
between 45 degrees  north latitude and 45 degrees  south latitude. 
This form of abort  is initiated only when catastrophic failure is 
imminent, no r epa i r s  a r e  possible, and the c rew is in  immediate 
danger.  
An emergency abort  is c rea ted  by the need to 
2 . 6 . 2  Abort Cr i te r ia  
The abort  criteria fo r  all the ELOR mission phases except the quies -  
cent phase is  considered without exception to be the same  as those imposed 
on the Block I1 configuration of the Apollo DRM-2A. 
phase; i. e .  , L M  dormant on the lunar  surface o r  the CSM i n  lunar  orbit ,  
however, the basic  approach must  of necessity change. 
only quiescent control and te lemet ry  will be functioning; therefore ,  fa i lures  
cannot occur  i n  the other sys tem functions -by definition. Fa i lures  will 
only become apparent after the vehicle has  been boarded and the systems 
have been activated; at this t ime maintenance and repair  actions can be 
planned to compensate for failures.  
During the quiescent 
During this t ime, 
Abort c r i t e r i a  for the quiescent phases need only be addressed to the 
problem of maintaining the required state and/or not degrading abort  cap- 
ability. 
Tables  2-7 and 2-8. 
The resu l t s  of this approach a r e  reflected in the c r i te r ia  of 
2.7 SYSTEM FUNCTION DOWNTIME CONSTRAINTS 
2.7.  1 Definitions and Causations 
Since maintenance in space is a requirement for  longer missions,  one 
of the associated problems is identification of the system tolerance to  m a l -  
function. To resolve this problem, i t  is necessary to understand system 
operation when performance anomalies occur.  
seldom lead to complete sys tem failure;  ra ther ,  there is the temporary lo s s  
of a function. In most  of these cases ,  and for  all  cr i t ical  functions, modern 
spacecraf t  designs call  for  some fo rm of independent backup that will permit  
continued operation. Even with this amount of precaution, some situations 
Individual malfunctions 
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Table 2-7.  Abort Cr i te r ia ,  CSM Dormant in  Lunar Orbit 
Sys tem 
1. Elec t r ica l  power 
2 .  ECLSS 
3 .  Commun,cations 
4. Stability control 
5. Guidance and navigation 
6. Other 
Abort Cr i te r ia  
1. Loss  of one fuel cell  
2.  Excessive 0 2  o r  H2 usage/ loss  
(fuel cell  concept only) 
1. No coolant circulation 
2 .  
3 .  Loss of cabin p r e s s u r e  
Out -of - tolerance internal tempera tures  
1. Loss of command link 
2 .  Loss of all s ta tus  data 
1. Loss  of stability control 
2 .  Loss of orientation/attitude control 
and/or  attitude reference 
1. Loss of IMU temperature  control 
(maybe) 
1. Excessive heat-shield tempera ture  
stress 
Table 2 - 8 .  Orbit Cri ter ia ,  LM Stored on Lunar Surface 
I System 
~ 
1. Elec t r ica l  power 
2 .  ECLSS 
3 .  Communication 
4.  Stability control 
5. Guidance and navigation 
\ 
6. Others 
Abort Cri ter ia  
1. 
2 .  
1. 
2 .  
1. 
2. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
Loss  of e lectr ical  power 
Excessive use o r  loss  of 0 2  (o r  fuel) 
Out -of - tolerance temperatures ,  
Loss  of cabin p re s su re  
internal o r  external (fuel tanks) 
Loss  of communications with ear th  
Inability to  monitor status 
None 
Loss  of IMU temperature  control 
(maybe) 
None 
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may a r i s e  that would not pe rmi t  performance of a given critical function 
until a r epa i r  is made.  
constraints  on miss ion  sys tems design. These a r e  the maintenance time 
constraints  (MTC's).  
commitment o r  to support the needs of the c rew,  
It is these situations that establish the most  c r i t i ca l  
MTC's stem f r o m  the need to  per form a miss ion  
It is logical to a s sume  that a function is required during some specific 
par t  of the miss ion  or for  a percentage of the total miss ion  duration. Per- 
haps it is required randomly throughout the mission. 
logical to  a s sume  that the miss ion  can proceed in  a degraded mode, if only 
fo r  a ve ry  shor t  period. 
periodic maintenance and the necessary  repair  o r  replacement actions. 
The MTC, therefore ,  is defined as - 
It is also just  as 
If this is t rue,  that  per iod can  be used fo r  both 
A res t r ic t ion  imposed on the total allowable elapsed 
t ime a miss ion  sys tem function can be out of se rv ice  
before a situation is c rea ted  that would resul t  in  
ultimate lo s s  of the miss ion  spacecraft  and/or  crew.  
It should be recognized that downtime constraints a r e  not always de-  
sc r ibedby a single value defining a line of demarcation between life and 
death. Crew o r  function degradation may be gradual so that the crew's  
ability to  meet  the situation is degraded gradually to the point of final inca-  
pacitation, In addition, not all c r ew members  will react  alike. This will 
become obvious f r o m  the data that follow: 
Downtime constraints ,  as they apply to the ELOR mission, have 
meaning only during the manned portions of the mission, o r  as they affect 
the time available to  abort  f rom the lunar  surface.  Since the CSM vehicle 
has  been qualified for  the normal  Apollo mission, the only phase of the mis- 
sion where the MTC has  much significance is during the lunar a r e a  opera-  
tions where the approach has  changed substantially. 
2 .  7 .  2 Spacecraft-Stability or Attitude -Control Constraints 
Constraints are crea ted  by the need to meet  mission commitments A 
Fur the r ,  c r ew personnel a r e  limited in  their  ability to 
stable and orientable platform is needed for navigation, guidance, and con- 
duct of experiments.  
tolerate  random and repetitive motion. 
The attitude -control sys tems can  fail in the following modes: 
1. Under manned phases  
a.  Loss of ability to activate the sys tem o r  any pa r t  thereof 
resu l t s  in random drift .  
- 50 - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
2.  
b. Fai lure  of a reaction control engine resul ts  in a runaway 
engine and an accelerating spin in at  least  one plane. 
c. Fai lure  of the propulsion engine nozzle (burn-through) resul ts  
in vector misalignment. 
Under s tored phases,  l o s s  of ability to activate the spin system 
resul ts  in  loss  of ability to change the spacecraft  state;  i. e . ,  loss  
of ability to go f rom the quiescent state slow roll to the stabilized 
mode o r  vice versa .  
Since the spacecraft  is assumed to be operated i n  two basic modes with 
respect  to control -system problems, the associated control -system e m e r -  
gencies will be quite different. 
Under manned phases,  the spacecraft  must  maintain a given attitude 
The platform is used a s  a reference and through use of a stable platform. 
as a reaction control system for  repositioning o r  stopping motion. 
tem must  work constantly throughout the mission to  prevent random drift .  
The tighter the stability dead band, the more  often the reaction control sys-  
tem will work. Loss of the system function leaves the spacecraft with an 
unchanged course vector, but uncontrolled in attitude. It can remain in this 
condition without ser ious effects for  a considerable portion of a mission; 
eventually, however, communications, the heat shield, and the reentry o r  
heat-rejection capabilities may be affected. It is probable that the space- 
craft will eventually l'weather-vane" into the solar  winds and remain 
semistable.  
The sys -  
If one of the reaction control je ts  fails open, the roll ra te  could build 
This situation has been shown to be very unlikely for 
up. 
being the worst  case .  
the Apollo CSM o r  LM. 
The rate will vary according to the axis involved, the axis of symmetry 
Under the storage phase, complete loss of the roll control function 
will result  in a slow buildup of the wobble around the roll axis and eventually 
a shifting of the actual roll axis to one through the centroid where it will 
tend to stabilize. 
craft ,  but could overs t ress  some equipment. The time available before 
the wobble becomes excessive is a direct  function of the established roll 
ra te .  According to the LMSC data (Reference 1-2), i t  will take 48 hours 
for the CSM to achieve a 20-degree half-angle wobble at  the recommended 
0 .  5 rpm roll rate.  Furthermore,  the time factor increases rapidly a s  the 
initial roll rate is decreased. It would, therefore,  seem desirable to es tab-  
l ish the CSM roll at as low a rate as i s  compatible with other cr i ter ia .  
Since the fuel consumption goes down with roll ra te ,  the only l imit  is that 
This should not cause any immediate ha rm to the space- 
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established by the need for  spin stability and barbecuing the vehicle. 
Fu r the r  study is required in  this a r e a .  
2 . 7 . 3  Spacecraft  Velocity Control, A Profi le  Constraint  
Midcourse correct ions a r e  normally required at some time after 
t ranslunar  injection and pr ior  to a r r iva l .  
preclude midcourse cor rec t ion  at a specific point in  t ime;  however, this 
requirement  may not be very critical if the subsystem can be re turned  to 
operational s ta tus .  The data resulting f r o m  severa l  studies indicate tha t  
midcourse correct ions can be deferred f o r  many hours .  
are expected to be less than 150 feet per  second fo r  delays up to 24 hour s  f o r  
ear ly  correct ions.  
in  an  aborted mission and a f r ee  re turn.  
Loss of subsystem functions may 
The fuel penalt ies 
Inability to  apply a AV on the outbound leg would r e su l t  
Earth-approach velocity correct ions are those made as the spacecraf t  
approaches the ea r th ' s  sphere of influence, before  its position is established 
relevant to the reent ry  cor r idor .  This is an activity that is a l so  c r i t i ca l  i n  
that it mus t  be  performed; however, there  a r e  about 15 hours during which 
the t a sk  can  be performed without appreciable penalty. Fai lure  to  make the 
correct ion could easi ly  resul t  in passing ear th  o r  overheating on reent ry ,  
The ear th-en t ry  phase requires  the uninterrupted operation of a l l  
associated sys tem functions; thus,  a very narrow cor r idor  must  be  acquired 
and maintained by constant vernier  control. Any downtime on the p a r t  of a n  
associated function could easi ly  resul t  in l o s s  of the mission and crew.  
2 . 7 . 4  Atmospheric - P r e s s u r e  Constraints 
Atmospheric p re s su re  is required to make the spacecraft  habitable to 
P r e s s u r e  below about 2 . 0  psia  will eventually resul t  in death because man. 
body fluids vaporize at p r e s s u r e s  somewhere below 1 . 5  psia.  
safe boundary, therefore ,  i s  about 2 .  8 psia (or  about 180 r u n  of Hg) 0 2  pres -  
su re ;  however, a t  this  p re s su re ,  man must be provided with pure oxygen 
for  breathing. 
U.S. Air F o r c e  tes t s .  
The minimum 
Limited exposure to vacuum m a y  be possible, according to 
Fa i lu re s  in, o r  l o s s  of, the atmospheric control system are descr ibed 
under the oxygen subfunction. An additional failure mode is the accidental 
re lease  of cabin p re s su re ,  which could be caused by a la rge  meteoroid 
impingement o r  by the blowout of an  access  hatch o r  relief sys tem.  
Under these conditions, the t ime to catastrophe cannot be rigidly se t  
at any specific value, since it is directly re la ted to  the hole s ize .  
situation result ing f rom the most  probable cause is reflected in the curve 
of F igure  2-14, where the t ime history of the internal pressure  of the CSM 
The 
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Figure  2-14. Cabin Depressurization/Pressurization Rates ,  Apollo CSM 
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is presented a s  i t  would r e su l t  f r o m  up to a one-half-inch meteoroid puncture. 
Under these conditions, there  would be about ten minutes before the crew 
would encounter any deleterious effects. 
ability of occurrence,  l e s s  than one change in a mill ion with the proposed 
protection. Smaller  s ize  holes have a m o r e  significant probability of occur -  
rence;  however, the decompression r a t e s  a r e  much slower and because of 
the CM wall construction, will not penetrate below a 0. 127-inch particle s i ze  
r ega rd le s s  of the velocity. 
(Reference 2.7), this s i ze  has  a probability of about 0.9993. The decompres-  
sion r a t e  for  this par t ic le  leaves m o r e  than 25 minutes before the unsafe 
p r e s  s u r  e level. 
This hole s ize  has  a very low prob-  
Using the NASA/Apollo penetration equation 
2 . 7 . 5  Oxygen-System Constraints 
The oxygen-system is designed to provide f o r  the metabolic needs of 
the astronauts .  
pheric  p re s su re .  
In addition, the sys tem provides a portion of the a tmos-  
The total p r e s s u r e  is normally expected to be 5 psia.  
Loss of the oxygen-system functions can prevent the sys tem f r o m  
feeding oxygen to  the cabin and /o r  crew. 
tion can  cause the oxygen p r e s s u r e  to either increase  o r  decrease.  Man is  
very  flexible in  his  tolerance to wide variations in  oxygen partial  p r e s s u r e ,  
See Reference 2 .  1. 
members  can  survive as long as the c rew module s t ruc ture  can. 
Loss of oxygen balance or regula-  
If the 0 2  p re s su re  builds up within the cabin, crew 
Loss of the oxygen feed sys tem where the oxygen is not replenished 
would seem more  hazardous 
oxygen at 5 psia a t  the t ime the lo s s  occurred and i f  the cabin volume were  
250 cubic fee t ,  the 0 2  par t ia l  p re s su re  would slowly drop off a s  a function 
of c rew metabolic r a t e s .  
the following assumptions.  
If the cabin a i r  consisted of 100-percent 
F o r  this study, an  est imate  was made based on 
1. 
2.  
3 .  
4. 
The leakage rat io  is about 1 . 0  pound per  day 
P(actua1) x 0 . 2  
5 psig at 5 .0  psia  o r  
Metabolic consumption is about 0. 74 cubic feet  per  hour a t  
5 . 0  psia  fo r  each crew member ,  o r  0 . 3 3  l b / h r .  
There are three  c rew members  working at a normal ra te  and 
under normal  temperature .  
Hypoxia sets in at a n  oxygen partial  p re s su re  below about 
2 .8  psia,  o r  af ter  a 20 -percent reduction in the available 
oxygen. 
- 54 - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
These  data indicate that the oxygen feed sys t em could be inoperative 
and down f o r  r epa i r  fo r  about 2 . 0  hours  for  the CSM. 
by such f ac to r s  as higher leak  rates, increased work activity, and high 
tempera tures .  However, it could be increased  if the carbon-dioxide 
removal sys t em continued to operate  and/or  the emergency supplies o r  
backpacks were  used. 
This could be reduced 
2 ,  7 .6  Carbon-Dioxide -System Constraints 
The  carbon-dioxide reduction sys tem removes carbon dioxide f r o m  the 
cabin atmosphere and keeps it below a partial  p r e s s u r e  of 4 mi l l imeters  of 
m e r c u r y  o r  0.11 percent  by volume. The normal  atmosphere contains only 
about 0 .03  percent.  Man's average daily output is between 1.76 pounds ( o r  
0 .61 cubic feet) and 2.25 pounds p e r  hour,  due to normal metabolic function, 
Under s t r e s s  and high activity, this value will increase  considerably. 
Extensive tests and operational situations have provided data which 
relate man ' s  performance under various conditions and carbon-dioxide con- 
centrations.  There  seems  to be no sharp  line between the safe zone and a 
fatal dose.  Rather ,  performance is gradually degraded until the c rewman 
becomes unconscious. 
The problems associated with lo s s  of the carbon-dioxide reduction 
sys tem functions and the subsequent buildup of carbon dioxide a r e  re la ted  
i n  F igure  2-15. In this f igure,  the buildup rate and the c r i t i ca l  points are 
est imated f o r  the minimum buildup r a t e  (1. 75 pounds per  hour) ,  an  e s t i -  
mated cabin leak  rate of 1 .0  pounds pe r  day, and an ambient tempera ture  
of 75 F. In addition, the cabin initial atmospheric content is about 5 ps ia  
of oxygen, with carbon dioxide at between 3 .  5 and 4 . 0  mil l imeters  of 
mercury .  
The data indicate that the complete CM carbon-dioxide removal func- 
tion can be  out of se rv ice  for  up to  8 . 0  hours with little perceptible degra-  
dation in  performance,  o r  6 . 0  hours  in  the smaller LM cabin. A f t e r  this,  
the c r e w  members  will probably develop headaches and gradually become 
less and less efficient. A f t e r  about 10 hours,  they may become unconscious 
o r  incapable of performing useful work. It can  be said,  therefore ,  that  a 
reasonable downtime constraint  for  the CM carbon-dioxide removal function 
need not be any less than the 6 hours  and could possibly be 8 hours ,  depend- 
ing on the final free volume of the CM and its associated leak rate .  
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2 . 7 . 8  T r a c e  -Contaminant-Control Constraints 
T r a c e  contaminants (gases ,  vapors ,  aerosols ,  and particulates) stem 
f r o m  two major  sources:  the equipment within the spacecraf t  and the human 
body. The body is considered the grea tes t  source  of these contaminants via 
the metabolic p rocess .  Under actual tests, approximately 100 contaminants 
have been isolated within the spacecraf t  cabin, but neither the buildup rate 
nor the toxicity of the individual contributants has  been identified. 
If the trace-contaminant removal function fails and is down fo r  any 
However, the buildup rate is known to be 
It is most  certainly expected to be  less 
length of time, the contaminants will probably reach  a point of equilibrium, 
probably above the toxic level. 
low-so low that, with caution in  the material selection, it will take days 
f o r  the levels  t o  r each  a toxic state.  
than that associated with carbon-dioxide removal,  which can, therefore ,  
provide a n  estimate of the lower boundary (worst  ca se )  approximately 1Ohours. 
2.  7 .9  Tempera ture  -Control Constraints 
The equipment tempera ture  -control function is required to  provide 
coolant through equipment heat-sinks in  the f o r m  of coldplates. 
removes the excess heat produced by the electr ical  power source.  
two functions, the power-source cooling is the m o r e  cr i t ical  and will prob-  
ably f o r m t h e  l imiting case .  
constraint .  
It a lso 
Of the 
Each loop will be t reated a s  a separate  constrai  
The fuel ce l l s  o r  the RTG's, which a r e  used to  generate the electr ical  
power, are  not 100-percent efficient; therefore,  some of the fuel is con- 
ver ted  into paras i t ic  heat energy. F o r  example, the amount generated 
depends on the operating level of the cells and the cell  design, F o r  the 
ELOR mission, this  heat is to be used to control the internal temperature  
of the CM and L M  during the quiescent phase. Any surplus is radiated into 
space.  Loss of coolant circulation may cause the cabin to  cool down to the 
point where the water  and, later, the water-glycol could freeze.  A m o r e  
immediate problem would result f rom overheating of the power source and 
the result ing necessi ty  for  manual shutdown and l o s s  of e lectr ical  power. 
During the manned o r  unmanned mission phases,  the permissible  down- 
t ime (MTC) for  e lectr ical  power source cooling has  no absolute value, it 
var ies  over a wide range with loading. Under wors t  case,  the fuel cells tem-  
pera ture  r i s e s  at the r a t e  of 4 F p e r  minute. However, there  is adequate 
t ime f o r  the c rew to take the necessary  action o r  for the status monitor to 
t r ansmi t  the alarm to MSFN and they, in turn,  to command a shutdown o r  a 
switchover action. 
tu re ,  using the spacecraf t  as a heatsink and radiator .  
The RTG would stabilize at a higher than normal  tempera-  
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The CM cabin tempera ture  (wall and equipment) is held a t  70 *5 F. 
During the unmanned phases,  i t  can wander between the wide limits of 100 F 
and 40 F a s  measu red  a t  the inter ior  walls. As a resul t ,  only g ross  control 
is required during the quiescent phase. 
Each  crewman adds about 11,200 Btu per  day to the c rew compartment 
in addition to the 22, 900 Btu contributed by the operating equipment, 
a la rge  surplus  of heat is generated, thermal  balance i s  maintained by 
radiating mos t  of the hea t  into space. 
Since 
During the quiescent phase,  the only source of internal heat is the para-  
s i t ic  hea t  output f r o m  the electr ical  power source and i ts  u se r s .  This input 
amounts to an average of about 3000 Btu per hour for  one fuel cell o r  4940Btu 
per  hour for one SNAP-27 .  This hea t  mus t  be distributed within the CSM to 
sat isfy the wall temperature  c r i te r ia .  
keep the radiators  and RCS engines f r o m  freezing during barbecue; however, 
t es t s  a r e  required to verify this capability (Reference 2-5). 
The solar  radiation i s  expected to 
Heat lost  through the Block I1 CM wall amounts to about 300 Btu per  
hour a t  normal  operating temperature  (70 F). 
be  permit ted to operate a t  lower temperatures  (as  low a s  40 F), the lo s s  is 
expected to be much l e s s  per  unit t ime, and perhaps none. 
external  coating (paint color) can change this loss  radically. 
However, since the cabin m a y  
A change in 
Given that the available heat  energy can be somewhat evenly distributed 
throughout the spacecraf t  and that the foregoing est imates  a r e  reasonably 
accurate ,  two facts a r e  evident. 
1. The surplus heat,  between 3000 and 5000 Btu per  hour,  m u s t  be 
rejected or  distributed to other par t s  of the spacecraft  to maintain 
them within the required l imits ,  
2 .  With fuel cel ls  i n  the SM as the sole e lectr ical  power source,  
some of the surplus  heat mus t  be t ransfer red  to  the GM, since 
most  heat-generating elements in the CM a r e  not operating during 
the quiescent period. Conversely, with 2 RTG's  in the CM, some 
heat will need to be t r ans fe r r ed  to  the SM. 
The available downtime is l imited by the t ime required for  the C M  
tempera ture  to  drop below the freezing level for  the water  s torage and/or  
the water-glycol at the lower ex t reme;  and the t ime required to  exceed the 
100°F  maximum a t  the upper extreme.  The data indicate that there should 
be m o r e  than 24  hours  to take a required compensating action. More study 
is requi red  because of the complex nature of the controlling fac tors .  
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2.8  ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
2.  8. 1 Considerations 
The environmental factors  associated with the ELOR mission will 
probably not change mater ia l ly  f rom those applied to the Apollo mission 
except where the t ime factor  changes. 
tial effects of these a reas :  
The t ime factor  changes the poten- 
1. Vacuum 
2 .  Temperature  variations 
3. Radiation 
4.  Meteoroids 
Fac tors  1 and 2 are covered under the individual subsystems, but radiation 
and meteoroids may m e r i t  special  considerations. 
2.  8 .2  Penetrating Radiation 
During a lunar  mission a spacecraf t  will be exposed to  penetrating 
radiation. On the outbound and the inbound portions of the mission, the 
spacecraf t  will pass  through the ear th ' s  radiation bel ts ;  these will not change 
f rom Apollo 11. In space,  there  i s  a finite probability that the spacecraft  
will be exposed to  sporadic so la r  f l a r e  radiation. It i s  estimated that the 
radiation exposure under a shield of one g ram per  square centimeter of 
aluminum f rom two passages through the ear th ' s  radiation belts would be 
500 rads .  Extrapolation of Apollo data provides an est imate  of a probability 
of 0 . 0 0 7  of exposure to  one o r  more  so la r  f la re  events which would produce 
a radiation exposure under a shield of 1 gm/cm2 of aluminum of 7x103 rads 
during a 99 -day lunar  mission. (Reference 2 -6) 
2. 8 .3  Meteoroids 
The Apollo spacecraf t  was designed to limit the probability of a mete-  
However, the 
oroid puncture to  less than 0 ,001  for the 14-day mission? This is actually 
the system contribution to  the probability of safe r e tu rn  (Ps). 
ELOR mission i s  up to 99 days in total duration, and obviously this Ps will 
be much l e s s  a s  it is affected by the t ime in  the meteoroid environment. 
As reflected in  Reference 2 -7, NR/SD conducted a study of the potential 
affects of the meteoroid environment, and these data were used to estimate 
the potential effects of meteoroids on the CSM and LM. These effects a r e  
*Based on the NASA meteoroid model as reflected in NASA/MSC Design Standards Bulletin # E 2 1 A  dated 
February 1968. 
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discussed under the i r  respective headings in Section 4. 
analysis indicated that  there  is a very high probability of a command o r  
se rv ice  module puncture and a resulting need to provide for  its r epa i r  and/or  
shielding. 
The resu l t s  of the 
2 .8 .4  Component Technical Considerations 
The addition of a 90-day s torage period to the ELOR spacecraf t  Corn- 
ponents makes i t  necessary  to  determine how component life will b e  affected, 
Based  upon the requirement  that  mos t  components will not be  operated dur -  
ing the quiescent period, there  is no present  concern for  diminishing the 
life of any component o r  significantly affecting the ope rating reliabil i ty.  
This is of course  based on the p remise  that maintenance of co r rec t  t empera -  
t u re s  and p r e s s u r e s  will be  accomplished. 
lem areas that  m e r i t  consideration: 
The following are severa l  prob-  
Vacuum We 1 ding 
Vacuum welding, known as cold welding, is the phenomena of fusion 
between two ultraclean metall ic sur faces  loaded against each other while in 
a h a r d  vacuum. 
rosion protection o r  lubricity, thereby precluding clean surfaces  which lead 
t o  cold welding. 
It is not a problem since most  surfaces  a r e  t reated f o r  c o r -  
Outgassing 
Outgassing is the evaporation of dissolved gases  and solvents and 
products of decomposition f r o m  the sur face  and inter ior  of mater ia l s .  
quantities of the outgassed constituents a r e  dependent upon length of expo- 
s u r e  and environment. The principal sources  a r e  nonmetallic mater ia l s  
such as plast ics ,  e las tomers ,  adhesives,  lubricants,  potting compounds 
and fabr ics .  
The 
Two problem a r e a s  are prevalent with outgassing: (1) contamination 
of the cabin space with constituents having toxic, noxious, o r  flammable 
propert ies  and (2)  the decay of physical and mechanical propert ies  of the 
parent material such as the residual bond strength of an  adhesive. 
have been  conducted on all Apollo mater ia l s  to  determine their  applicability 
to  space  hardware fabrication. 
Tes t s  
Other cabin materials are also tes ted to  indicate their  suitability in 
high-vacuum environments. 
those materials capable of producing significant toxic o r  flammable products 
OF those whose mechanical propert ies  deter iorate  significantly due to  off - 
gassing and oxidation of ball  bearing lubricants,  which has  been a minor  
The selection c r i t e r i a  to date have eliminated 
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problem in  some areas. 
indicate that no future  problems exist. 
However, new lubricants and data now available 
Corrosion 
A l l  Apollo heat exchangers and similar components are designed for  a 
4000 hour serv ice  l ife.  
the quiescent mode is less cor ros ive  and has  fewer vibrations and p r e s s u r e  
fluctuations than the above design requirement,  thus providing a design 
safety fac tor  for  possible cor ros ion  problems. 
During the 90-day miss ion  period ( 2 , 1 6 0  hours) ,  
Leakage 
Where future extended tests show any significant leakage of fluids 
where ample r e s e r v e  is not available in the sys tem,  it should be  possible to  
c a r r y  additional fluids and top off the ascent stage sys tems p r io r  to  r e tu rn  
to  the CSM. 
tanks o r  nitrogen to  the p re s su r i zed  side of the water  tank bladder. 
glycol coolant can a l so  be  added to  the cooling loop and accumulators .  
two LOX ascent  stage tanks each have shutoff valves which should not be  
opened until .the ascent  mission phase.  There  is a l so  significant oxygen 
p r e s s u r e  on the downstream side of these two shutoff valves due to  a con- 
nection to  the descent stage LOX tank. By 1975 the Apollo missions should 
provide sufficient leakage data to  allow proper  precautionary measu res  as 
required fo r  a long miss ion  such as ELOR. 
GSE connections a r e  available f o r  adding water  to the water  
Water/  
The 
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3.0 ELOR MISSION SYSTEM 
3 .1  DESIGN APPROACH 
As recommended in the LMSC study, the approach to  satisfying the 
ELOR mission requirements  is based on maximum utilization of Apollo pro-  
g r a m  hardware;  therefore ,  the Apollo command and serv ice  module (CSM) 
and the lunar module (LM) were  used as the baseline spacecraft ,  Modifica- 
t ions a r e  suggested only where required to facil i tate moving the  third man to  
the  lunar  surface and maintaining optimum quiescent conditions while either 
o r  both vehicles a r e  unmanned. In addition, no systems o r  technologies that 
a r e  not presently qualified o r  in the process  of being qualified f o r  space  
application were  considered for  usage. 
were  held to  the minimum, being limited to  only those required to  a s s u r e  a 
reasonable probability of c rew safe r e t u r n  (P,) and the 90-day s tay time 
(P90)* 
Changes in modules and sys tems 
The ELOR spacecraf t  launch configuration is essentially the s a m e  a s  
that of Apollo 11, a s  described in Reference 3.2. 
do not mater ia l ly  affect the external  appearance a s  shown in F igure  3-1. 
flight profile i s  basically that of Apollo, except for  the 90-day quiescent mode. 
The recommended changes 
The 
Achieving the proposed mission is dependent on two basic factors:  
1. The Apollo mission is both feasible and reliable,  
2. The addition of the 90-day dormancy period does not impose any 
stress on the sys tems that exceeds their  present qualification 
limits, 
during the quiescent phase remains  the major  exception. 
The additional life requirement for components operating 
These factors  a r e  expected to be satisfied for both the LM and the CSM. 
Operating sys tems and/or components, of course,  will have to be tes ted to 
demonstrate the lifetime requirements;  however, only the components involved 
in the quiescent-state control mode a r e  affected. 
3 . 2  COMMAND MODULE CONFIGURATION 
The Block I1 command module (CM) will require  little or no s t ruc tura l  
changes and only very minor  modifications. 
Block I1 configuration a r e  presented in Table 3-1. 
The changes required for the 
These changes resu l t  
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f r o m  the functions added t o  facil i tate the quiescent mode of operation during 
the  unmanned phases of the  lunar orbit ,  
t ions ,  deletions, and modifications to  the Block I1 CM a r e  indicated in 
F igu re  3-2. 
The location of t he  proposed addi- 
Two CSM concepts evolved f r o m  the study, the one proposed by LMSC 
as the baseline mission through Reference 1 .2  and the  one resulting f r o m  the  
SD analysis.  Both were  analyzed insofar a s  they affected safe re turn  and 
its associated requirements .  The differences in the two concepts evolve 
around the  electr ical  power source  used and the  result ing impact on CSM 
injected weight. 
out the  mission; the SD concept suggests the possibility of using two modified 
SNAP-27 radioisotope thermoelec t r ic  generators  (RTG). 
The LMSC concept recommended use  of fuel cells  through- 
Table  3-1  ref lects  the resulting requirements imposed on the CM by 
the  ELOR mission using both the  recommended SD concepts (2  RTG's) and 
the  LMSC concept (fuel cells),, The proposed changes would increase the  
weight of the CM by up to 233. 9 pounds for the fuel-cell  concept. 
weight data f r o m  CM 107 (Reference 3-2), the CM weight would increase  
f r o m  12,519.9 pounds to  12,752.8 pounds; however, a slight plus o r  minus 
var ia t ion can be expected in the included 87 pounds of ballast, depending on 
the  result ing changes in  "center of gravity" (CG) location. 
Using the 
T h e  RTG concept would affect t he  CM a s  indicated i n  F igure  3-2 by 
adding the  two modified SNAP-27's and a heat exchanger to  the  outer per im-  
e t e r  compartment. 
100  pounds. 
It would increase  the CM weight by no more  than 
A s  indicated by the sum of Table 3-1 and 3-2, for the R T G  concept, 
only about 124 watts of e lectr ical  power a r e  expected to be required for  the 
CSM (average);  the peaks a r e  not expected to exceed 191 watts during the 
simultaneous t ransmissions to the MSFN and the lunar surface.  This requi re -  
ment  could be lowered to about 155 i f  the two peaks were staggered, which 
represents  a considerable reduction in the lower level required for the fuel- 
cel l  concept. The differences a r e  due to the l e s s  complex quiescent concept 
identified in Section 4 .2 .1  of this volume and the elimination of e lectr ical  
hea t e r s  where new data indicate they a r e  not required or where waste heat 
could be used instead. Fur ther  the elimination of the hea ters  required to 
support the fuel-cell  system, a s  well as  its associated cryogenic storage and 
control functions, saved much electr ical  power. 
A detailed description of the resulting subsystems and changes a r e  
presented in the respective pa r t s  of Section 4. 1 as indicated in Table 3-1. 
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3 .3  THE SERVICE MODULE CONFIGURATION 
The service module (SM) configuration i s  affected considerably by the 
differences in the power source concepts. 
no changes a r e  required in the SM since the two RTG's  a r e  put into the CM 
a s  indicated in Figure 3-2. 
extensive internal  changes a re  required in the SM (Figure 3-3). The differ-  
ences in  the concepts have their  g rea tes t  impact on the overall  weight of the 
injected SM and its development schedule. 
When the RTG's  a r e  used, few o r  
When the all-fuel-cell  EPS concept is used, 
Table  3-2 i s  a list of the SM modification requirements  and the i r  
impacts  on the subsystem of the SM. 
the  engine design i s  disturbed. 
extensive a s  discussed in the following paragraphs,  
Neither the basic SM structure  nor 
Beyond these  changes, the differences a r e  
The  all-fuel-cell  concept calls for replacement of the three  present  P& W 
cel ls  with a longer life vers ion,  one of t h ree  to operate during the  quiescent 
stage f o r  a full  90 days. This concept requi res  a much l a rge r  fuel capacity, 
which may be achieved by replacement of t he  cryogenic storage sys tem with 
a new and unqualified subcri t ical  s torage system. 
678 pounds for  tankage and s t ruc tura l  supports, 
H2 and 0 2  a r e  required f o r  operation of the fuel cel l  for the  90-day period. 
In turn  the  addition of RCS fuels and oxidizer as  well as propulsion fuel and 
oxidizer a r e  required.  
meet  the quiescent power requirement  for  the 90-day dormancy, even with 
the 258-pound weight saving derived f r o m  use of the new cells.  
This change adds about 
In addition, more  cryogenic 
About 5 , 156 pounds a r e  added to  the SM weight t o  
The  RTG concept calls for  shutdown of a l l  fuel cells  (only two may be 
required)  during the quiescent phase and use of two modified SNAP-27's f o r  
both electr ical  power and paras i t ic  heat. 
ted in the  weight and P90. 
reduced below the  Block I1 weight, 
to  Ps i s  improved substantially (per  Section 4.2.1). 
Results of this  concept a r e  reflec- 
The dry weight of the modified SM could b e  
At the s a m e  t ime,  the  EPS contribution 
In addition to the RTG's ,  the recommended 
ment of the fuel cells with the improved version, 
increased meteoroid protection, and some minor 
result ing SM configuration is much safer  than i ts  
somewhat l ighter.  Fur thermore  , examination of 
m a y  show weight savings there  a s  well. 
3 .4  LM ASCENT STAGE 
concept calls for replace- 
addition of two sun sensors ,  
plumbing changes . The 
Block I1 counterpart  and 
the cryogenic requirements 
NOTE: Much of the information used herein was provided by the 
Grumman Air craft  Company through Reference 3 -2 e 
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The three-man ELOR LM concept provides a spacecraf t  that is  flown 
in  a dual-launch mission mode, making a manned lunar  landing and rendez- 
vous with a previously landed logistics vehicle, such as the LMSC early 
cargo stage of Reference 1-2. The LM has a ve ry  l imited surface mission 
capability and remains dormant on the moon while the c rew is supported by the 
logistics vehicle payload. 
activates the LM, and an ascent  and rendezvous with the unmanned CSM i s  
performed,  
mission capability: 
At the end of the surface-mission phase, the crew 
The proposed ELOR configuration provides the following 
1. Lunar landing with a three-man crew nea r  a previously landed 
unmanned logistics vehicle, 
2. Quiescent, unmanned dormancy for a period up to 90 days, 
3. Remote control of some functions of the unmanned CSM, which 
was left in  lunar  orbit, 
4. Launch f rom the moon with the three-man crew (up to  100 pounds 
of payload optional), rendezvous, and dock to the unmanned CSM. 
The ascent  stage must  be modified to accommodate the third crewman 
and the additional functions required to maintain equipment in a safe and 
ready state for the re turn  t r ip ,  In addition, it should be ready for abort  
within a reasonable t ime,  
functions a r e  depicted in Figures  3-4 and 3-5, i temized in Table 3-3 along 
with an  assessment  of the i r  ramifications, and described i n  detail in  
Section 4.3. The changes to the ascent  stage a r e  fa i r ly  extensive in appear-  
ance, but a r e  not expected to have a commensurate effect on the development 
program (see Section 5.3).  
expected to total 1366 pounds, with the required additional propellant and 
crewman. 
Modifications required to  accomplish these 
The increase in ascent  stage injected weight i s  
The power consumption during the quiescent mode could be a s  low as  
The resul ts  of these minimum requirements have a 
20 watts average, the peaks going a s  high a s  500 for very short  intervals 
during the lunar night. 
profound effect on the selected power source a s  reflected in Section 4. 4. 1. 
Details on the ascent  stage subsystems and their  modifications a r e  p re -  
sented in Section 4.3. 
3.5 LM DESCENT STAGE 
NOTE: Much of the information used here in  was provided by the 
Grumman Aircraf t  Go. through Reference 3 -3 .  
The descent stage of the LM vehicle is to  be modified to handle the 
additional -.we’ight and the propulsion sys tem uprating that accompanies 
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increased  weight. 
the l a s t  of which is the only new function: 
The stage is  required to provide three basic functions, 
1. The acceleration force required for a soft touchdown. 
2. A launch pad fo r  the ascent  stage when leaving the lunar surface.  
3 .  The electr ical  power for the stay-period. 
A detailed l i s t  of the required changes by subsystem is given in 
Table 3-4 along with their  ramifications.  These changes are i l lustrated i n  
Figure 3 - 4 .  The increase  in  stage weight i s  substantial, amounting to over 
5, 000 pounds, of which over 3 , 4 0 0  pounds i s  fuel alone, These figures a r e  
considered to be on the pessimist ic  side and may be reduced af ter  a m o r e  
careful study of each influencing factor ,  Power consumption i s  l imited to  
about 25 watts -that required to  recharge the batteries af ter  warmup cycles 
and/or  status t ransmissions,  Details of sys tem design proposed changes 
a r e  presented in  Section 4.4. 
The proposed SNAP-27, bat ter ies  and the associated heat-pipe instal-  
The installation requires  some study of the design integration prob- 
lation a r e  new functions required to provide the quiescent- state e lectr ical  
power. 
lem. 
stage. 
In addition, SNAP-27 waste heat output must  be piped into the ascent  
3.6 THE LUNAR SHELTER INTERFACE 
3.6. 1 Interface Causations 
As  a par t  of the 1975 mission concept a s  defined by LMSC (Refer- 
ence 1 -2 ) ,  a shel ter  is  to be sent up ahead of the LM/CSM personnel 
c a r r i e r ,  
while on the lunar surface,  
orbiting CSM or  the dormant LM vehicle, some interface requirements a r e  
imposed on the lunar  shelter by these vehicles. 
a r e  created by the need to be aware  of the status of both vehicle systems 
and to  be able to initiate compensating action in the event of operational 
anomalies , 
It is to provide the living and working quar te rs  for the personnel 
Since the re  wi l l  be no crewmen in either the 
The interface requirements 
These needs take the form of communications with the vehicle and 
status displays i n  the shelter.  The extent of status data handled by the 
shel ter  as opposed to the MSFN is yet to  be resolved and is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
requirements ,  particularly a s  they could affect the lunar shel ter :  
The following i s  a f i r s t  cut a t  a list of the interface 
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T a b l e  3 - 3 .  Lunar Module As c e n t  S tage  Recommenda t ions  and 
Effects Summary 
IS u b s y s t e m  P o w e r *  (Wat t s )  Weight  A ( P o u n d s )  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n  
1. R e p l a c e  a s c e n t  b a t t e r i e s  wi th  a l o n g e r -  
l i fe  v e r s i o n  ( s i l v e r - o x i d e ,  z i n c )  
2. R e p l a c e  p y r o  b a t t e r i e s  with d r y - c h a r g e  
3. Modify p o w e r  d i s t r ibu t ion .  
type .  
0 .1  
0 
0 
t 2  5 
t 4  
t 3 0  
E l e c t r i c a l  p o w e r  
(See  Sec t ion  4 .3 .  1) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a.  6 
3 
t 1  
t 3  0 
t 4  
t a  
+a 
1. Add h e a t  p ipe  a s s e m b l y .  
2. Add IMU/ASA by-pass .  
3. Add r a d i a t o r  and  con t ro l s .  
4. T h i r d  s u i t  u m b i l i c a l  h o s e  and  man i fo ld .  
5. Add squ ib  va lve  t o  0 2  and  H2 
6. Add L i  OH c a n i s t e r  and  o t h e r  s p a r e s .  
c o n t r o l  
(See  Sec t ion  4. 3. 2 )  
Guidance  
and  naviga t ion  
(See  Sec t ion  4. 3. 3) 
1. Send s p a r e  components  v i a  d i r e c t  l a n d e r  
i f  d e s i r e d .  Not n e c e s s a r y  to m e e t  
Apollo ob jec t ives .  
2. Make p r o v i s i o n  to  shut  down IMU h e a t e r .  
S t ab i l i t y  c o n t r o l  
(See  Sec t ion  4. 3. 4) 
1. Add p r o g r a m  coup le r  a s s e m b l y .  
2. P r o v i d e  r e m o t e  c o n t r o l s  f o r  CSM. 
0. a 
0 
t 1 5  
t 1 5  
~~ 
Add h e a t e r s  to thaw fue l  l i n e s  p r i o r  t o  
l aunch  f r o m  l u n a r  s u r f a c e .  
t 4  Reac t ion  c o n t r o l  
(See  Sec t ion  4 . 3 . 5 )  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
(See  Sec t ion  4. 3 . 6 )  
1. Add c o m m a n d  r e c e i v e r  and  decode r .  
2. Add r e m o v e  con t ro l  m o n i t o r  (of CSM). 
8 . 2  
0 
t 2 5  
t 1 0  
A s c e n t  p ropu l s ion  
(See  Sec t ion  4. 3 .7 )  
1. R e m o v e  a l l  p rope l l an t  t ankage ,  
2. Add new p rope l l an t  tankage .  
0 
0 
- 142 
t 1 7 0  
S t r u c t u r e  and  
c r e w  p r o v i s i o n s  
(See  Sec t ion  4. 3 .8 )  
~~ 
1. 
2. Add top -ha tch  t h e r m a l  cove r .  
3. Add r a d i a t i o n  pane l  s u p p o r t s .  
4. Modify a s c e n t  p rope l l an t - t ank  suppor t s .  
5. Add t h i r d - m a n  r e s t r a i n t  a s s e m b l y .  
6. Add c r e w  t r a n s f e r  and  s u p p o r t  s y s .  
Modify t h e r m a l  and  m e t e o r o i d  sh ie ld ing .  t 1 0 8  
t 1 3  
t 5  
t 1 5  
t 3  
t 8 0  
I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n  1. 
2 .  Modify t r a n s d u c e r ,  
3. Modify SCEA/CWEA.  
4. R e m o v e  t a p e  r e c o r d e r .  
5. Add t h i r d - m a n  functions.  
6. R e m o v e  TV and  cable .  
Add p rov i s ion  f o r  s t a t u s  m o n i t o r .  1 .7  
0 . 2  
0 . 2  
0 
0 
$10 
t 5  
t 1 0  
- 2  
t 2  5 
-9  
I Tota l s  ( d r y )  T h i r d  c r e w m a n  and  equip. 19.  8 47 5 
2 90 O t h e r s  I T h i r d  c r e w m a n  and  equip.  
Add p rope l l an t s  - 
T o t a l  i n j ec t ed  
weight  
601 
1366 
‘::Quiescent p h a s e  p o w e r  only,  
::::::With s p a r e s  ind ica t ed  i n  r e s p e c t i v e  sec t ion .  
[ ] R e q u i r e d  j u s t  p r i o r  to launch  only. 
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3 .  6.2 Shelter Communications Provisions 
1. Between CSM and shelter.  
a. Command message  generator (as in  LM). 
b. CSM status monitor/decoder.  
c. CSM status  display/alarm. 
d. VHF complement of equipments, a s  provided on LM. 
e. Possible  need for VHF antennas of 3 to 6 db gain ( requi res  
fur ther  study) , 
f. Signal processor  assembly. 
2. Between LM and shelter.  
a. LM status  monitor/decoder. 
b. LM status  display/alarm.  
c. VHF complement of equipments a s  provided on LM. (Same 
complement as under Id  above, and would be time-shared for 
CSM, LM, and EVA links, ) 
d. Signal processor  assembly, LM (time-shared).  
3 .  Between shel ter  and EVA crewman, 
a. VHF complement. 
shared for CSM, LM and EVA links.)  
(Same as under 1 and 2 above and time- 
b. EVA antenna (vertically polarized single element). 
c. Signal processor  assembly, LM (time-shared).  
4. Between shel ter  and ear th  MSFN. 
a. S-band t ransce ivers  similar to LM. 
b. S-band erectable  antenna as used with LM. 
c. Solid-state S-band power amplifier. (Recommended for high 
reliability for extended 90-day usage. ) 
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d. Signal processor  assembly, LM. (This i t e m  would be t ime- 
shared  among other links given above under 1, 2 and 3 . )  
e. Data up-link assembly,  
f. CSM status monitor and display/alarm.  (Same units as under 
1 above, but l isted h e r e  to interface with S-band rece ivers  for 
the case  of CSM status relayed CSM/earth/shelter.  This 
function could be accomplished via the up-data link with a few 
modifications o r  as baseband signal replacing P R N  range 
code. ) 
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4 . 0  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
4 . 1  COMMAND MODULE SYSTEMS" 
This section is a n  analysis of the Apolla Block I1 commandmodule (CM) 
sys tems a s  modified and applied to the ELOR Mission. 
on the ELOR sys tem functional requirements;  the system description i s  p re -  
sented only where required to reflect  the differences between the ELOR 
concept and that of Apollo 11. 
see  Reference 3 -1. 
on the SM electr ical  power plant, two concepts for CSM power generation 
a r e  considered: 
ner  as Apollo Block 11, and the RTG concept using two o r  three fuel cel ls  and 
two radioisotope thermoelectr ic  generators .  
r ec ommende d. 
Details a r e  presented 
F o r  details on the unchanged Apollo sys tems,  
As developed in the following analysis and in Section 4. 2 .1  
the fuel-cell concept using three  fuel cells  in the same man- 
The la t ter  concept i s  being 
4. 1 . 1  Reentry Electr ical  Power System 
NOTE: Some of the information used herein was provided by the 
Westinghouse Electr ic  Corporation through Reference 4-1,  
by ITT Industrial  Products through Reference 4 - 2 ,  and by 
Eagle Pi tcher  Company through Reference 4-3 ,  
Functional Description 
The electr ical  power system is divided between the command and 
serv ice  module. The command module is self-sufficient during the reent ry  
and recovery phases only, receiving i ts  power from the reent ry  and recovery 
bat ter ies ,  which a l so  provide emergency power. The normal power source 
fo r  the manned phases a r e  the fuel cells  for  the fuel-cell concept, and the 
fuel cel ls  and the RTG's in the RTG concept, The fuel cel ls  a r e  in the SM 
and a r e  analyzed in detail in Section 4. 2. 1 .  In the application of the RTG 
concept, the two RTG's  a r e  installed in the CM and a r e  used to supply the 
needed power for  the quiescent phase in lunar  orbit ,  
one fuel cell supplies the power for the quiescent phase.  
4 
In the fuel-cell concept, 
The electr ical  power subsystem (EPS) consists of the equipment and 
reactants  required to  supply the electr ical  energy sources ,  power generation 
and controls,  power conversion and conditioning, and power distribution to  
the electr ical  buses (Figure 4-1). Power is  supplied the command and 
'A foldout sheet listing abbreviations used in Section 4.1 and their meanings is located at page 159. 
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serv ice  module (CSM) to fulfill a l l  requirements  and to  the lunar module (LM) 
for operation of hea te r  c i rcui ts  af ter  transposit ion and docking, 
can be functionally divided into four major categories: 
The E P S  
1. Energy s torage (cryogenics s torage and the entry,  postlanding, 
and p y r ot e c hnic ba tt e r i e s) , 
2 .  
3 .  
Power generation (fuel-cell power plants and RTG's). 
Power conversion (solid-state inver te rs  and battery charger) .  
4. Power distribution (d-c and a - c  power buses,  d-'c and a - c  
sensing circui ts ,  controls, and displays). 
In general ,  the system operates in  three  modes: peak, average, and 
Peak loads occur during the short  velocity changes, minimum-mission loads,  
including boost, 
plemented by two of t h ree  entry batteries.  
two of th ree  inve r t e r s ,  
th ree  fuel-cell  power plants, and a -c  power is supplied by one o r  two 
inverters .  
power during the quiescent state. 
D-c power is supplied by three  fuel cell  power plants sup- 
A-c power i s  processed through 
During coast  periods,  d-c  power is supplied by 
The RTG's  a r e  active during all phases ,  providing the only 
Energy Storage. The pr imary  source of energy is provided by the 
cryogenic gas  s torage system that provides fuel (H2) and oxidizer (02) to the 
power -generating system, 
ciated controls and plumbing a r e  located in the serv ice  module. 
reactants  i s  accomplished under controlled cryogenic temperature  and p r e s -  
sures ;  automatic and manual p re s su re  control i s  provided, 
of the reactants  for  repressurizat ion i s  dependent on energy demand by the 
power -generating and/or  environmental contr ol subsystems. 
Two hydrogen and two ixygen  tanks with-the a s so -  
Storage of 
Automatic heating 
A secondary source of energy storage is provided by five bat ter ies  
located in the CM. Three  rechargeable entry and postlanding batteries 
supply sequencer -logic power a t  all t imes;  supplemental d-c power for 
peak loads; all operating power required for entry and postlanding; and when 
appropriately connected, either o r  both pyro circui ts .  Two pyro bat ter ies  
provide energy for activation of pyro devices when required,  
' 
Power Generation. Three Bacon-type fuel-cell  power plants, gen- 
erating power through electrochemical reaction of H2 and 0 
SNAP-27A supply pr imary  d-c power to spacecraf t  systems until CSM 
separation, For  normal  operation, a l l  th ree  power plants generate power, 
but two a r e  adequate to  complete the mission. Should two of the three  ma l -  
function, one power plant with nonessential loads removed will insure  suc-  
cessful mission completion, F o r  details, see  Section 4. 2. 1. 
and/or  the 2' 
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Power Conversion and Conditioning: P r i m a r y  d-c  power i s  converted 
into a - c  by solid-state static inver te rs  that provide 115/200-volt, 4OO-cps, 
3-phase,  a - c  power up to 1,250 volt-amperes each. A-c power i s  connected 
by motor  switch controls to two a -c  buses for distribution to the a -c  loads,  
One inver te r  has  the capacity to supply all spacecraft  p r imary  a -c  power. 
One inver te r  can power both buses while the two remaining inver te rs  act  a s  
redundant sources ,  
separa te  inver te r ,  
the event of malfunctions, 
therefore ,  interlocked motorized switching circui ts  a r e  incorporated to 
prevent connection of two inver te rs  to  the same bus. 
During velocity changes, each bus is powered by a 
Provisions a r e  made for bus and/or  inverter  isolation in 
Inverter outputs cannot be phase -synchronized; 
A second conversion unit, the  bat tery charger ,  a s s u r e s  keeping the 
th ree  entry and postlanding bat ter ies  in a fully charged s ta te ,  
s ta te  device utilizing dc and a c  to develop charging voltage. 
It i s  a solid- 
Power Distribution, 
two redundant d-c buses in the SM, which a r e  connected to  two redundant 
buses in  the CM. 
nonessential loads; a flight bus for servicing in-flight telecommunications 
equipment; two bat tery buses for distributing power to  sequencers ,  gimbal 
motor controls,  and servicing the battery relay bus for power distribution 
switching; and a flight and postlanding loads bus. 
Distribution of d-c power i s  accomplished via 
Additional buses provided a r e  two d-c buses for servicing 
Three-phase a -c  i s  distributed via two redundant a -c  buses, providing 
bus selection through switches in the a - c  operated component circuits.  
Power t o  the lunar  module i s  provided through two redundant umbili- 
ca l s ,  which a r e  manually connected after completion of transposition and 
docking. 
abort  sensor  assembly  (ASA) and to cycling hea ters  in the landing r ada r ,  
rendezvous r a d a r ,  S-band antenna, and iner t ia l  measurement unit (IMU). 
Power consumption with all hea te rs  operating simultaneously is approxi- 
mately 309 watts,  
An average of 81 watts dc i s  provided to continuous hea ters  in the 
Sensing circui ts  monitor bus voltages and provide a warning indica- 
tion of out-of -tolerance conditions. 
fuel-cell load o r  reverse-cur ren t  l imi t s  a r e  exceeded, when an  inverter  
overvoltage occurs ,  o r  when cur ren t  l imits  a r e  exceeded, 
They activate disconnect relays when 
System Analysis 
The reent ry  electr ical  power sys tem and the other component of the 
CM-EPS will remain  substantially unchanged except fo r  the following: 
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Components 
Bat ter ies  
(1 of 3)  
1. Replace tLe reent ry / recovery  bat ter ies  with a silver-cadmium 
type already developed by Eagle P i tcher  Co. (Reference 4-3). 
AWeight 
Duty Cycle P S  Spares (Pounds ) 
2300 h r  1 . 0  0 t33 .0  
100 cy 
2. Add new circui t  b reake r s  t o  control the additional components 
added to  the CSM. 
397 h r  
2374 h r  Inverter  (1 of 3 )  
(1 of 2 each) 
Circuit  b reake r s  169/2374 hr 
< 5 0  cy 
Totals 
3. 
4. 
Replace pyrotechnic bat ter ies  with a longer life si lver-oxide zinc 
type. 
Add radioisotope thermoelectr ic  generators  (SD concept only, 
s ee  Section 4.2. I ) .  
>o. 9999 0 0 
0.9992 * 1 t52 .5  
9 0.9999 0 0 
= 0.999 1 t85. 5 
The functional requirements  have not changed, except for the extended 
life factor;  and all components a r e  expected to  meet  this requirement without 
change, 
Figure 4-2. 
units required for  the quiescent mode, 
The c rew safe re turn  logic for the total  EPS  is as presented in 
The numbers  above the blocks indicate the number of functioning 
The circui t  b reakers ,  normally considered a high-failure-hazard 
component, a r e  not expected to  present  a problem since the number of use  
cycles are expected to  be less than for the Apollo mission, 
The EPS system contribution to  the probability of safe re turn  (P,) 
may exceed 0.999 with the aforementioned changes (see Table 4-1). 
remaining weakness is the inverter ;  however, it may prove to be more 
reliable than present  data supports,  
indicate that the inver te r  may actually be better than now estimated; fur ther -  
more ,  it can easi ly  be improved, In any event, one additional standby unit 
will exceed any requirement  imposed by ELOR. 
The one 
Westinghouse data (Reference 4-1) 
The fuel cel ls  and RTG are discussed under Paragraph 4.2.  I as par t  
of the service module, 
Table 4- 1. Ent ry  Elec t r ica l  Power,  Crit ical  Components Analysis 
Batter charger  I (1 of 3 7  . 
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4.1.2 Environmental  Control Svstem (CM-ECS) 
NOTE: Much of the information used here in  was provided by the 
AiResearch Manufacturing Division of Garre t t  through 
Reference 4-4. 
Subs y s t em Des c ription 
In addition to the normal  Apollo requirements ,  the CM-ECS is to  
provide a means of controlling the CM quiescent-state environment fo r  the 
90-day unmanned lunar  polar orbit, s o  that at the end of this period, when 
the crew re tu rns ,  the ECS and other sys tems will be able to  function in the 
normal  manner  for the re turn  to ear th ,  The ECS, therefore ,  mus t  provide 
the following functions: 
1. Limit tempera ture  excursions of the cabin wall to  t 40  to 100 F. 
2. Assure  a water-glycol temperature  within safe l imits ;  i. e . ,  
above the freezing point for this mixture. 
3. P ro tec t  equipment from damage due to freezing of contained 
water  (drinking, wash and EPS by-products). 
4. Maintain minimum required atmosphere p r e s s u r e  to  prevent 
decomposition of spacecraft  ma te r i a l s  through outgas sing and 
sublimation, about 0 .  5 psia .  
a r e  expected t o  be tolerable.  
Variations of f rom 0 .  1 to  5 .0  
5 .  Assess  cabin p r e s s u r e  and cr i t ical  temperatures;  provide for 
critical-function failure a l a rms .  
6 .  Provide remote  o r  automatic control to switch redundant systems.  
Detailed information concerning environmental heat loads imposed 
upon the CM cabin in te r ior  and atmosphere throughout the 90-day mission 
is  scant.  However, based upon detailed information generated by NR/SD 
fo r  the lunar  mapping miss ion  of the Apollo Extension System (AES), and 
l a t e r  Apollo Applications P rogram (AAP), it is anticipated that there  would 
be a cabin heat l o s s  from the inter ior  into space.  The lunar mapping m i s -  
sion called f o r  a lunar  polar orbit, where the cabin heat load computed for  
this mi s s ion  was  - 1, 235 Btu/ h r  (Reference 4- 5 ) .  Extrapolation indicated 
that the ELOR loss  could be as low as 300 Btu/hr .  
is  expected to resu l t  i n  a continuous heat l o s s  to  space. 
substantiated by the AAP study, which gave the average equatorial lunar 
orbi t  loads as -35 Btu /hr  and the maximum as t115 Btu/hr for the CM. 
The bulk of the mission 
This effect is  
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The total  of all e lectr ical  loads within the command module is es t i -  
mated to be 284 watts,  o r  970 Btu/hr.  
heat i s  rejected to  the cabin atmosphere o r  the glycol heat-transport  circuit. 
As revealed in recent  Apollo thermal/vacuum te s t s ,  much of this heat is  
passively rejected to  space via conduction through the vehicle s t ructure .  
These tes t s  reveal  cooler -than-expected cabin conditions, Therefore,  active 
cooling of the cabin inter ior  and atmosphere would not be required f o r  this  
mission. 
Not all of this electrically derived 
Rather ,  a nominal amount of cabin heating would be required,  
F igure  4-3 presents  the skeletal schematic of the active elements 
of the CSM ECS for  the quiescent lunar orbit  mode. It i s  noted that the heat 
source  f o r  the ECS glycol circuit  is  an intercooler heat exchanger thermally 
connecting the ECS and electr ical-power-system (EPS) circuits.  
positioning (Vernatherm) control valve bypasses fluid around the intercooler 
in o rde r  t o  l imit  the ECS glycol temperature  excursions. 
solenoid valves and two manual shutoff valves a r e  used to  provide the a l t e r -  
nate flow path into the intercooler exchanger, 
new design of the latching type. The shutoff valves a r e  Apollo ECS 
Item 2.28 valves. The solenoid valves may be actuated remotely, whenever 
isolation of the ECS and EPS  i s  desired,  Because of the expected cold 
environment conditions, the heat absorbed by the intercooler and in the 
active CM cold plates i s  rejected passively in the r e s t  of the inactive com- 
ponents of the loop. 
extensive inactive cold-plate network; in turn ,  some of this heat will be 
re jected to  the cabin atmosphere.  
A self-  
Three ganged 
The solenoid valves a r e  a 
Most of the heat rejection will probably occur in the 
The other active component in the CSM glycol loop is the glycol pump. 
Here a new pump selector  control has  been added to  monitor flow ra te  and 
to  automatically switch to  the standby pump i f  the pump fails. 
system status a l so  is te lemetered by this control. 
Pumping- 
The secondary glycol circuit  in the CM ECS i s  s imilar ly  connected 
t o  the EPS  through the intercooler,  
exchanger with passages for  both ECS glycol fluids (this arrangement  i s  
direct ly  analogous to that of the suit c i rcui t  heat exchanger, Item 1. 29). 
A second control valve and three  more  ganged solenoid valves a r e  required,  
The circui t  i s  normally inactive, In emergencies ,  it may be activated 
remotely by turning on the glycol pump in the loop. 
The intercooler i s  a three-fluid 
Cabin pressur iza t ion is  maintained by two fixed-area bleed devices on the 
1,’OOO-psi oxygen supply l ine.  The bleed devices a r e  new concepts andhave yet to 
be designed; severa l  types a r e  available commercially,  however. Some of 
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these  employ labyrinth pas sages;  others  employ specially calibrated porous 
plates,  Simple orifices a r e  susceptible to  plugging and thus a r e  not usable, 
The flow to  the cabin, in  the range 0 . 1  to 0.25 l b  of oxygen per  day, is  
designed to  equal the CM leakage at  cabin p re s su res  in the range 0 . 3  to  
0 . 8  psia,  
The r e s t  of the Apollo oxygen supply system is turned off by means 
of a latching solenoid valve, 
the 90 days of manned operation, 
of the valve turns  on the normal  5-psia supply system to r ep res su r i ze  the 
cabin. 
No power i s  required for this  valve during 
At the end of this t ime,  remote activation 
Glycol flow, at a tempera ture  of approximately 75 F, provides thermal  
conditioning of water -containing components that might be damaged by f r eez -  
ing. 
c i rcui t  heat exchanger (Item 1. 29 ) ,  and the water chil ler (Item 5. 14). The 
secondary evaporator (Item 2. 7 ) ,  whose glycol c i rcui t  is normally off, i s  
kept above freezing by its proximity in the environmental control unit (ECU) 
package to  the many glycol-containing components of the p r imary  circuit ,  
Included among such i tems are the evaporator (Item 2.  6), the sui t -  
It is proposed that the water-valve panel in the ECU and the externally 
s tored water tanks be thermally conditioned by parasi t ic  EPS heat and 
insulation, 
its own heater  or  by paras i t ic  heat from the electr ical  power source.  
The potable water supply assembly can be kept f rom freezing by 
All ECS controls,  except the pump selector control, a r e  off and 
control valves manually positioned. 
closed; the cabin heat exchanger valves a r e  set  to  allow warm glycol to 
flow in  the exchanger; and cabin fans a r e  turned off, 
isolated by closure of the suit hose connectors. 
regulator is  turned off, and the cyclic accumulators a r e  placed in a standby 
mode. Both lithium hydroxide charges a r e  removed from the C02 absorber  
canis ter  (Item 1.15)  and s tored t o  prevent dehydration into LiO. 
Water boiler back-pressure valves a r e  
The suit circuit  i s  
The suit-circuit  demand 
The water subsystem in the CM is turned off during the unmanned 
lunar  orbit, 
be utilized during this t ime,  This function would be to accept by-product 
water f rom the fuel cel ls  and to  either s tore  it or  vent it to space. 
of the relatively low reliability of the la t te r  function, however, alternate 
a r rangements  for  water disposal a r e  suggested. Water dumping now involves 
flowing water through many feet of tubing, f rom the SM to the CM water sub- 
system, to  the overboard dump nozzle and, thus,  poses considerable r i sk  of 
freezing. 
use)  is not required during this mission s tage,  water dumping to  space could 
be accomplished more  reliably directly f rom the EPS in the SM. 
ample waste heat is available to  ensure  against freezing. 
Potentially, only one of the functions of this subsystem could 
Because 
Since water s torage ( for  c rew drinking or  for ECS heat-rejection 
Here,  
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The ECS SM radiators  a r e  bypassed by use of the diver ter  valve 
(Item 2 .36 )  in  the CM. The heat rejection load of the ECS i s  s o  smal l  that ,  
without major  modifications , the radiators  would stagnate and either lower 
the total flow in  the glycol circuit  o r  stop it entirely. 
low loads (1500 Btu /hr  o r  l e s s )  on the radiator  system i s  described in 
Reference 4.6. 
Radiator tempera tures  may become ve ry  low; but with the thermal  control 
afforded by rolling the spacecraft  in the sun's r ays ,  actual freezing of the 
panels i s  not expected. 
fluid f rom the CM glycol c i rcui t  in  the event of meteoroid puncture of 
radiator  tubes on the vehicle exter ior .  
The effect of such 
Because of these effects, the radiator  circuit  is  turned off, 
Isolation of the rad ia tors  also precludes the loss of 
Systems Analysis 
Basic  Considerations. One of the most  important considerations i n  
this study was that of minimum change of existing Apollo Block I1 sys tems.  
Since this c r i te r ion  was accompanied by considerably relaxed performance 
specifications for  the 90-day unmanned lunar orbit ,  very  few changes were  
necessary  in the ECS. 
In the a r e a  of thermal  control, however, some uncertainty exis ts  
regarding the requirements  for the ECS, since detailed information i s  
lacking on the environmental load on the cabin inter ior .  
such loads r equ i r e s  complex and t ime -consuming t ransient  computations of 
(1) the radiant interchange of the vehicle and its environment and (2)  the 
transient heat conduction in the vehicle s t ructure .  
tions must  be c a r r i e d  out over the ent i re  lunar  orbit  stage of the mission. 
Such computations were  not a par t  of this study, 
The generation of 
Each of these computa- 
Another cr i t ical  design consideration i s  the relatively high rel iabi l -  
ity goal, 0. 999,  for  the ECS for  the 90-day unmanned lunar orbit, Most of 
the redundancies present  in the Apollo ECS a r e  set  up for manual switching. 
For example, s i x  regulators  in the oxygen system all  have manual provisions 
for  turning off a regulator if a valve fails open, Obviously, such provisions 
a r e  meaningless for  unmanned operation, 
for  many components, including the regulators ,  a r e  approximately 3 to 
10 fa i lures  per  l o 6  h r ,  which f a r  exceeds the allowable 0.46 failures per  
10 6 h r ,  use of many components during the semiactive operational stage 
was ruled out. 
capability would have introduced considerable complexity into the systems.  
A good deal of effort was made  to  establish a separable and reliable system- 
operating configuration. 
Because the basic failure ra tes  
To provide redundancy and automatic (or remote) switching 
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0 .  5-PSIA Pressurizat ion.  A review of the capability of the Apollo ECS 
oxygen supply subsystem indicated that, because of reliability considerations 
for  the unmanned 90-day lunar  orbit ,  the cur ren t  cabin pressurizat ion com- 
ponents could not, and need not, be used without substantial modification, 
Also, since the present  5.  O-psia cabin p r e s s u r e  regulator could not be modi- 
fied for use  a t  0 .  5 ps ia ,  a new valve would have to be designed. 
situations prompted a cr i t ical  evaluation of the 0 .  5 psia  cabin pressurizat ion 
requirement .  Curren t  data indicate that p r e s s u r e  levels of 0 .  1 psia  a r e  
sufficient. 
ized f rom the manned orbiting laboratory a t  0 .  1 psia  f o r  30 days. 
specification of 0 .  5 psia  was considered to be a ta rge t  value with a lower 
limit of approximately 0 .  1 psia .  Below the burs t  p r e s s u r e  of the vehicle, 
t he re  i s  no expressed upper limit of cabin p re s su re .  However, any such 
upper limit would r e su l t  f rom requirements f o r  the conservation of stored 
cryogenic oxygen. Presumably,  enough oxygen would be ca r r i ed  to main- 
ta in  the cabin at 0.  5 psia  for 90 days, based upon expected CM leakage ra tes  
at this p re s su re .  Higher cabin p re s su res  would resul t  in grea te r  leakage 
and thus requi re  a l a r g e r  quantity of s tored oxygen. 
These 
F o r  example, the Gemini B capsule i s  designed t o  be p re s su r -  
The ELOR 
It is expected that, by 1975, when extended missions a r e  to be under- 
taken, CM leakage r a t e s  will be well known and fair ly  low. It has  been 
assumed,  therefore ,  that  cabin pressurizat ion can be maintained within 
reasonable limits by a constant flow ra t e  of oxygen into the CM inter ior .  
This flow ra te  is  normally se t  equal to leakage r a t e s  for  between 0 .  5 to 0 .  7 
psia  cabin p r e s s u r e .  
CM, only the allocated quantity of cryogenic oxygen is used. 
r a t e s  of twice that expected, the cabin p re s su re  would be maintained a t  
approximately 0 .  25 psia .  F o r  lower-than-expected leakage, the cabin p re s -  
s u r e  will simply be higher than 0 .  5, with no inc rease  in  the consumption 
ra te .  
s t ruc tura l  integrity of the cabin would be maintained by the normal  function 
of the cabin pressure- re l ie f  valve (Item 3. 1).  
The flow is to  be limited s o  that,  even with a punctured 
For leakage 
F o r  extremely low leakage values (which a r e  very unlikely), the 
The method chosen to provide the constant oxygen pressurizat ion flow 
is by means  of two constant-area res t r ic tors .  Each res t r ic tor  i s  sized to 
give a flow of approximately 0.  0 1 lb  pe r  h r ,  the total flow being equivalent 
to the estimated leakage r a t e  of 0.  48 lb per  day. Complete plugging of one 
r e s t r i c to r  still provides pressurizat ion a t  0 .  25 psia .  
be of two types, both commercially available. 
porous meta l  plates;  the other u ses  labyrinth flow paths.  
reasonably tolerant  to blockage by some particulate mat te r  in  the oxygen and 
considerably m o r e  s o  than orifice devices. 
The res t r ic tor  can 
Both types a r e  
One type uses  calibrated 
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In normal  ECS operation, the r e s t r i c to r s  a r e  turned off by means  of 
a manual  valve (Item 4. 26). 
of the oxygen supply sys tem is closed off by means  of a latching solenoid 
valve. 
of the valve for  the 90-day period. 
In lunar orbit ,  th i s  valve i s  open, and the r e s t  
A latching type of valve has  been chosen to  maintain reliable operation 
Thermal  Control. Study NAS8-21006 indicated that the electrical 
power sys tem parasi t ic  load could be used as a heat source for  the CM ECS 
heat- t ransport  loop. 
allow hot glycol f r o m  the EPS  to flow into the ECS, with suitable tempera ture  
control valves to limit ECS glycol temperatures .  The  concept was studied 
in  detail ,  and then finally abandoned in favor of the concept using an inter- 
cooler.  The main difficulty with the interconnection of the circui ts  is that  
of maintaining proper  flow rates in both loops. The ECS flow is nominally 
200 l b / h r ,  while the EPS flow i s  l e s s  than 110 l b / h r .  
and EPS pumps a r e  variable-displacement types (centrifugal and vane types, 
respectively),  interconnection of the circui ts  would require  an extensive 
development program to ensure proper  operation of both circui ts  while 
interconnected. Such a p rogram would involve the proper  matching of pres -  
s u r e  levels,  a s  well as p r e s s u r e  drops;  these pa rame te r s  would be found t o  
va ry  with the position of the thermal  control valves. 
The method chosen to be utilized was  to  physically 
Since both the ECS 
The thermal  connection of the circui ts  by use  of an intercooler i s  
eminently simple and straightforward. Thermal  control; that  i s ,  selective 
heating of the ECS glycol, i s  easily attained with a reliable,  self-positioning, 
control valve. 
cuit without considering the complicated problem of fluid interchange. 
Reliability of the fuel-cell glycol loop would be maintained, since a leak in 
the ECS circui t  could not affect the high-priority EPS. The only disadvantage 
i s  the weight of the intercooler exchanger. The weight of the unit, designed 
f o r  low-pressure drops i n  each circui t ,  i s  estimated t o  be about 5 lb.  
Each c i rcu i t  may  b e  qualified independently of the other c i r -  
The isolation valves a r e  required t o  separate  and couple the two circui ts  
fo r  the different operating modes.  
a r e  of the latching solenoid type.  This type of valve was chosen t o  mee t  the 
reliabil i ty requirement on the system. Normally, these valves would be 
required to  operate through only one cycle i n  the mission.  Since no e lec t r i -  
cal cur ren t  i s  required during the 90-day period, a very low fai lure  r a t e  for  
these valves i s  expected. Should the temperature-control valve fail i n  t h e  
exchanger full-flow position and permi t  intercooler-outlet temperatures  
above 80 F, the remote  switching capability of these valves can be used to  
isolate  the two c i rcu i t s .  Periodic interconnection and disconnection could 
be used to maintain CM glycol temperature  control in the event of such a 
fai lure .  
These a r e  in the interconnecting l ines  and 
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F o r  the ea r th  atmosphere entry portion of the mission, when the SM 
i s  detached f rom the CM, backup for  the solenoid valves i s  provided by man-  
ual valves (Item 2.  28) .  
open; for the manned portion of the orbi t ,  the  valves a r e  closed. 
F o r  unmanned lunar  orbit ,  these valves a r e  normally 
During the quiescent mode when the radiant heat loss  f rom the vehicle 
skin exceeds the sum of the radiant heat absorption from the environment 
and the heat being generated in the CM itself (crew metabolic loads, com- 
p r e s s o r  loads,  C 0 2  absorption loads,  and cabin fan loads a r e  all absent;  and 
electronic loads a r e  greatly reduced), it i s  c lear ly  mandatory that some 
fo rm of heating be  provided. The major  reason  for heating is to prevent 
freezing in ,  and thus possible damage of, components containing water .  The 
flow of glycol in the temperature  range of 55 to 75 F through such components 
provides sufficient heat to prevent freezing and maintain the desired cabin 
temper  a tur  e.  
It is expected that cabin temperature  will be no l e s s  than t 4 0 " F  require-  
ment  throughout the mission.  
plished passively by conduction through the extensive cold-plate s t ructure .  
Although w a r m  glycol will be circulating through the cabin heat exchanger, 
no convective heat t ransfer  i s  required f rom the unit, and the fans a r e  
turned off. 
The actual heat t r ans fe r  to  the cabin i s  accom- 
Active heat-rejection devices of the CSM ECS a r e  not needed for the low 
loads expected; therefore ,  both boi lers  and the ECS radiators  may be turned 
off. 
event of sustained low cabin tempera tures ;  but the water  feed t o  the units 
and their  control sys tems a r e  turned off.  
sys tem i s  bypassed, leaving stagnant glycol i n  this  portion of the system. 
Actual freezing i n  the radiators  of the CM lines i s  not expected, even with 
low tempera tures .  Continual barbecuing of the vehicle will limit the low 
tempera tures  to above the freezing point of the 62 .  5 percent glycol mixture .  
Glycol flows through the boilers to prevent freezing in  them in the 
The ent i re  ECS CM radiator 
If detailed thermal  analyses should show potential freezing of stagnant 
l ines in  the CSM, e lec t r ic  blankets may be  used to thaw the l ines when the 
sys tem is to be reactivated.  
preclude their  l a t e r  use ,  since selective orientation of the vehicle relative 
t o  the sun could be used to  thaw the panels.  Damaging effects, i f  any, of 
freezing the glycol fluid within components and l ines is, of course,  an 
over riding consider ation. 
Freezing i n  the radiator  panels would not 
Cooling of those electronic components i n  operation in  the CM is 
accomplished by the flow of glycol at 55 to 75 F. 
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The reliabil i ty of the glycol loop i s  l imited pr imar i ly  by the life of 
the glycol pumps, Life tes t s  on the pumps indicate useful operating t imes 
of 6 , 0 0 0  h r ,  which exceeds the mission duration by near ly  a factor of three. 
In the p r imary  circuit ,  a backup glycol pump, which is  presently activated 
manually, i s  available. For  ELOR, an automatic pump-selector control is  
provided. For even grea te r  assurance  of continued ECS functioning, should 
both pumps fail, or a single leakage failure i n  the p r imary  glycol c i rcui t  
occur,  the control can activate the secondary CSM glycol loop. 
this loop requi res  an additional s e t  of glycol passages i n  the intercooler  
exchanger. 
a tmo s phe r e c i r  cula ti on being r equi r ed. 
The use  of 
Cabin temperature  control can be obtained passively without 
In st r um entation and Monitoring . The following ins  t r um entation 
additions to the cur ren t  Apollo Block I1 ECS a r e  recommended for extended 
lunar orbital  missions: 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
A second cabin-pressure t ransducer  i s  required to  monitor the 
0 . 5  psia  cabin p re s su re ,  The cur ren t  0-to-17 psia cabin p r e s -  
s u r e  t ransducer  has  a tolerance of *O, 425 psia, which i s  not 
accurate  enough for  low-pressure monitoring. The new p res su re  
t ransducer  should have a sensing range of 0 to 2 psia and a 
tolerance of about *O, 06 psia. These a r e  commercially available. 
A tempera ture  sensor  is required to  monitor the control function 
of the temperature-control  bypass valve on the ECS/EPS inter-  
cooler.  
ECS glycol loop could be subjected to  tempera tures  in the range 
of 100 to 120 F. 
outlet temperature  will detect such a failure well before i t s  effect 
would be evident f rom the present  ECS instrumentation, 
ea r ly  detection of such fai lure ,  coupled with the fact  that the 
CM glycol loop has  appreciable thermal  capacitance, would 
probably allow the crew sufficient t ime to remotely switch to  
the secondary glycol loop and then, depending on the abort  
c r i te r ia ,  permit  c rew re tu rn  to the CM before damage occurs  to 
c r i t i c  a1 electronic s , 
Should this valve fail closed, it i s  possible that the 
The d i rec t  monitoring of the control valve 
The 
A flow indicator is required f o r  the automatic pump selector 
control,  
pump failure. 
two other ECS indicators.  
This device would only have ON/OFF reading to signal 
Actual flow ra t e  indications a r e  available f rom 
The normal  Apollo ECS instrumentation readings, plus the above 
three  measurements ,  would normally be te lemetered to earth.  Selected 
te lemetry and a l a r m s  to  the lunar surface would include the three  measure-  
ment, pump p res su res ,  glycol flow ra t e ,  cabin temperature ,  and electronic 
cold-plate tempera tures .  
show the following conditions: 
Alarms  indicating CSM ECS problems would 
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1, 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6. 
Fai lure  of a glycol pump a s  evidenced by (1) the flow indicator, 
(2)  a low or z e r o  pump pressure  differential p re s su re ,  o r  
(3 )  a low reading f rom the cold-plate glycol flow ra te  t ransducer ,  
Loss of glycol determined by a bottomed glycol accumulator 
quantity t ransducer ,  
Excessive cabin leakage as indicated by the cabin p re s su re  
sensor .  
Malfunction of the intercooler temperature  limiting control 
noted by glycol tempera tures  over 8 0  F f rom the intercooler.  
High (or  low) electronic cold-plate tempera tures .  
High (o r  low) cabin temperatures ,  
Remote Control. Provisions from MSFN o r  the lunar surface should 
include the ability to  select  o r  deactivate any of the three  glycol pumps; and 
the operation of the three  ganged solenoids in  e i ther  c i rcui t  that permit  
glycol flow into the ECS/EPS intercooler.  
pump a lso  i s  automatic whenever the p r imary  pump flow falls to  a cer ta in  
level. 
function of the control. 
The selection of the backup 
Remote actuation of the pump selector control overr ides  the automatic 
The oxygen shutoff valve can be remotely controlled so  that the cabin 
can be repressur ized  by the emergency inflow valve (Item 4.22) pr ior  t o  
c rew rendezvous with the CSM. 
ECS Safety and the 90-Day Requirement 
Because par t s  of the ECS system operate throughout the 90-day 
quiescent phase a s  well as the manned phases of the mission, i ts  functions 
contribute to both Ps and P90. 
separately and then identify the interaction. 
It is therefore necessary  to evaluate each 
The manned phases involve the Apollo Block I1 system functions only; 
however, they a r e  required to  operate about 175 hours ,  2 5  percent l e s s  than 
for  the DRM. The resu l t  i s  that  the system contribution to  Ps should 
should approach Ps = 0. 9997, actually exceeding the expected DRM value, 
because the c rew leaves the CSM soon af ter  a r r iva l  in lunar  orbit ,  No 
changes o r  modifications are required for those functions not operating 
during the quiescent phase, 
the shutdown and s torage procedure presented in  Appendix A i s  followed, 
This assumption is based on the premise that 
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The quiescent phase involves use  of only a small  portion of the 
Block I1 system. 
logic of F igure  4-4. 
requirement  and P90.  
figured t o  achieve a P 9 0  of 0. 9995. 
the potential fa i lure  modes of any significance. 
The involved components a r e  presented in the reliability 
The system functions as i l lustrated have been con- 
The analysis takes  into account a l l  of 
Fa i lure  of this function mere ly  affects the abort  
The fai lure  r a t e  for  each latching solenoid valve is taken t o  be 
0.05 x 10-6 fai lures  per  hour. 
these valves must  undergo only a few operational cycles in the 90 days-and 
potentially only one cycle. 
(mean cycles between fa i lures ) ,  instead of MTBF, the value would be about 
20 x 10-6 fa i lures  per  cycle. 
would be the same (0. 99989) a s  that calculated f rom the hourly failure ra te ,  
The reason  for  such a low value is  that 
If the fai lure  r a t e  were  expressed in  MCBF 
The reliability for five cycles of operation 
The pump selector  control i s  activated automatically whenever the 
flow indicator ceases  to detect the proper glycol-circuit .flow ra te .  
control then selects  the backup pump in the p r imary  circuit ;  i f  this pump 
has  al ready been in operation, the control selects  the pump in the secondary 
circuit .  The fai lure  ra te  for the automatic selector  (10  x l o m 6 )  includes 
the flow indicator instrument.  A backup, remotely controlled selector a l so  
is provided. 
in the event that  two or  more  of the others failed during the dormant phase. 
The backup selector  can override the automatic selector ,  Information that 
would be used to  define the need to use the backup selector comes f rom the 
te lemetry of pump differential  p res  su re ,  o r  cold-plate outlet glycol flow 
ra t e ,  o r  both. 
i ts  fa i lure  r a t e  (2 x 10-6 )  i s  assumed to  be lower than that of the automatic 
selector.  Reliability of the remote control communications link, however, 
has  not been considered here .  
The 
A spa re  pump motor i s  recommended for  use af ter  crew re turn  
Since the backup selector  does not depend on just  one sensor ,  
In each glycol circuit ,  the cr i t ical  fa i lure-rate  component is  the 
The predominant failure of this 
As discussed ea r l i e r ,  
intercooler tempera ture  control valve, 
type of self-positioning valve i s  to  j a m  or  stick. 
should this valve j a m  with f u l l  flow to the intercooler,  the ECS glycol 
c i rcui t  would potentially experience 100 to  120 F temperatuqes,  which heat 
would be damaging to  electronic components, 
ECS/EPS isolation valves would have to  be remotely activated to  isolate the 
circuits;  then the secondary circuit  would have to  be used. 
is not fully accounted for in Figure 4-1. 
intermediate position might, however, require  no remedial  action. 
With such a failure,  the 
This operation 
A jamming of the valve in an  
Maintenance or repa i r  i s  not considered a requirement for the CM- 
After re turn  to  the CM, the c rew could replace a faulty 
ECS since it i s  impract ical  during the quiescent mode and not indicated to 
be a requirement.  
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pump motor if required,  
act ion for  the whole sys tem,  a spa re  would add only 1. 5 pounds. 
This task  seems to  be the only potential M&R 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
The system as here in  defined will satisfy the ELOR requirements 
and provide a P 9 0  of 0.9995 and a Ps of 0. 9997. 
l imited to  2 2 . 6  pounds and the power consumption during the quiescent 
mode will be about 50 wat ts ,  No new technology i s  required,  although 
10 new i tems a r e  required,  
p ro  cur ement cycle. 
The weight increase  i s  
They a r e  either available o r  requi re  a short  
Table 4-2 gives the development status of those components used in 
the ELOR ECS in addition t o  those in the Apollo ECS. 
Table 4-2. Development Status of ECS Components 
Added to the LOR Configuration 
Component 
Oxygen shutoff valve, latching solenoid 
Oxygen shutoff valve remote  actuator 
Oxygen shutoff valve, manual 
Cabin pressurizat ion r e s  t r ic tor  
Cabin p re s su re  t ransducer ,  0 to 2 psia 
Suit - c i r  cui t- exchanger water  tank 
ECS/EPS intercooler heat  exchanger 
Temperature  contr ol valve, self-  positioning 
Temper a tur e t ransducer  
(Ve r na the rm) 
ECS/EPS isolation valve, latching solenoid 
ECS/EPS isolation backup valve, manual 
Isolation valve remote  actuator 
Pump selector control 
Flow indicator 
Number 
Required 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
Development 
Status 
New 
New 
Qualified Apollo, 
New, commercially 
New 
New 
New 
New 
Item 4. 26 
available 
Qualified Apollo, 
Item 8. 23 
New 
Qualified Apollo, 
New 
New 
New 
Item 2. 28 
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4. 1. 3 Guidance and Navigation 
NOTE: Much of the information used here in  has  been provided by the 
A. C. Electronics Division of General’ Motors Corporation 
through Reference 4-7.  
System Description 
The guidance and navigation (G&N) sys t em is employed to provide a 
means of determining the spacecraft  position and velocity vector with respec t  
to a given reference.  
local p r imary  and ea r th  p r imary  via the communications link. Fo rmer  
studies indicate that ear th  p r imary  is the optimum mode for a l l  mission 
phases except in  the immediate vicinity of the moon or during ear th  reentry,  
Two basic operational modes of navigation a r e  possible: 
The G&N sys tem is expected to be the Apollo Block I1 system, which is  
composed of an  optical navigation subsystem, a guidance computer, and an 
iner t ia l  measurement  unit. 
Apollo mission; therefore,  the associated components formed the basis  of 
this analysis ,  The optical subsystem possesses  the ability to measu re  the 
angle between a s t a r  and the moon center,  or some landmark thereon, and 
the capability of measuring the apparent angle subtended by a planet (s ta-  
diametr ic) .  
performing the necessary  calculations to re la te  the optically measured data 
to the position and velocity of the spacecraf t  and, when required,  to calculate 
the vehicle course correct ions required.  The iner t ia l  measurement  unit 
( N U )  provides a reference coordinate sys tem and monitors the accelerations 
applied to the vehicle. 
These same functions a r e  required for the 
The guidance computer (CGC) is to have the capability of 
The functional logic for the G&N velocity change functions a r e  given in 
Figure 4-5. 
in  Figure 4-6. 
impose somewhat different requirements .  
requirements  are similar to those of the Apollo in all respects ;  and the 
Apollo sys tem is expected to meet  those needs or exceed them without change. 
The miss ion  module system, which i s  to facilitate velocity corrections only 
and to function under different c i rcumstances,  is the sys tem studied in depth 
herein;  the recommended operational concept is justified in Section 2. 1 of 
this report .  
The functional logic for the earth-entry-mode sys tem i s  given 
It will  be noted that f rom these examples the different modules 
The ear th  entry module functional 
The capability of the Apollo G&N system, using present operational 
concepts to meet  the above requirement  has  a l ready been demonstrated for 
the Apollo mission, differences in miss ion  profile a r e  considered insignificant 
with respec t  to normal  operation. 
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Systems Analysis 
Since the functional requirements  f o r  the ELOR mission were  satisfied 
by the Apollo I1 system, the subsequent analysis cen ters  around improving 
the contribution to safe r e tu rn  and resolving any life problems. The G&N 
sys tem operates  during the manned phases and only affects Ps. Variations 
in both operational concept and equipment affiliation were  considered in an  
attempt to maximize Ps and life margin.  
A Ps of about 0. 999 (much higher than Apollo) was set. The sys t em 
duty cycles will  be about the same for the ELOR mission as for the present  
DRM; however, the sys tem functions do not attain reliabil i t ies of 0. 999 for  
the DRM. 
equipment fa i lure  r a t e s  andlor  re turn  usage t imes must  be found to improve 
safe re turn.  
It i s  therefore  apparent that  some means of reducing the 
There  exists considerable latitude in choosing a sys tem configuration 
and operational concept depending on the acceptable reliability and the 
acceptable cost  (additional equipment, changes in equipment and operational 
concept, reduced capability, etc.  ) in achieving it. Possibil i t ies considered 
include - 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
Use of present  Apollo equipment and operational concept. 
Change of the operational concept to reduce equipment usage time. 
Redesign or  use of additional equipment to improve the failure 
r a t e .  
Scavenging of LM equipment to improve the CM failure hazard 
for the r e tu rn  tr ip.  
Combinations of the above, 
Using the previously defined G & N  sys tem functional duty cycle a s  a 
basis ,  the detailed equipment operational and standby times were  developed 
and a r e  presented in Table 4-3, P a r t s  I and I1 respectively. 
Additional G & N  functions include optical subsystem usage for align- 
ment of the iner t ia l  re fe rence  and navigation during lunar orbit. 
computer operational time was added in the P repa re  LM Phase  ( 6 . 2 )  because 
an iner t ia l  re fe rence  was required and because the listed computer t ime 
was  increased during the Departure Preparat ion Phase (6. 19) to allow for 
navigation. 
CM 
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Under present  Apollo operational concepts, the iner t ia l  subsystem (ISS) 
i s  always in a t  l ea s t  the standby mode so heat is supplied to the iner t ia l  
instruments .  
3,  200-cycle power supply for iner t ia l  instrument suspension. 
supply requi res  a timing reference f rom the computer meaning that the 
computer subsystem (CSS) must  be in  a t  l eas t  the standby mode also,  
Therefore ,  in the normal  Apollo mission, the iner t ia l  instrument  hea ters  
and suspension and the computer t imer  a r e  never turned off, 
In the CM system, the standby mode a l so  energizes  the 
This power 
System operating and standby failure r a t e s  were  determined f r o m  MIT 
IL Report  E-1142 (Rev, 55) (Reference 4-8). 
subassembly failure r a t e s  a r e  shown in Table 4-4. 
not all display and monitoring equipment is included, even though many 
G&N sys t em signals might be displayed there.  Only the display and key- 
boards (DSKY's) and the display and control (D&C) group a r e  considered 
G&N equipment, The CM DSKY's a r e  normally redundant, accounting for 
thelow failure ra te .  The CM D&C group i s  considered par t  of the optical 
subsystem since i t  i s  mainly used during optics functions, while the LM 
D&C group i s  mainly associated with iner t ia l  subsystem functions. 
These major  subsystem and 
It should be noted that 
Table 4-3 ( P a r t  I). CM G&N System Functional Profile 
for Boost, Transit ,  and Entry 
~ ~~ 
Mission 
Phase  
1. 0 Prelaunch 
2.0 Ascent 
3. 0 Ea r th  orbi t  
5; 0 Translunar 
6 . 0  Lunar orbit  
7 . 0  Transear th  
8. 0 En t ry  
CM G&N System Operational Functions 
Turn-on, warmup, checkout, vertical  erection, 
optical azimuth alignment, and gyrocompas sing, 
Monitor attitude and AV. 
Monitor attitude and one alignment update, 
Monitor injection attitude and AV; control attitude 
during transposition and docking; alignment, 
attitude control, and AV control for three mid- 
course  correct ions;  and alignment update, attitude 
control, and AV control for lunar orbit  insertion. 
None 
Alignment, attitude control, and AV control for 
th ree  midcourse correct ions;  and attitude control 
and alignment update just  pr ior  to entry. 
Ent ry  c o n t ~ o l .  
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Table 4-3 ( P a r t  11). CM G&N System Equipment Usage Times 
Based on ELOR Functional Requirements 
CM Phase 
1 . 0  Prelaunch 
2 .0  Ascent 
3 .0  E.O. 
5 .0  Translunar 
6 . 0  Lunar area 
6 . 1  Adjust orbit 
6.2 Prepare LM 
6 . 4  Separate 
6.6 CSM quiescent initiatioi 
6.8 CSM unattended 
6. 17 CSM activate 
6.18 Transfer 
6.19 Departure preparation 
6.21 Transearth injection 
7. 0 Transearth 
8.0 Entry 
9 .0  Recovery 
Iuration 
(Hours) 
100 
0.2 
1. 5 
61.7 
2208.8 
2.2 
3.5 
0.2 
1.4 
2195.9 
1. 0 
0. 5 
4. 0 
0. 1 
88.2 
0.3 
20. 0 
Totals I 2480.7 
ISS = Inertial subsystem 
CSS = Computer subsystem 
OSS = Optical subsystem 
ISS 
Operational 
Equipment 
4 
0.2 
1.5 
3.5 
2.2 
3.5 
0 
0 
0 
1. 0 
0. 5 
4. 0 
0. 1 
3. 5 
0. 3 
0 
24. 3 
ISS 
Stand by 
Equipment 
4 
0.2 
1.5 
61.7 
2.2 
3.5 
0.2 
1.4 
2195.9 
1.0 
0.5 
4 .0  
0.1 
88.2 
0.3 
0 
2364.7 
css 
Operational 
Equipment 
4 
0.2 
1.5. 
3.5 
2.2 
3.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.5 
0.1 
3.5 
0.3 
0 
21.3 
css 
Standby 
Equipment 
4 
0.2 
1.5 
61.7 
2.2 
3.5 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
1. 0 
0.5 
4.0 
0.1 
88.2 
0.3 
0 
167.5 
- 
oss 
0. 1 
0 
0. 1 
0. 8 
1. 0 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.5 
0 
0.8 
0 
0 
4. 8 
- 
- 
- 
The question of failure during dormancy was investigated, but the 
conclusions hold for  any interval when the equipment is off or deenergized. 
Assuming no severe  environmental s t r e s s e s  on the equipment during the 
dormant period, the only possible cause for equipment failure would be an 
aging process ;  i. e . ,  a continuation of a chemical o r  physical reaction that 
had begun pr ior  to dormancy. 
r a t e  a s  opposed to the constant r a t e  applicable during the useful operating 
life of equipment. (See Section 2. 5) .  
This effect implies a time-dependent failure 
Considering comparable external environmental s t r e s s e s  for 
operational and dormant  periods,  the dormant failure r a t e  becomes extremely 
low, and the number of sys tem failures occurring during a 90-day quiescent 
period a r e  considered insignificant. 
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ICM guidance compu- 
l(CGC) DSKY 
te r  
Table 4-4.  CM G&N System Fai lure  Rates 
Subassembly 
I (css) 
Operating 
A x  10-6 
IMU and PIPA Elec 
Power Servo Assy 
Coupling Data Unit 
Assy 
(PSA) 
(CDU) 
129 
110 
155 
Optical Assy 
PSA 
CDU 
D&C Group 
94 
77 
9 1  
2 .3  
23 5 
2.3 
Standby 
A x  10-6 
10 .2  
6. 3 
- 
60. 5 
- 
The G&N sys tem function contribution to  Ps for  the mission can now be 
computed by combining the operational and standby reliabil i t ies of the various 
equipment groups only. 
tional concepts. 
operating throughout the miss ion  even though (according to Table 4-3) the 
timing reference i s  not continuously required for computations throughout 
the mission. 
mission Ps is only 0 .  82, which is considered too low, 
The f i r s t  computations a r e  based on normal  opera-  
The CM G&N sys tem computer clock i s  assumed to be 
The resu l t s  appear in Table 4-5, where the contribution to 
The Ps falls short  of the goal mainly because of standby equipment 
The f i r s t  and mos t  obvious remedy would be to change the failures.  
operational concept such that the computer need not be on when no computa- 
tions o r  timing reference a r e  functionally required (when only IMU heater  
power is needed). As presently mechanized, the suspension power would 
s t i l l  be present  with the M U  heater  power, but i t s  frequency would not be 
accurate .  The functionally required CSS standby equipment time, exclusive 
of suspension time when suspension is not rea l ly  needed, is 167. 5 hours.  
Of this t ime, the CSS standby equipment is on alone for 146. 2 hours,  and 
i t s  Ps becomes 0 .  99. Fo r  the overall  system, Ps = 0.94. 
The capability of updating computer t ime exists,  but has  not been 
used in the Apollo missions since the computer is never turned off. 
timing e r r o r  will  resu l t  f r o m  transmission f rom the ear th  to the moon, but 
Some 
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Table 4-5. CM G&N ELOR Mission Probability of Success, 
Normal  Apollo Operational Concepts 
~~ 
CM 
Subs ys t em 
ISS - Operating 
- Standby 
CSS - Operating 
- Standby 
css 
Total 
Ax 10-6 
394 
16. 5 
237. 3 
60 .  5 
264. 3 
T 
(Hours) 
24. 3 
2340.4 
21.3 
2343.4 
4. 8 
AT 
0. 009574 
0. 038617 
0.005054 
0.  141776 
0.001269 
0. 196290 
P S  
0.99 
0. 96 
0 . 9 9  
0. 88 
0.999 
0. 821 
this could be calibrated for the nominal lunar distance. 
tion is that an  additional burden is  placed on the up-data link because 
absolute t ime i s  no longer available on board. 
and velocity could s t i l l  be determined on board, but relative position and 
velocity would not be known quickly and accurately except through communi- 
cations via MSFN. 
Another considera- 
Vehicle inertial  position 
Once the CSS standby time has  been reduced, the ISS standby equip- 
ment,  consisting of temperature  control and suspension, becomes the 
reliability-limiting i tem. Since there  a r e  long standby periods when only 
temperature  control is needed, i t  might be desirable to change the power 
switching design such that the suspension equipment i s  energized separately. 
The ISS standby fai lure  r a t e  i s  then reduced to 1.6 x 10-6 failures per hour, 
and Ps = 0. 994. Incorporating this change along with the CSS standby 
change discussed, the overall  CM G&N sys tem exhibits Ps = 0. 97 as 
shown in  Table 4-6. 
If i t  were  possible to eliminate all the normal  standby functions of 
I M U  temperature  control, computer timing, and inertial  instrument sus  - 
pension, the result ing overal l  G&N sys tem character is  tics would be 
Ps = 0. 9 8 .  
The ramifications of removing IMU temperature control a r e  discussed 
i n  Appendix B. Investigations have shown that iner t ia l  instrument tempera-  
tu re  can be lowered below present  specification limits during nonoperational 
per  io d s without instrument  degradation. 
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Table 4-6. CM G&N ELOR Mission Probabili ty of Success, 
Modified Standby Operation 
CM 
Subsys tem 
ISS - Operating 
- Standby 
CSS - Operating 
- Standby 
css 
I .Total 
Fai lure  
Rate 
Ax 10 
394.0 
1 . 6  
237.3 
60. 5 
264.3 
T T (Hours) I- 2340.4 
21.3 
146.2 
4. 8 
AT 
0.009574 
0. 003585 
0.005054 
0.008845 
0.001269 
0. 028327 
0.99 
0.994 
0.995 
0. 99 
0 .999  
0. 97 
~ 
An al ternate  approach to increase  sys tem reliability i s  to improve 
the operational fa i lure  r a t e  by some means.  
accomplished by redesign, redundancy, spa res  and maintenance, or a 
combination of these approaches.  
appreciably reduce the overal l  sys tem operational failure ra te .  The recom-  
mended alternative is taking along additional equipment either redundantly or  
as spares .  As indicated in Table 4-7, by sparing the f i r s t  four i tems, the 
overal l  sys tem Ps is 0. 99. 
limiting i tem, two spare  computers and one each of the ISS subassemblies 
would increase  the overall  sys tem PS to over 0.993. 
sys tem components af ter  rendezvous will accomplish much the same resu l t s .  
This increase might be 
Extensive redesign would be required to 
Since the computer reliability was sti l l  the 
Planned use of LM 
Reduction of usage t ime by eliminating all standby functions and the 
application of four spa res  yields an overall  sys tem Ps of 0. 999, which is well  
in excess  of Apollo I1 est imates .  
The possibility of scavenging LM equipment for the CM re turn  t r ip  is  
enhanced by the fact  that  the CM components most likely to fa i l  a r e  available 
when required in  the LM and usable i n  the CM with only slight modifications. 
The reliability breakdown, considering t ime before and af ter  a spare  is 
available, i s  as shown i n  Table 4-8. 
imal and m a y  not be worth the problems of removing and t ransferr ing LM 
equipment to the CM i f  they a r e  not needed p r i o r  to CM/LM separation. 
It can be seen that the Ps gain is min- 
Re commendations and Consluisons 
The Apollo I1 concept i n  the operational concept identified in  the fore-  
going will  satisfy the ELOR mission without any significant changes in design 
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0.003135 
0.023872 
0.027007 
0.002673 
0.014745 
0 :  017418 
0.003767 
0.005006 
Table  4-7. C M  G&N System Ps as a Function 
of Various Sparing Elements 
0. 9969 
0. 9764 
0. 9733 
0.9973 
0. 9854 
0. 9827 
0.9962 
0.9950 
0.000049 
0.000451 
0.000370 
0.000437 
0.000011 
0.99995 
0. 9995 
0.9996 
0. 9996 
0.99999 
T 
(Hours) 
:quivalent 
AT 
Equivalent 
PS .x 10-6 No. of Spares CM Subassembly 
IMU and PIPA Elec Assy 
- Operating 
- Standby 
129. 0 
10.2 
110 .0  
6. 3 
155. 0 
235. 0 
60. 6 
2 . 3  
94. 0 
77. 0 
91. 0 
2 . 3  
24 .3  
2340.4 
24.3 
2340.4 
24.3 
21.3 
2343.4 
21 .3  
4 . 8  
4.8 
4 . 8  
4 . 8  
0.000414 
0.000183 
0. 000007 
0.009800 
0. 000049 
0.000451 
0. 000370 
0.000437 
0.000011 
0.9996 
0.9998 
0.99999 
0.99 
0.99995 
0.9995 
0.9996 
0.9996 
0.99999 
0.99 
PSA (ISS) - Operating 
- Standby 
CDU (ISS) 
CGC - Operating 
- Standby 0.141776 0. 8680 
0.146782 I 
DSKY 
Optical Assy 
PSA (OSS) 
CDU (OSS) 
D&C 
Total 0.196292 I O .  8215 4 0. 011722 
Table 4-8. CM G&N System Subassembly Reliability Breakdown, 
Operational Only, LM Components a s  Spares for Return Tr ip  
CM Subassembly A x 10-6 T No. of Spares AT PS 
IMU and PIPA Elec 129.0 
110.0 
155.0 
235.0 
2 . 3  
94.0 
77 .0  
91.0 
2.3 
16.4 
7.9 
16 .4  
7.9 
16.4 
7 .9  
14.9 
6 . 4  
21.3 
4 . 8  
4 . 8  
4 . 8  
4 . 8  
0 .  002116 
0.000002 
0 .  001804 
0.000001 
0.002542 
0.000002 
0.003502 
0. 000003 
0.000049 
0.000451 
0.000370 
0.000437 
0.000011 
0.998 
0.99999 
0,998 
0.99999 
0.998 
0.99999 
0.997 
0.99999 
0.99995 
0.9995 
0.9996 
0. 9996 
0.99999 
PSA (ISS) 
CDU (ISS) 
CGC 
DSKY 
Optical Assy 
PSA (OSS) 
CDU (OSS) 
D&C 
0. 99 Tot a1 4 0.011290 
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o r  new equipment. 
concepts possible. 
s p a r e s  will  provide a contribution to P, of about 0 .  999. 
Table 4-9 is  a summary  of the various implementation 
Use of LM components and/or  provision of up to four 
’ 
Changes in the Apollo operational concept to reduce equipment usage 
t imes  appear to offer the grea tes t  promise for reliability performance 
improvement without the penalty of additional equipment o r  extensive redesign. 
An additional burden m a y  be placed on other systems;  i. e . ,  shutdown of IMU 
heater  power could impose restr ic t ions on the environmental control system, 
and shutdown of computer timing would requi re  ground updates of absolute 
time. These a r e a s  requi re  fur ther  thorough investigation before they can 
be implemented. 
Special consideration was  given to investigations of the effects of 
turning off the computer timing reference,  iner t ia l  instrument  cooldown, 
and equipment failure during dormant periods. 
The only development ramifications involve the M U  heater.  This 
study has  assumed what available data seems  to indicate, that they a r e  not 
required for a quiescent mode, provided adequate warmup is provided pr ior  
to usage. This aspect m u s t  b e  demonstrated by t e s t ,  
Table 4-9. Summary of CM G&N System 
Reliability, Improvement Steps 
Configuration and Ope rational Concept 
Contribution 
to Ps 
0. 82 
0.94 
0. 94 
0. 97 
0.  98:: 
0.99* 
0.991k 
0.993 
0.999 
hkApproximately that projected for Apollo I1 (See Reference 4 .  6). 
Apollo Block I1 G&N system and operational 
Reduced computer standby time. 
One spa re  computer. 
Reduced computer standby and inertial  instrument 
suspension t imes.  
All equipment off during standby periods,  
One spare  computer and one spare  of each ISS 
subassembly. 
Spares  f r o m  LM for  re turn  t r i p  and all  equipment 
off in standby, 
Two spa re  computers and one spare  of each 
ISS subassembly. 
One .spare computer, one spare  of each ISS sub- 
assembly,  and all equipment off during standby. 
concepts. 
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Delta 
(pounds) 
0 
0 
$42 
0 
0 
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4. 1 . 4  Stability Control System (CSM-SCS) 
NOTE: Much of the information used herein was provided by 
the Honeywell Corporation through Reference 4-9.  
(The sys t em proposed herein involves the addition 
of a new function, ra ther  than the Block I1 SCS, for  
the quiescent state.  ) 
System Functions and Description 
The SCS sys t em for  the ELOR mission must  per form two fair ly  d iverse  
functions : 
1. The stabil i ty control of the CSM-LM on the way to  the moon and 
the CSM during the re turn  t r ip ,  in the same  manner as  specified 
for Apollo I1 (Apollo Block I1 SCS unchanged). 
2 .  Provision of a minimum-control mode f o r  the CSM while unattended 
in the lunar  orbit  quiescent mode (new function). 
This study is specifically addressed to the la t te r  requirement since, 
The ability to per form the to-and-from aspects of the 
for  the grea te r  par t ,  the two functions can be separable  in t e r m s  of compo- 
nent requirements .  
mission remain unchanged by the new requirement .  
The ELOR control phase begins with the CSM-LM vehicle established 
At 
in lunar orbit .  
in which i t s  longitudinal axis i s  perpendicular to the solar line of sight. 
this  point, vehicle attitude control i s  established using Block I1 SCS minimum 
deadband attitude hold. All SCS devices a r e  turned off except the Gyro 
Assembly No .  1 (GA No. l ) ,  Gyro Assembly No. 2 (GA No. 2), electronic 
control assembly (ECA), and reaction jet/engine control (RJ /EC)  device, 
which continue to maintain vehicle attitude. 
command module to  the LM, the astronauts arm the remote control function 
to be used in switching f r o m  the SCS to the ELOR stabilization system (ESS) 
control of the CSM. 
The combined vehicle i s  astronaut-maneuvered to a position 
Before moving f rom the 
After LM separat ion f r o m  the CSM, the quiescent mode i s  commanded; 
and a slow rol l  i s  initiated through the ESS. 
pitch and yaw attitude control a r e  established via the ESS; and all SCS devices 
except the reaction jet/engine control a r e  turned off. 
90-day lunar exploration period, the unattended CSM orbits the moon under 
ESS control.  
to the solar  line-of-sight within *20 degrees  in pitch and yaw while the rol l  
r a t e  is maintained between 2 and 3 degrees  per second. 
except the RJ /EC remain powered down during the quiescent mode, but can 
be  reactivated by remote  command if  required.  
When the desired ra te  i s  reached, 
During the ensuing 
The vehicle 's  longitudinal axis i s  maintained perpendicular 
Al l  SCS devices 
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During the rendezvous phase, the manned LM returns  to  rendezvous 
with the unmanned CSM. 
and CSM control reestablished using SCS minimum deadband attitude hold. 
The SCS functions a s  in Apollo I1 for  the remainder  of the mission.  
P r i o r  to docking, the ESS is remotely disabled 
A functional block d iagram of the basic  ESS is shown in Figure 4-7.  
The ESS consists of the present  SCS RJ /EC device, a gyro electronics 
assembly (GEA), and two sun-sensor assemblies .  
The sun senso r s  a r e  located on the SM periphery and provide pitch 
and yaw attitude information with respect  to  impinging solar radiation. 
An electrically caged gyro in the GEA provides a source of ro l l - ra te  infor- 
mation to complete the list of ESS references.  
Signals f r o m  the sun sensors  and gyro are  processed by the GEA, 
which provides switching outputs to  the R J / E C .  The RJ /EC,  in turn,  fires 
the required serv ice  module reaction je ts .  
The nominal rol l  r a t e  i s  established by summing a constant d-c  voltage 
with the r a t e  gyro ' s  demodulated output. 
adjusted so that identical deadband and minimum impulse circui ts  can be 
used in all channels. 
be enabled in each axis to permit  limit-cycling a t  low vehicle ra tes  with 
attendant minimization of fuel consumption. 
descr ibed in detail  in the following: 
Each channel's amplifier gain i s  
Only two reaction je ts  (one plus and one minus) will 
The functional blocks a r e  
Each sun sensor  contains two Ball Brothers  Research Corporation 
CE-3 photoelectrical angular detectors a s  shown in Figure 4-8. The sun 
senso r s  will be mounted on the SM periphery and located so  that the yaw 
sensor  detects coning in the yaw axis and the pitch sensor  does the same 
in pitch. 
Output cur ren t  of the CE-3 detector approximates a sinusoid as  shown 
in F igure  4-8, with a maximum output when solar  radiation is normal to the 
detector face.  In combining two detectors a s  shown in Figure 4-8, the out- 
put cur ren ts  will  be equal when solar  radiation i s  normal  to the overall  
sensor  o r  a t  a nominal 45 degrees  to each detector.  
this position will resu l t  in unequal detector outputs and a usable e r r o r  
signal. 
ze ro  to  a maximum and back to  zero.  
however; since both outputs vary  in unison. 
Any deviation f rom 
As the vehicle rotates ,  the individual detector outputs vary f rom 
This variation c rea tes  no problem, 
The r a t e  BMAG (body-mounted attitude gyro)  i s  a heater less  version 
of the GG248 BMAG used in the Apollo SCS, caged through circui ts  s imilar  
to  those used in  the Apollo SCS. 
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PITCH SIlN SENSOR 
(SEE ENLARGED 
CE-3 DETECTOR 
YAW SUN SENSOR 
(SEE ENLARGED VIEW) 
ELOR SUN SENSOR 
Figure 4-8, Prop0se.d ELOR Sun Sensor,  Location, and Characterist ics 
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Each amplifier i s  based on a Fairchi ld  p709 integrated circuit .  F ive  
r e s i s t o r s  and two capaci tors  will  be  used with each ~ 7 0 9 ,  
The demodulator is a full-wave circui t  s imi la r  to those used in the 
Apollo SCS. 
capacitor.  
It will  consist  of six r e s i s to r s ,  two t r ans i s to r s  and one 
The deadband and minimum-impulse circui ts  are  similar to those used 
in the SCS electronic control assembly (ECA). 
Required power supply input i s  115-v, a -c ,  three-phase,  400-cps 
electr ical  power. Power supply outputs a r e  26-v, a - c ,  three-phase,  BMAG, 
spin-motor- excitation; 36-v, a -c ,  Phase-  A, BMAG, signal-generator- 
excitation; 10-v, a - c ,  Phase-A, demodulator-reference; and *15-v, d -c  
control- electronics power and *15-v, d- c signal- conditioning power. 
The RJ /EC i s  modified to accept th ree  additional switching inputs. 
Six r e s i s to r s  and three  t r ans i s to r s  a r e  added to switch the added inputs. 
Each signal conditioner is  of the type used in the Apollo SCS, but 
repackaging may be  required.  
Systems Analysis 
SCS for  the manned phases of ELOR will contribute to P,. Because 
that time is reduced to about 175 hours (25 percent below the Apollo DRM) 
the SCS contribution to P, should be about 0 .  997. 
The quiescent-phase function contributes to the mission stay-time 
and the resulting P90 ,  fa i lure  resu l t s  in  abort .  This is  a separate  function. 
Analysis of the proposed new basic  ELOR control function (ESS) of 
Figure 4-9 indicates that the sys tem contribution to P 9 0  would approach 
0 .  91, which i s  too low. It i s  a lso evidenced that the BMAG and its elec- 
tronics is the weakest link. 
will improve P 9 0  to better than 0. 97. Fur ther  improvement i s  required 
and may  be achieved through redundant deadband minimum-impulse c i rcu i t ry  
and a redundant power supply function. These additions increase  the function 
reliability such that the ESS contribution to P90 will reach  about 0.  993. The 
logic for  this function i s  presented in Figure 4-10. 
tradeoff considerations a r e  reflected in Table 4- 10. 
Providing for  a remotely selected spa re  BMAG 
The resul ts  of these 
These est imates  a r e  made with a parts-count approach to reliability 
analysis and a r e  based upon Apollo high-reliability piece-par t  failure ra tes  
and a knowledge of the quantity of each utilized in each specific subassembly. 
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Figure  4-10. Modified ESS and Resulting Reliability Logic 
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No. 3: Basic ESS 
plus redundant 
BMAG, deadband 
minimum-impuls e 
No. 4: Basic ESS 
plus redundant 
BMAG, deadband 
minimum- impul s e , 
power supply 
Table 4- 10. ELOR Stabilization System Tradeoffs 
0. 9830 16. 7 56 0 17. 5 
(5 welded 
module s ) 
0.9924 20 .  6 662 27 .  0 
(7 welded 
modules ) 
The gyro fa i lure  r a t e  of 2 . 8  percent per  1000 hours i s  an average fai lure  
r a t e  based on a 90-day mission. 
caused by spin-motor wearout character is t ics .  
for  the sun sensor  was obtained by applying a 1973 build growth r a t e  to 
Honeywell's standard fai lure  r a t e  for a photo diode. 
to yield a pessimist ic  estimate,  so  the actual value for P90 will approach 
o r  exceed the des i red  0. 999 by the time the sys tem is  qualified. 
It includes allowances for  time-dependency 
The predicted fai lure  ra te  
These data a r e  known 
Fur the r  redundancy, such a s  redundant sun sensors  and a third BMAG, 
could be added to improve P90.  
considered unwarranted, since Ps i s  not directly dependent upon the ESS 
reliability. Certain ESS fai lures ,  such a s  a parameter  shift beyond speci-  
fication, would degrade performance, but in  many cases  would not require  
mission termination. Other fa i lures ,  such a s  a sun sensor  failure,  would 
requi re  shutdown of the ELOR stabilization system. 
be scheduled in this instance with normal  SCS control of the CSM during 
rendezvous. 
is calculated to  be  0. 9992; thus, an ESS fai lure  might shorten an ELOR 
mission,  but would not compromise c rew safety. 
The increase  in cost  and weight i s  
A mission abort  would 
The P, for  the SCS during the three-hour rendezvous period 
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To satisfy the diagnostic and monitoring requirements  the signal- 
conditioned outputs representing pitch attitude, yaw attitude, and rol l  r a t e  
will  provide a significant m e a s u r e  of ESS performance on a continuing bases .  
In addition, where necessary ,  normal  SCS signal conditioning can be remotely 
enabled to facilitate troubleshooting and fault analysis.  
In-flight support requirements  include- 
1. Remote turn-on and turn-off of GA No. 1, GA No. 2,  and ECA 
and electronic display assembly (EDA) in the SCS. 
2 .  Remote switchover f r o m  SCS to ESS control and vice ve r sa .  
3 .  Remote enable and disable of the SM reaction je t s .  
4. Remote selection of redundant components. 
ELOR electronics weight, volume, and power consumption range f rom 
13. 8 pounds, 518 cubic inches,  and 14. 7 watts to 2 0 . 6  pounds, 662 cubic 
inches,  and 27.0 watts in the approaches considered. 
computations a r e  based on a GEA packaging concept similar to that used 
in  the Block I1 SCS and a sun-sensor  design a s  shown in Figure 4-8. 
six welded modules would be contained in  the GEA plus one or  two heater less  
BMAG' s .  
Weight and volume 
Up to 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In consonance with one LMSC recommendation, (NAS8-21006) the 
analysis  indicates that spin stability is  the best  operational mode; however, 
the sys tem analysis  indicates that the Apollo I1 SCS would not approach the 
des i red  Ps (about 0.55). 
ESS that will meet  the requirements  with no m o r e  than a 6.8-pound weight 
penalty. The required sys tem could be developed and qualified within two 
yea r s .  
without any changes and is expected to exceed the Apollo crew safety c r i te r ia ,  
A much l e s s  complex approach is  to provide an 
The Apollo I1 SCS will per form the translunar and t ransear th  control 
Maintenance and/or  repa i r  in the conventional sense is not recommended 
for  this system, since the requirements  for the SCS a r e  l e s s  stringent than 
for  Apollo DRM; and the requirement for  maintenance would be greatest  when 
man  is not available to  per form i t .  
adaptive electronics is recommended in i t s  place. 
Therefore,  a f o r m  of self-healing or 
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4. 1. 5 Communications and Data System (C&D) 
NOTE: Much of the information used herein was provided by 
the Collins Radio Co . ,  through Reference 4-8. 
Functional Requirements and Constraints 
The ELOR mission consists of th ree  basic  mission segments as they 
affect the CSM C&D Subsystem. 
duration a s  they affect the C&D functions a r e  shown below: 
These mission segments and the t ime 
Segment A (manned t ranslunar  phases)  
Segment B (unattended lunar orbit  o r  
Segment C (manned t rans  ear th  phases 
o r  quiescent) 
166.6 hr:: 
~ 
Total mission t ime 2480. 7 hr 
The C&D functions and duty cycles for  Segments A and C a r e  identical 
The 
with the corresponding phases of conventional Apollo DRM. 
functional requirements  for  these phases a r e  the same a s  for the DRM. 
effects on the mission should also be unchanged. 
The resulting 
This sys tem has little effect on the probability of safe re turn during 
the manned or  unmanned phases .  It does,  however, affect the s tay- t ime and, 
therefore ,  P 9 0  and Pa. These mission-cr i t ical  functions a r e  l imited to 
those required to  re lay status and commands permitting changes in opera- 
tional mode or  redundancy switching. As a resul t ,  Segment B, the quiescent 
phase,  requi res  two new functions not included in Apollo 11. These functions, 
s ta tus  monitoring and remote control, a r e  required for the entire 90-day 
unattended orbi t  period and will necessi ta te  some modification of the present  
Apollo I1 subsystem. The basic  requirements  for  these new functions are-  
1 .  Status monitoring shall  be included to analyze the condition of 
a l l  sys tem functions wherein a fa i lure  would preclude safe 
rendezvous o r  re turn  to ear th .  As a minimum, the sys t em 
would have to  indicafe when a safe  threshold i s  approached 
and/or  surpassed,  providing enough warning (where main- 
tenance is  not possible) for the c rew to return to the CSM 
and abort  the missions o r  repa i r  and abort  when possible.  
Status monitoring information is required a t  the lunar 
surface o r  LM during rendezvous and at  the MSFN-MCC. 
It was estimated that up to  forty normalized analog inputs 
must  be monitored by the system. 
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2. Remote control capability shal l  be included to  (1) provide 
switching between cr i t ical  redundant systems and functions, 
(2)  provide control for  the docking function, ( 3 )  provide 
emergency control of orbital  position and plane, and 
(4) initiate a detailed checkout or  diagnostic routine. 
LM on the lunar surface or  during rendezvous was assumed 
to have remote  control capability for  Items 1, 2 and 4 
l is ted above while the MSFN-MCC can control Items 1, 3 
and 4. Twenty ON-OFF type commands t ransmit ted at  a 
relatively slow ra te  were  estimated to  b e  sufficient for 
the lunar  sur face /LM remote control capability. 
The 
The major  interface constraints involve- 
1. Antenna subsystem interface constraints impose the major  
mission constraint  on the CSM communications functions. 
A prel iminary investigation of the antenna problems has 
been made,  since effective communications cannot be 
achieved without methods of alleviating the potential prob- 
lems. The high-gain S-band antenna will not be used 
during the unattended lunar orbit  phase of the mission 
because of operational complexity ( see  Section 4. 2 .  5). 
Therefore ,  all CSM-MSFN communications must  be 
accommodated by the CSM S-band omnidirectional anten- 
nas .  The CSM spin will c rea te  problems for  the CSM 
dormant-mode communication. 
means that no single CSM S-band and VHF omnidirec- 
tional antenna will be pointing a t  the ear th  o r  the lunar 
surface for  periods longer than an estimated 40  seconds; 
i. e . ,  within - 3  db points. 
This rapid spin ra te  
2 .  It was assumed that a t  l eas t  th ree  stations of the MSFN 
will be available to enable communications on a contin- 
uous bas is  with at leas t  one station for  the entire CSM 
quiescent phase.  These stations a r e  expected to have 
8 5 - foot - diameter  antennas . 
Baseline System Description 
The Apollo I1 C&D sys tem provides a working subsystem on which an 
extensive amount of weight and reliability data (Table 4- 11) a r e  available. 
This sys tem will provide suitable operating capability for  these missions 
with only minor additions. 
for navigation, voice, and data communications between the CSM and the 
MSFN; voice, ranging, and data communications between the CSM and LM; 
and voice and data communications between the CSM and the extravehicular 
astronaut (EVA). 
The Block I1 subsystem provides the capabilities 
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A block d iagram of a C&D subsystem configuration that can meet  the 
The sys tem employs maxi- ELOR requirements  i s  shown in  Figure 4- 11. 
m u m  utilization of existing Apollo Block I1 C&D subsystem equipment for  
all segments of the mission.  
a r e  necessary  to  sat isfy the ELOR unattended lunar  orbit  functions a r e  
designated by the blocks having heavy outlines. 
a r e  new additions to  the subsystem, while others  a r e  slightly modified. 
other C & D  subsystem equipments a r e  unmodified and interfaced with other 
spacecraf t  sys tems in a manner  identical with normal  Apollo Block I1 
configurations. 
Those equipments of the C&D subsystem that 
Certain of these equipments 
All 
Two new equipments, the status monitoring equipment (SME) and the 
command demodulator-decoder, a r e  added to the subsystem along with 
modifications of the unified S-band equipment and the VHF/AM t ransmi t te r -  
rece iver .  Several  minor  antenna subsystem components, such a s  switches 
diplexers,  and power dividers,  and the up-data link sys tem a r e  required 
for  the remote-control concept, but a r e  covered in other sections of this 
repor t .  
The VHF recovery  beacon has  a single function to provide line-of-sight 
beacon t ransmission during earth-landing and recovery operations. 
s i s t s  of a VHF amplitude modulated t ransmi t te r .  
It con- 
The VHF tr iplexer  is  a 3-channel passive f i l ter  device. It provides 
the necessary  isolation to  permi t  single-channel o r  simultaneous 2-  or 
3-channel t ransmission and/or  reception with a common antenna. 
The .VHF/AM t ransmi t te r -  receiver consists of two independent VHF/AM 
t ransmi t te rs  and two independent VHF/AM rece ivers  in a single package. 
One t ransmit ter  and rece iver  provide for  t ransmission and reception of voice 
communications on a single preassigned frequency. 
and receiver  provide fo r  t ransmission and reception of voice communications 
on a second preassigned frequency. 
permit the rece ivers  and t ransmi t te rs  to  be used i n  any combination of the 
two channels for voice communications. 
reception of data (such as EVA biomedical) a t  the same frequency. 
VHF/AM t ransmi t te r - rece iver  a lso provides for  the t ransmission and 
reception of ranging signals to and f r o m  the LM. 
The other t ransmit ter  
External switching and the VHF tr iplexer  
This unit a lso provides for the 
The 
The digital ranging generator (DRG) provides for range measurements  
between the CSM and the LM during rendezvous. The DRG provides sequen- 
t ia l  tones to the VHF/AM transmit ter  - receiver ,  which t ransmits  the ranging 
signal along with voice to the LM. 
transponds the ranging signal on the duplex frequency. The CSM’s DRG then 
receives  the ranging signal and after internal processing provides a range 
readout to the command module computer and/or  the entry monitor system. 
The LM receives  the composite signaland 
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NOTE: Where the CSM i s  unmanned during CSM-LM 
rendezvous, consideration should be given for 
interchanging the CSM- LM ranging functions. 
The audio center consists of three electrically identical se t s  of c i r -  
cuitry (stations), which enable parallel  selection, isolation, gain control, 
and amplification of all spacecraft voice communications. 
Each station i s  operated f rom a remote- control panel, which provides 
each astronaut with independent audio control of common S-band, VHF/AM, 
and intercommunication circuits.  
microphone and earphone jacks. In the event of a station failure, the failed 
station microphone and earphones may be plugged into one, but not both, of 
the remaining stations. 
will produce a successful mission. 
Each astronaut i s  provided with individual 
Because of this feature,  two of the three stations 
Unified S-band equipment (USBE) consists of two redundant S-band 
phase-locked transponders and one FM transmit ter .  
consists of a t ransmit ter ,  receiver,  and power supply. The FM transmitter 
is electrically independent of the transponders.  
active at  a given t ime; however, simultaneous operation of the FM trans-  
mit ter  and one of the transponders is  possible. 
Each transponder 
Only one transponder is 
The S-band power amplifier consists of two 20-watt travelling-wave- 
tube power amplifiers with associated power supplies, control circuits, and 
a multiplexer mounted on a common chassis.  
o r  bypass transmission in the PM mode. It also provides for amplified, but 
not bypassed, FM transmission. The multiplexer provides a receive signal 
f r o m  the antenna and isolates the amplifiers so  that PM andFMtransmissions 
a r e  possible simultaneously or separately. 
emergency use only. 
It provides for either amplified 
The PM bypass mode i s  for 
The status-monitoring function requires use of the status monitoring 
equipment (SME), unified S-band equipment (USBE), VHF/AM transmit ter-  
receiver,  VHF triplexer,  and the associated VHF and S-band omnidirectional 
antennas. 
cri t ical  parameters  of the CSM while in the unattended orbit phase.:: 
forty normalized analog inputs can be accepted by the SME and compared 
with preestablished limits to a s ses s  the status of the unattended CSM. 
detection of beyond specification condition, the SME activates the CSM to 
MSFN and CSM to lunar surface/LM data links for transmission of a l a rm 
and status information. 
unified S-band system (USBS), while the CSM to lunar surface/LM link will 
be accommodated by the existing VHF/AM transmit ter-  receiver.  
The SME provides the capability to continuously monitor selected 
Up to 
Upon 
The CSM-to-MSFN data link will be handled via the 
~ ~~ 
(*)See Appendix J for a list of parameters now monitored. 
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The SME is new equipment; details  a r e  presented in  Appendix I 
(Volume 11). It consists of analog gates,  analog-to-digital converter ,  pro-  
. g r a m m e r ,  comparison circui t ry ,  synchronization generator,  data modula- 
t o r s  and a power supply. 
a t  a rate of once per  ten seconds by the SME and converted into an eight-bit 
word. 
reference words representing the upper and lower limit for  each channel. 
The comparison ma t r ix  will employ decoding logic to provide up to forty 
reference-word pa i r s ,  which will permit  comparison of each analog input 
with an independent reference.  
Each of the forty data channels will be  sampled 
The PCM encoded data will  then be ser ia l ly  compared with two 
Upon detection of a malfunction, the SME will  activate the data t r ans -  
mi t t e r s ,  and the se r i a l  digital data s t r e a m  of approximately 40 bits per  
second will be processed for t ransmission.  The SME se r i a l  data will 
biphase-modulate a 4. 7 kHz subca r r i e r  for t ransmission to  the MSFN via 
the USBS. 
LM transmission by frequency-shift keying (FSK)  a data tone. 
may  a l so  se rve  a s  an audible a l a r m  tone by frequency-dividing a processed 
f o r m  of the tone. 
The SME will a l so  process  the CSM status data for  lunar -sur face /  
The FSK tone 
The a.daptive sys tem data acquisition programmer (ASDAP) concepts, 
a s  recommended by LMSC (Reference 1 - Z ) ,  a r e  not implemented in the 
recommended SME. Basically, the ASDAP would continuously monitor CSM 
status points and t ransmi t  status information upon detection of out-of- 
tolerance conditions, but a l so  would periodically t ransmit  status data 
i r respec t ive  of the status of the monitoring points. 
for  t ransmission would vary a s  a function of mission duration and status of 
the monitoring points. 
phase the s ta tus ,  information would be transmitted frequently, perhaps once 
pe r  hour ,  
lengthen the t ransmission periods to  once per  day. 
The period selected 
During the initial portion of the unattended orbit  
After a given period of successful operation, the ASDAP would 
A major  problem with the ASDAP concept i s  lack of knowledge of when 
favorable t ransmission conditions exist;  i. e . ,  when the CSM is not occulted 
by the moon. The G & N  subsystem i s  not operative and, therefore,  cannot 
provide such information. One remedy for  the problem would be to use the 
AGC f r o m  the USBE’s S-band receiver  a s  an indication of when CSM-MSFN 
t ransmiss ion  would be possible. 
the S-Band link, however, it would not be much m o r e  difficult to activate the 
SME by means of an earth-originated command over the MSFN-to-CSM 
remote-control  link when status data a r e  desired.  In addition, the lunar- 
sur face /LM may  also activate either the CSM to lunar-surface/LM or the 
MSFN data links by i t s  remote control capability; therefore,  the ASDAP is 
not considered a safe’or  optimum alternative. 
Because this method depends on the use of 
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With the CSM-to-MSFN SME data link, the SME data will be t ransmit ted 
to ear th  by means of a modified USBE as  described in Appendix E. 
USBE modifications required for  the remote-control a s  well  a s  the status- 
monitoring functions a r e  principally necessitated by the spin- stabilization 
requirements  of the CSM. 
The 
The present  Apollo S-band omnidirectional antennas consist  of four 
flush-mounted antennas located a t  approximately ninety-degree intervals 
around the command module. 
on an individual bas i s  by the astronaut controlling the switching while observ- 
ing the received signal strength (AGC display on control panel). It i s  assumed 
that communication with the spacecraf t  is des i red  on a near ly  continuous bas is  
when possible; i. e . ,  when the spacecraft  is not occulted by the moon. It i s  
estimated that l e s s  than forty-percent communication availability would be 
possible i f  only one of the four were  continuously utilized. Communication 
on a continuous bas i s  will requi re  simultaneous use  of the four CSM antennas. 
Phasing problems will  a r i se  i f  the four antennas a r e  directly tied together 
due to the antenna pat tern anticipated. If two diametr ical ly  opposing antennas 
a r e  interconnected, it is estimated that approximately seventy-percent com- 
munication availability would be  possible. This availability would permit  
continuous communications between the spacecraf t  and the MSFN for periods 
up to for ty  seconds in duration, which should exceed the requirements.  
The antennas a r e  present ly  selected manually 
The r e c ommende d modification provide s continuous communication 
availability when both S-band receiver  channels a r e  operative by tying the 
two pa i rs  of diametrically opposed antennas together with power dividers 
and by operating each of the present ly  redundant rece ivers  of the USBE from 
an independent pair  of antennas. 
routed to an AGC signal comparator .  
that is receiving the bes t  signal based upon an AGC signal character is t ic  and 
switch the S-band PM exciter output to the corresponding pair  of antennas. 
The comparator will a l so  select  the best  received signal and route this to 
the SME fo r  demodulation of the up-data subca r r i e r .  
receive channel will  limit the communications coverage to 70 percent. 
The AGC outputs of each receiver will be 
The comparator will select  the receiver  
Fai lure  of any S-band 
Acquisition of the up-link MSFN c a r r i e r  requires  a change in opera- 
tional procedure for  the MSFN stations ( see  Appendix D).  
The existing S-band exciter power output is sufficient for adequate 
communication of the 40-bps SME data. 
the CSM to,MSFN SME data  link is presented in Appendix E. 
A circuit-quality calculation for  
When in the ELOR mode, the recommended modification will reduce 
the sensitivity of the S-band receiver  by 3. 5 to 4 db f r o m  that of the normal 
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omnidirectional antenna mode; however, the present  omnidirectional 
command mode has  sufficient margin  to absorb this degradation. 
The S-band omnidirectional antenna sys t em must  be  modified to  pro-  
vide the antenna changes described previously. 
will be required for  this modification along with two S-band diplexers/  
power dividers.  
p r io r  to departure  to the LM a s  shown in Figure 4-11. 
connect the diametrically opposing pa i rs  of antennas through the S-band 
diplexer/power divider. 
other position normal  omnidirectional antenna modes of operation will be  
obtained. 
in each omnidirectional antenna line due to the insertion loss  of the added 
switch. 
Four two-position switches 
The switches will be  manually set  by the CSM astronauts 
This setting will 
By setting the new two-position switches in the 
Approximately one-half db of additional attenuation will be seen 
The CSM to lunar-surface/LM SME data link will use the CSM's 
VHF/AM t ransmi t te r .  
fulfill the requirements  with the modification described in Appendix I. The 
rece iver  end must  have a data demodulator and decommutator suitable for 
stripping the data f r o m  the FSK tones and for processing and displaying the 
CSM status data. 
The present  VHF/AM t ransmi t te r  can be used to 
The CSM VHF antenna's sys tem must  b e  modified because the 
0.  5 revolutions per  minute will not permit  continuous VHF antenna coverage 
when communicating with the lunar surface.  
consist  of the two flush-mounted antennas located on diametrically opposite 
s ides  of the serv ice  module. Block I1 operations permit  omnidirectional 
antenna selection manually, one a t  a t ime. 
addition of th ree  two-position manual R F  switches and a power divider to 
permi t  simultaneous operation of both antennas. The astronauts will se t  
the position of the switches (Figure 4-11) for ELOR operation. 
position, the no rma l  Apollo modes of operation exist. Approximately 1 db 
of inser t ion loss in t ransmission path to one antenna and one half db in the 
other will resul t  f rom this modification. 
quality calculation for  the CSM- to-lunar-surface SME data link. 
The present  VHF antennas 
The modification consists of the 
In the other 
Appendix F contains the circui t  
The remote-control functions require  the use of the USBE, VHF/AM 
t ransmi t te r -  rece iver ,  V H F  t r iplexer ,  command demodulator - decoder, SME, 
and associated antennas a s  modified in Appendix I. 
Remote control of the CSM by the MSFN will be via the normal  S-band 
up-data link. The MSFN can t ransmi t  ON-OFF commands and orbit-plane 
o r  position information to  the CSM. 
ment,  the up-data link equipment (UDL) will be  required for demodulation 
and decoding of earth-originated commands ( see  Section 4. 1. 7). 
In addition to  the C&D subsystem equip- 
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The lunar -sur face /LM remote control of the CSM will be by means of 
the VHF/AM link. 
be  l imited to  ON-OFF type commands, which will be  received by the CSM's 
VHF/AM Receiver and routed to the Command Demodulator Decoder for  
demodulation, decoding and conditioning for  driving external ON- O F F  
devices.  
The lunar -sur face /LM remote-control capability will  
Verification of commands received f r o m  either the MSFN or  LM may  
be accomplished by transmitt ing status data f r o m  the SME to the command 
source.  Use of the SME data link for command verification will limit the 
command ra te  to  approximately one command pe r  ten seconds i f  one SME 
channel is  used. If additional SME channels a r e  allocated, the command 
verification ra te  can be increased.  The alternative to using the SME data 
link for verification of MSFN originated commands is to use the existing 
method of up-data verification which i s  by means of the low-bit-rate PCM 
channel over the coherent S-band link. With this method of verification, 
a command capability that i s  identical to that used during the normal  manned 
lunar  mission modes of operation is provided. However, the S-band power 
amplifier,  PCM te lemet ry  equipment, and premodulation processor  (PMP)  
a r e  required for this method; and, unless fas te r  command ra t e s  a r e  required,  
this method i s  not recommended. 
MSFN remote-  control capability may be implemented through the 
existing S-band up-data channel with modifications to some equipment as  s o -  
ciated with the function ( see  Appendix I) .  
identical with the baseline Apollo sys tem in that ON-OFF type commands 
a s  well a s  digital information for  the central  timing equipment and guidance 
and navigation sys tem can be handled; however, the command ra te  will be 
much slower because of the verification ra te  described previously. 
The command capability will be 
The S-band transponder must  have both rece ivers  operative simultane- 
ously, each connected to diametrically opposing pa i rs  of the S-band omni- 
directional antennas, to provide continuous antenna coverage during the 
spin stabilization of the CSM. 
directional antenna modifications previously described will se rve  to fulfill 
the MSFN remote-control  requirements a s  well as  the SME to MSFN data 
t ransmission function. 
The S-band transponder and S-band omni- 
The output of the USBE, a s  selected by the AGC comparator will be 
routed to the SME. 
employed in the premodulation processor  (PMP)  will be incorporated into 
the status -monitoring equipment (SME). 
An up-data demodulator s imilar  to the module presently 
The up-data demodulator was placed in the SME package mere ly  for 
a convenient mounting location for  the smal l  module. 
la tor  of the P M P  was not used for  severa l  reasons including maintaining 
The up-data demodu- 
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the reliability goal for  each segment of the mission and to conserve space-  
c raf t  power by not wasting power on unnecessary P M P  functions. 
The UDL descr ibed in Section 4. 1. 7 must  operate continuously (a t  
l ea s t  in a standby condition). 
including the UDL, i s  not satisfactory,  the command decoder could interface 
with the SME to accept the demodulated USBE output and provide a l imited 
number of ON-OFF type commands. Another scheme for minimizing UDL 
ON-time could b e  devised by using the USBE's AGC to activate the UDL. 
If the reliability of the overall function, 
Verification of the MSFN- originated up- commands may  be handled 
by activation of the SME to MSFN data link. 
can be allocated to the UDL to accommodate the verification function. 
Normally the UDL sends an 8-bit  parallel-data word to the PCM telemetry 
equipment to ascer ta in  that an up-data message  with the proper coding, 
address  and, length had been received by the unit and that the command was 
executed. 
validation of the command with one SME data word. 
a command to activate the SME to MSFN data link must be  executed before 
the des i red  command can be sent by the MSFN. A circuit  quality analysis 
for the MSFN-to-CSM remote-control link i s  presented in Appendix G. 
Appendix D i s  a discussion of some operational-ground- station procedures 
that m a y  be  required to a s su re  that the CSM USBE receivers  can acquire 
the MSFN up-link c a r r i e r  signal and have sufficient time available f o r  
reception of commands before the CSM will turn another antenna toward 
ear th .  
One data channel of the SME 
This verification word can be processed in the SME to permi t  
If this method is used, 
Lunar- sur face /LM remote-control capability may  control the unattended 
CSM over the existing VHF/AM communications link as  an optional backup 
mode. A l imited number of ON-OFF type commands may be accommodated 
by t ransmission of a command message of digital format  by frequency-shift- 
key (FSK) modulating a subca r r i e r .  
of an encoder and modulator in the LM and a command demodulator-decoder 
in the CSM. 
This concept requires  incorporation 
The existing VHF/AM receivers  in the CSM will require  minor modi- 
fications a s  descr ibed in Appendix I. The CSM VHF antenna sys tem modifi- 
cation previously described for the SME-to-lunar-surface/LM data link will 
fulfill the requirements  for this function also.  The SME-to-lunar- surface / 
LM data link will be used for command message  verification, 
The command demodulator-decoder will consist  of an FSK data 
demodulator, synchronizing circui t ry ,  digital command decoder, and twenty 
re lay  d r ive r s .  The up-link command will consist  of a bilevel signal that will 
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provide a self-synchronizing data message  format .  
in  a digital format  with the f i r s t  group of pulses of each message  used for 
addressing the decoder for  sys t em synchronization purposes .  
message  coding i s  not expected to be required,  because the circui t  quality 
i s  quite good for this link. It i s  proposed, however, to t ransmi t  the com- 
mand word twice for each message .  
receipt of two command words and the synchronizing code before execution. 
The address  will be  10 bits in length, while each command word will be  
5 bits  in length, result ing in a message  length of 20 bi ts .  
r a t e  of 20 bits per  second i s  assumed to be adequate for  the link. 
The commands will be 
Complex 
The decoder would requi re  co r rec t  
A t ransmission 
The CSM-to-lunar sur face /LM SME data link is used for command 
The init ial  command transmitted to the CSM preceding any verification. 
other command message ,  mus t  be for activation of the SME data link. The 
SME can provide a data channel for transmission of verification information 
such as acknowledgement of receipt,  proper processing, and execution of a 
lunar - surface / LM- originated command. 
A circuit  quality es t imate  fo r  the lunar-surface/LM-to-CSM remote- 
control link is presented in  Appendix H. 
System Analysis 
The analysis of the ELOR C&D system must  consider the manned and 
unmanned phases separately.  
reported by Collins Radio in Reference 4. 11 and summarized in Table 4- 11. 
The analysis was based on Apollo I1 data 
The manned phases do not contribute to either Ps o r  P90, because the 
mission could be completed without any communications s o  long as  the G & N  
continued to function; nevertheless ,  i t s  probability of no failure for the 
manned phase (R. ) is bet ter  than for the DRM because of the lower operating 
t ime.  R. i s  estimated to be bet ter  than 0 .  99.  
The quiescent-phase functions contribute to both P90 and Ps in that 
some potential fa i lures  would either make rendezvous difficult o r  would 
prevent status assessment .  
the quiescent cr i t ical  functions. 
The remainder of the analysis is devoted to 
The following assumptions were  also used in the analysis: 
1. All C & D  subsystem equipments used a r e  cor rec t ly  operating when 
the c rew leaves the CSM. 
2. The ELOR quiescent mission t ime i s  2,  201  hours .  
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3. The t r ansmi t t e r s  of both the VHF/AM equipment and the USBE 
will operate for 24 hours for the f i r s t  day plus 45 minutes pe r  
day thereaf ter  for  up to 90 days, yielding a total  operating t ime 
of 90 hours  during the lunar orbi t  phase. Other equipment 
required for  this phase will operate continuously with the excep- 
tion of a portion of the command demodulator-decoder, fo r  which 
the estimated usage is 90 hours.  
4. Reliability data in Collins Specification 514-0004, Rev. E, a r e  
valid. 
The logic diagram for the quiescent phase i s  shown in Figure 4-12. 
Table 4-12 shows the estimated P90 for  each equipment of the subsystem and 
an overall  subsystem P90 of 0 . 8 6  for  the mission,  which i s  unsatisfactory. 
The USBE is the mos t  cr i t ical  equipment in the system, mainly 
because of the fact that the two normally redundant rece ivers  of the USBE 
a r e  required to  operate simultaneously to provide the des i red  continuous 
communication capability. 
Table 4-1 1. Apollo Block I1 C&D Subsystem Equipments::: 
Equipment 
VHF recovery beacon 
VHF t r iplexer  (Note 1)  
VHF / AM transmi t te r  - receiver  
Digital ranging generator  
Audio center ( three stations) 
Premodulation processor  
Data s torage equipment 
PCM telemetry equipment 
USBE P M  transponder 
F M  t ransmi t te r  
S-band power amplifier 
~ 
Fai lure  Rate 
(%/ 1 , 0 0 0  Hr)  
0.109 
0. 0067- 
1.519 
1.783 
0. 51 
0.665 
4. 50 
0. 111 (Note 1) 
1 . 9 4  
0.68 
1 . 2 1  
Weight 
(Pounds) 
2 .3  
1 . 6  
12.2 
7.0 
7.5 
11.4 
40.0 
42.7 
31.6 (Note 2) 
31.6 (Note 3) 
Notes: 1, Fai lure  r a t e  reflects built-in redundancy, 
2. 
3. Includes two redundant amplifiers.  
Includes two P M  transponders and one F M  transmit ter .  
*Excludes resu l t s  of ELOR modifications 
- 137 - 
SD 68-850-1  
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
m m 
CDm m c n  
I-- 
0 
Lo e m  m .  
0 
L 
W O L  s w  aJ a a u  0 
E- 0 - 
€ 3 0  ma3 
O U a J  e ch 
0 
o o n  
- 138 - 
9 
m 
d 
II 
h m 
x 
e 
x 
PT 
x 
PT 
x 
oc 
x 
PT 
x 
PT 
II 
CD 
L n  
e 
m 
cu 
7 
I-- a 
L 
aJ > 
0 
PT 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
m 
m 
.rl 
x 
8-l 
4 
c, 
a, 
a, 
k a 
d 
E 
zl 
E 
2 
H 
c, *rl 
A 
h 
rd 
.4 
I+ 
2 
E 
a, * 
[o 
h m 
P 
1 ul 
4 
0 
n 
4 w 
N 
A 
I * 
a, 
P 
Id 
b 
8-l 
00 
m rn m 
m 
0 
0 0  0 0 0 
0 0  0 0 0 
9 
00 o m  
m m  o m  
0 0  
. 
_ _ _ _ _ ~ ~  
- 1 3 9  - 
SD 68-850-1 
- 
00 m 
m 
0 
* m m 
0 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
The first  s tep  taken in improving P90 was to examine the requirement  
for  continuous communication between the CSM and MSFN throughout the 
quiescent phase,  Although continuous communication may  be desirable ,  it 
m u s t  be recognized that, during the period when the CSM will be occulted by 
the moon, communication with the MSFN is not possible. 
period lasts approximately one half of the two-hour orbit. 
recourse  other than to accept this physical limitation on communications. 
Because l e s s  than continuous communication is actually required,  the opera-  
tional procedure can  be adjusted to conform with the physical constraints and 
communications planned only when possible. 
r ece ive r s  can provide adequate communications, these rece ivers  of the USBE 
and the S-band diplexers-power dividers can  be considered in parallel ,  which 
would essentially be providing active redundancy for this portion of the sub- 
system, This technique would reduce communications capability to approxi- 
mately 240 degrees  of the lunar  orbi t  if a fai lure  in either receiver  occured. 
Approximately 40 seconds of unbroken communications will be possible twice 
per  revolution and will permi t  t ransmiss ion  of perhaps three frames of SME 
data and/or  th ree  o r  four commands to be received during each 40-second 
period. The USBE P90 contribution will increase f r o m  0. 931 to 0. 9996, and 
the subsystem will be at least  0. 92. 
This occulted 
There  is no 
Since either one of the two 
The second s tep  involves the status monitor equipment (SME) with 
reliabil i ty of 0. 95. 
internal standby redundancy. 
SME f r o m  0.95 to  0.998 and the subsystem P90 becomes 0.97. 
To improve its reliability, it was necessary  to provide 
This approach increases  the reliability of the 
The third s tep  (Table 4-12) involves the command demodulator-decoder 
(CDD) with a f i r s t  estimate for  reliability of 0. 98. 
achieved by a n  operational procedure.  
decoder when not in use would substantially reduce its duty cycle and not com- 
promise i ts  function. 
be active fo r  the f i rs t  24 hours plus 45 minutes per day thereafter,  yielding 
a total of 90 hours .  
CDD and a P90 of 0. 98 for the overal l  subsystem. 
A gain in reliability i s  
Provisions to turn  off par t  of the 
I t  was est imated that this portion of the decoder would 
This concept resulted in a reliability of 0. 995 for the 
Since the ELOR C&D subsystem P90 is s t i l l  not close to the des i red  
objective an  overal l  examination of the system with regard  to rendezvous 
operations was undertaken, 
remote-control  links was operating, there would be no reduction to P90 or  
P,, which allows the VHF/AM t ransmi t te r - rece iver  and VHF triplexer to be 
considered in  paral le l  with the USBE and S-band diplexer-power dividers.  
Consequently, the combined reliability for  the VHF/AM t ransmi t te r - rece iver ,  
VHF tr iplexer ,  USBE, and S-band diplexer-power dividers is changed f r o m  
0. 99 to 0. 9998, thereby giving a sys t em P90 of 0. 993. 
It was found that, as long as  one of the two 
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Function 
S-band voice 
Xmit and r c v  
VHF/AM voice 
Xmit and r c v  
(CSM-MSFN) 
To achieve Step 5 of Table 4-12, the command demodulator-decoder 
was redesigned to include some internal active redundancy ( see  Appendix I). 
r This modification resulted in an estimated sys tem P90  of 0. 994. 
P resen t  CSM Function 
Reliability P90 for ELOR P90  With Spare 
0 .999  0.998 1 USBE 0.9999 
0. 999998 0.9996 1 VHF/AM 0. 999998 
T o  achieve Step 6 and approximate the subsystem objectives, a second 
This addition would compli- VHF/AM transmit ter  - rece iver  could be added. 
cate  the design somewhat a s  reflected in Appendix I; however, the r ecom-  
mendation is feasible and would permit  achieving a sys tem P90 of about 
0.998. 
accomplish near ly  the same. 
A spa re  to be used for the re turn  t r ip  (manually changed) may  
During the manned portions of the mission, M&R can be performed and 
m a y  be required after the long quiescent period. Two required functions of 
the CSM fo r  the manned portion of the flight and their  presently specified and 
predicted Apollo Block I1 reliabil i ty requirements a r e  shown in the f i r s t  three 
columns of Table 4-13. 
impact  included i s  shown in the third column. 
reliabil i ty for these functions when a spare  USBE and a VHF/AM Transmi t te r -  
Receiver is added to the subsystem. 
The reliability of these functions with the ELOR 
The sixth column shows the 
Table 4-13. C&D System Status 
Present ly ,  no C&D subsystem function or  equipment i s  considered vital 
to c rew safety for the manned Apollo DRM; however, since S-band voice, a s  
well a s  other functions such a s  te lemetry and up-data a r e  very desirable for 
manned portions of the mission, one complete USBE is recommended as a 
spa re ;  this adds only 31. 6 pounds to  the spares  complement. 
The UHF/AM t ransmi t te r - rece iver  i s  not recommended a s  a spare ,  
since it near ly  approximates the requirement.  
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Conclusions and Re commendations 
The subsys tern configuration based upon maximum utilization of the 
present  Apollo Block I1 CSM C&D subsystem requi res  two new i tems of 
equipment, the status monitoring equipment and the command demodulator - 
decoder, along with modifications to the VHF/AM t ransmi t te r - rece iver  and 
the unified S-band equipment. 
requirements  and not introduce any development problem. 
This configuration will satisfy the ELOR 
The contribution to sat isfactory completion of the 90 days for the 
selected subsystem configuration is over 0 . 9 9 3  for  the unattended lunar orbit  
phase of the miss ion  and over 0. 99 for all phases. 
sys t em concept provides status monitoring and remote control capabilities 
between the CSM and lunar surface/LM and the CSM and manned spaceflight 
network (MSFN) during the unattended lunar orbit  phase of the mission. 
reliability estimate was based upon cr i te r ia  that (1) the mission is not 
affected by loss  of one of the two remote-control o r  status-monitoring links 
and ( 2 )  the mission is not affected by loss  of communication capability between 
the CSM and MSFN for shor t  periods (i. e . ,  a cycle of 40 seconds availability 
followed by a 20-  second unavailability period of communications will be 
imposed for  each half revolution of the CSM due to the spin-rate  of once per 
two minutes. 
The recommended sub- 
The 
Maintenance i s  possible only during the manned phases,  and one com- 
This equipment adds only 
plete unified S-band equipment is required to provide sufficient subsystem 
reliability for the manned phases of the mission. 
3 4  pounds to the mission.  
add a total of about 26 pounds, making a delta over Apollo Block I1 C&D 
weight of only 60 pounds. 
expected to be required;  and whatever maintenance i s  required can be ini- 
tiated on the basis  of data a l ready  available. 
qualification could be accomplished in about two years .  
The modifications and new equipment required wi l l  
No special monitor o r  diagnostic equipment is 
The required development and 
4. 1.6 Reentrv Reaction Control Svstem (CM-RCS) 
System Description 
The CM-RCS i s  used to provide for attitude control after service 
module separation, during the ear th  reent ry  (Phase  8 .0) .  
powered by nonthrottleable pressure- fed  engines using hypergolic fuels and 
ablative chambers.  
dancy, The sys tem is controlled by the CM reaction control system, which 
has  a manual backup capability a s  well. 
The system is 
There  a r e  two individual systems operating in redun- 
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System Analysis 
The ELOR mission does not change the functional requirements  imposed 
on the CM-RCS except to increase  the t ime i t  is exposed to space conditions 
in the dormant state.  Because the CM-RCS it does not operate until reen t ry  
on Apollo, the s a m e  is projected for ELOR; no decrease in reliabil i ty or  Ps 
is expected. 
has  been offset by isolating the helium f rom the fuel with squib valves, until 
r e quir  e d. 
The one potential failure mode, helium migration into fuels, 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The Apollo I1 CM-RCS is satisfactory without any changes to the system 
o r  profile activity. There i s ,  therefore ,  no effect on the maintenance con- 
cept, development schedule, o r  support requirements.  The sys tem contri-  
bution to Ps is expected to be about 0. 99997 a s  is. 
4. 1. 7 The Up Data Link (UDL) 
NOTE: Much of the information used here in  was provided by the 
- Motorola Corporation through Reference 4. 1 2 .  
System Description 
The p r imary  function of the UDL i s  to provide the data required to 
update the guidance computer and central  t imer  a s  i t  i s  received f rom the 
MFSN. This function is particularly important because the recommended 
operational concept involves shutting down the guidance and navigation func - 
tions during the quiescent lunar orbit  phase. 
operate  intermittently throughout the quiescent phase to provide a remote-  
control channel that will demodulate and decode MFSN-originated commands 
generated to control this phase. See 4. 1 .  5-1 for details on this operation, 
The operation of this link i s  cr i t ical  to the mission in that a l l  control func- 
tions mus t  be processed through this sys tem during the unmanned phases.  
Fu r the r ,  it mus t  provide the capability to re turn  to the normal  operating 
mode to facilitate the rendezvous and docking activity. A functional block 
diagram is presented in Figure 4-13. 
In addition, the UDL mus t  
Specifically, the UDL performs spacecraf t  command and control func- 
tions by receiving the signal f r o m  the communications link, processing the 
data, and transmitt ing the commands to the spacecraft  functions serviced. 
The types of commands to be  handled a r e  expected to be much the s a m e  as 
those used for Block I1 Apollo. 
command o r  data and will include the following: 
They will be coded by subsystem and type of 
1. Real-t ime commands to control the operational mode of some 
spacecraf t  subs ys  tems  functions. 
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2 .  Insertion of words into the guidance computer to update and/or  
modify s tored  information. 
and ei ther  an instruction or  numerical  data including updated 
t ra jectory.  ) 
(Words consist  of a storage address  
3. Update timing. 
4. Quiescent-mode control. 
5. Redundancy control during quiescent phase. 
The data provided by the ear th  complex depends on the deep-space-net 
This function i s  particularly c r i t i ca l  for the earth-approach phase 
tracking, which is to be  the pr imary  mode of navigation for most  of the 
mission.  
where the on-board navigation capabilities a r e  expected to be marginal.  
System Analysis 
The data used in the analysis of the UDL have been derived f r o m  five 
These data a s su re  a valid analysis to a other programs a s  well a s  Apollo. 
high degree of confidence. 
The Apollo UDL is expected to require  l i t t le to no modification to meet  
the ELOR requirements .  
of the outputs. 
Section 4. 15-3. 
The changes a r e  external;  that is, in  the usage 
These changes a r e  presented under the C&D subsystem, 
Because the design remains basically unchanged, i t  is only necessary  
to apply the UDL to the ELOR mission where the difference with reference to 
Apollo is in the t ime and life parameters .  The life expectancy i s  well within 
the existing UDL capability since it is 100-percent electronics,  and wearout 
is not a problem. 
The result ing reliabil i ty of a UDL in the Apollo configuration m a y  be 
computed using a failure ra te  of 1.076 percent per 1000 hours,  as defined for 
the unit. 
0. 97, which is too low. 
mission,  which is not required. 
The probability of no failure during the mission is therefore P, = 
This value is based on operation throughout the 
Since the fai lure  rate used is associated with elevated temperatures ,  
the expected equipment temperature  during the mission will be limited to a 
normal  maximum of 70 F. 
the quiescent phase so that a new yet pessimist ic  failuresrate may  be achieved 
by applying a multiplier of 0 .  5 to the foregoing high-temperature failure ra te .  
It is es t imated that the result ing contribution to P, will be a t  least  0. 99,  st i l l  
operating full time. 
Fur ther ,  it  is expected to be much lower during 
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A breakdown of the sys tem to subassembly levels is given in Fig-  
u r e  4-14. Although the 
fai lure  r a t e s  represent  elevated temperature  conditions. Relative magnitudes 
m a y  be easily determined to establish subassemblies that have a higher 
probability of fa i lure  than others ,  
Respective failure r a t e s  a r e  shown in each block. 
The four alternatives to be considered in attempting to mee t  or  exceed 
the des i red  0. 999 contribution to Ps a re -  
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4. 
Two UDL's operating in redundant fashion with paralleled output 
capability yield a contribution to Ps of about 0. 9999. 
represents  a maximum estimated reliability, because additional 
c i rcu i t ry  will be required in the UDL to allow outputs to be con- 
nected in redundant fashion. With this technique, no information 
or capability is lost  in the switchover o r  replacement process ,  
This number 
One spa re  UDL in a standby redundant mode with paralleled output 
capability and manual o r  automatic switching between the two o r ,  
as  a third alternative,  replacement of the total UDL package. 
Either of these arrangements  will increase the resulting contribu- 
tion to Ps to 0. 99995, which i s  m o r e  than adequate, 
Reduction of operating time/USBE signal activation will resul t  in a 
much lower duty cycle and, as a resul t ,  an improvement in the 
contribution to Ps which would be better than 0. 997 based on 
22 hours  of commands. This assumption is pessimist ic ;  but 
because i t  is an assumption, it may  be a l e s s  desirable alternative 
than Alternative 2 ,  which requi res  no assumptions. 
Maintenance and/or  repa i r  of the UDL can be accomplished a t  two 
levels in i ts  present  form,  with minor modifications; however, f o r  
the ELOR mission,  M&R i s  practical  only af ter  re turn  to the CSM, 
Phase 6.  17. One sandwich assembly and/or three of the mother-  
boards contribute over 70 percent of the mission failure hazard.  
The spar ing concept could be established to work a t  either o r  both 
of these levels ;  however, three of the sandwich boards must  be 
spared to  reduce the r i sk  of no spare  and reduce Ps to l e s s  than 
one in a thousand. Four  motherboards were required to accomplish 
the s a m e  purpose; the motherboard i s  rated at  a lower level of 
assembly than the sandwich level. Of the two levels,  the sandwich 
level m a y  be the best  selection, because one must  be spared  in 
either concept, and, in addition, the diagnostic requirements  a r e  
fa r  less. 
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Since M&R actions can only be implemented during the manned phases 
and would only be required af ter  re turn  f r o m  the lunar surface,  the result ing 
contribution to  Ps could not exceed about 0. 998. Because a spare  UDL with- 
out M&R, Option 2, will exceed any reasonable objective, this option without 
any planned M&R actions seems  the obvious choice, it adds 19 pounds to the CM. 
Conclusions and Re commendations 
The Apollo I1 UDL will satisfy the ELOR-UDL requirement with minor 
modifications in  the application of some c i rcu i t s  for the command link activ- 
i t ies .  One spare  UDL is recommended with automatic o r  switching on 
command f r o m  the MSFN. 
craft and will require  no additional tes t  equipment, tools,  o r  other support 
i tems. 
This spare  will add only 19.0 pounds to the space-  
4. 1. 8 Central  Timing System 
NOTE: Much of the information used in this section was provided by the 
Genera l  Time Corporation through Reference 4.13. 
Subs y s  tern Description 
The functions of the central  timing equipment (CTE) a r e  straightforward 
because it provides the m a s t e r  t ime reference for a l l  mission systems,  
outputs appear in two forms,  t ime accumulation and frequency division. 
CTE is a single component of about a ten-inch cube; internally, it has  four 
module boards and weighs about ten pounds. 
facil i tate navigation measurements  and apply a thrust  vector. 
updated via the up-data link system. 
impair crew abili ty to re turn  safely; therefore,  it is considered to be a 
c r iti cal  function. 
The 
The 
The function is required to 
It  may  be 
Complete loss  of the function would 
The CTE consists of four functional subsystems: 
1. Power supply 
2.  Oscillator 
3 .  Frequency divider 
4. Time accumulator 
The CTE power supply subsystem consists of two separate identical 
pulsewidth-modulated power supplies, each capable of handling full load. The 
power supplies a r e  fed by nominal 28-volt d -c  l ines ( see  the functional block 
diagram of F igure  4- 15. ) 
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The oscil lator i s  a highly stable device and can operate in a p r imary  o r  
In secondary mode. 
Both signals a r e  double, shaped, and fed to a divide-by-four major i ty  logic 
network, 
The p r imary  mode i s  an internal 1,  024-kHz oscil lator.  
. the secondary mode, the CTE i s  driven by an external 1, 024-kHz signal, 
The oscil lator output is 512 kHz. 
The frequency divider is composed of successive two-out-of-three 
majori ty  logic networks that divide the 512-kHz signal down to one Hz.  
~~ 
The time accumulator subsystem i s  composed of two se t s  of outputs. 
The first of these is  a s e r i a l  t ime code output conforming to the IRIG B 
format;  the second is a s e t  of paral le l  time-code outputs. 
Subsystem Analysis 
The reliabil i ty goals for  the Apollo CTE have been established for the 
Apollo DRM under specific environmental conditions that a r e  commensurate 
with the ELOR mission requirements .  These requirements  a r e  a s  follows: 
1. For  any se t  of t ime-accumulator outputs, the probability 
shall  be 0 , 9 9 9 .  
2. F o r  any single frequency-divider output, the probability 
shal l  be 0.999999. 
The CTE utilizes various types of internal redundancy to achieve the 
reliability goals and i s  c r i t i ca l  in that i t  contributes to Ps. The power supply 
is a one-out-of-two paral le l  arrangement  whereby each power module is  cap- 
able of handling the full load in the event of failure of the other. 
The oscil lator section uti l izes diss imilar  paral le l  redundancy, This 
arrangement  allows the internal  c rys ta l  oscillator to phaselock with an  
externally supplied signal of the same frequency. In the event of failure of 
the external signal, the internal oscil lator continues to provide the cor rec t  
signal to  the frequency dividers without any loss  of count. 
The frequency divider section uses  two-out-of-three majority vote 
The output f r o m  the'oscil lator o r  previous divider i s  fed to three logic. 
independent divider chains. 
frequencies and be in phase for a proper output for  that  divider stage to be 
present.  
Any two of the three chains mus t  have identical 
Additional component par t  redundancy is used in various circui ts  to 
guard against shor t s  o r  opens, depending upon the cr i t ical i ty  of the par t  to 
successful c i rcui t  operation. 
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The subfunctional level reliability logic for the CTE is comparatively 
simple a s  expressed by  the logic diagram below. The reliability of the total 
. function for the miss ion  is  a t  l eas t  that of the Apollo Mission, since the pro-  
posed duty cycle f o r  the recommended operational concept i s  only 163 hours 
versus  a t  l ea s t  190 f o r  Apollo. The result ing estimated contribution to both 
crew safe re turn  (P,) is a t  l ea s t  0. 9998. Figure 4-15 is a functional picture 
of the redundant design. 
The Ps i s  sufficiently high s o  that it i s  considered unlikely that any 
maintenance will be required.  
as a unit ei ther by providing an on-board spa re  o r  by  cannibalizing the LM. 
Cannibalization would be permissible ,  since the maintenance would most  
probably be requi red  just  after the docking in lunar orbit. 
If i t  were required,  the CTE could be replaced 
The CTE i s  satisfactory as  is for the ELOR mission and i s  not expected 
to require  any changes, only a life test .  
Ac cumui B t i on 
9999994 --_- __I_-.- --.-_ - 
Reliability Logic, CTE,  Subfunctional Level 
4. 1. 9 Ea r th  Landing System (ELS) 
NOTE: Much of the information used herein was provided by the 
Northrop Ventura Company through Reference 4.14.  
Sub sys tem De scription 
During the lunar orbit  phase, the ELS is in a dormant mode, with no 
functional requirements ,  The only requirement pr ior  to ear th  entry i s  that 
the recovery sys tem be able to withstand exposure to the ELS compartment 
environment throughout the mission without nonrepairable degradation of 
operability o r  nonrepairable degradation of sys tem performance to a point 
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below specification levels.  
therefore  cannot be tested in the conventional sense of the word pr ior  to i ts  
intended mission.  
The sys tem i s  l imited to one use cycle and 
This limitation applies to a normal  o r  abort  profile. 
The Apollo Block I1 increased capability ELS consists of- 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 .  
One forward heat shield m o r t a r  assembly. 
Two drogue chute m o r t a r  assemblies .  
Three pilot chute m o r t a r  assemblies .  
Three main  parachute pack assemblies .  
Three main parachute r i s e r  assemblies .  
Three main  parachute retention assemblies .  
Two sequence control lers  (located in the crew compartment),  
The forward heat shield m o r t a r  assembly is permanently attached to 
The sequence control lers  a r e  installed within the the forward heat shield. 
crew compartment,  
in the ELS compartment beneath the forward heat shield. 
The remainder  of the landing sys tem is stowed in bays 
The ELS sys tem operation and design i s  expected to be identical to that 
for the Apollo 11. 
Systems Analysis 
Since the only difference between the present  Apollo mission and the 
ELOR mission is  the extension of the lunar orbit  phase, this factor governs 
the source  of potential ELS problems. 
earth entry was considered to  be 99  days for purpose of this study. 
The total elapsed t ime f r o m  launch to 
Extended exposure to the lunar orbital  environment requires  analysis 
of the anticipated effects on the ear th  landing system. 
which requi re  examination include- 
Specific problem a reas  
1. The possibility that exposure to mission temperature  and p res su re  
environments m a y  degrade the sys tem textiles to an extent that 
sys tem performance is degraded. 
2. The possibility of cold-welding of metall ic components. 
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3. The possibility of the degradation of pyrotechnics f r o m  exposure 
to the combined environments. 
4. The possibility of functional degradation of plastics and e las tomers  
in the sys t em f rom exposure to the thermal/vacuum environment, 
5. The possibility of sys tem degradation f r o m  penetrating radiation 
and meteoroids .  
These problem a r e a s  have been analyzed in some detail by the Northrop 
Corporation Ventura Division; the resul ts  a r e  presented in Appendix W. 
All data f r o m  the Block I, Block 11, and increased capability tes t  pro-  
g rams  that were assessable  to the qualified configuration were included in 
the final system reliabil i ty assessment .  A tabulation of the data is also con- 
tained in  Reference 4.15. Design factors  were included in the calculations 
wherever the degradation was not included in the tes t  procedure,  
The normal  ear th-en t ry  flight mode af ter  a 14-day Apollo mission was 
taken a s  the baseline for this analysis.  
to 99  days, and the effects of this extension were estimated in the gross  
failure modes and effects analysis of Table 4-14. 
The mission duration was extended 
The resu l t s  of the prel iminary reliability assessment  of the Apollo ELS 
increased capability for ELOR and the Apollo DRM a r e  shown in Table 4-15. 
The total ELS sys t em PS was found to be 0. 99993 a t  the 50-percent confidence 
level. A 10-percent s t rength degradation due to extended lunar orbital s to r -  
age in a near vacuum was applied to all fabr ics  in the earth-landing sys tem 
for the 90-day miss ion  sys tem reliability calculations. An additional level 
of analytical detail m a y  be found in Appendix R and Reference 4. 15. 
Access  to the ELS compartment would be very difficult to accomplish 
during the mission. F o r  this reason, it i s  considered that a capability for 
maintenance and/or repa i r  of the ELS components within this compartment 
i s  impractical  fo r  any mission phase af ter  launch. 
The sequence controller is accessible,  being located in the crew com- 
partment;  however, because of i ts  redundancy and protection from the space 
environment, it is considered reliable enough not to require maintenance 
and/or repa i r  during the mission. 
- 154 - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
Table 4-14. Gross  Fai lure  Modes and Effects ELOR-ELS 
Sys tem Function 
Pilot Parachutes  
Sequence Cont r 011 e r 
Potential Fai lure  Mode 
Fai lure  to f i re  - minimized by redundant 
components. 
Premature  fir ing - major  deleterious 
effect in p re s su re  car t r idges.  
line cut ters ,  redundant f i rs t -s tage reefing 
l ines reduce the possibility of cr i t ical  ea r ly  
d is r  eef 
In reefing 
Fai lure  of parachute - some limited effect, 
depending on geometry of separation 
dynamics: heat  shield could fall into the 
command module and cause damage to the 
ELS. 
Fai lure  of one parachute - little effect 
because of redundancy; however, there  is  a 
possibility of the failed chute damaging 
remaining functioning chute, 
Fa i lure  of both drogues - major  effect but 
low probability of occurrence.  
Fai lure  of one parachute - little effect 
since only two functioning parachutes a r e  
required for nominal landing velocity. 
Fai lure  of two o r  m o r e  parachutes - major  
effect but low probability of occurrence.  
Same a s  main chute. 
Fa i lure  of any one component - no effect 
due to complete redundancy, 
Fa i lure  of multiple components - possible 
major  effects dependent upon their  location. 
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Sub as s embly 
Sequence controller 
Table 4- 15. Results of Reliability. Analysis 
14-Day Mission Ps 99-Day Mission Ps 
0.9994 0.9994 
Retention assembly  
Metal riser assembly  
Forward  heat shield 
m o r t a r  assembly  
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  1.000000 
0.9999998 0.9999998 
Drogue parachute 
m o r t a r  assembly  
~ ~~ 
Parachute  subsystem PS I 0. 99993 
Pilot  pa r  a chu te 
m o r t a r  assembly 
0.99993 
Main parachute 
pack assembly  
0.996 
0.998 
0. 998 
0.997 
0. 9956 
0.998 
0 .  998 
0.997 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
I t  is concluded that the Apollo Block I1 increased capability earth- 
landing system (ELS) is capable of meeting the 90-day life in lunar orbit  
requi red  for the ELOR mission with a Ps of 0. 99993, provided the tempera-  
tu re  (and to a l e s s e r  extent the p re s su re )  environment within the ELS com- 
par tment  is substantially the same as that specified for  the present  Apollo 
ELS. 
The quiescent mode requirements  for the ELS during the extended lunar 
orbital  miss ion  a r e  substantially the s a m e  a s  f o r  the Apollo DRM mission. 
The temperature  environment within the ELS compartment should not depart  
significantly f r o m  the limits specified for the present  Apollo mission. 
P r e s s u r e s  within the compartment,  which a r e  no lower than the presently 
specified 10-6 t o r r ,  would be desirable  pr imar i ly  because much of the avail- 
able vacuum tes t  data is i n  that range. Venting of the compartment  should be 
held to  the minimum pract ical  level  pr imar i ly  to minimize the lo s s  of textile 
finish. 
compartment  can be tolerated. 
It is  questionable that minimum temperatures  below -65 F in the 
Maximum temperatures  above 120 F can be 
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tolerated for shor t  periods,  but a higher temperature  during a substantial 
portion of the miss ion  would be undesirable. 
expected to be maintained without any special  design, as a resu l t  of the 
barbecue concept. 
The required temperatures  a r e  
A temperature  monitor may  be desirable for  the ELS compartment to 
a l e r t  the crew on the lunar surface in the event compartment temperature  
departs  f r o m  the specification limits. 
The following tes t s ,  analyses and developments a r e  recommended. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6.  
7. 
Tes ts  to determine the functionality of the ent i re  ELS sys tem af te r  
extended exposure to a thermal/vacuum environment. 
Analysis and tes t s  to better define the vacuum stability of landing 
sys tem texti les (particularly nylon) to an extended thermal/vacuum 
environment. 
Analysis of nylon finish requirements and upgrading of textile 
specifications to a s s u r e  the use of silicone oils with the highest 
pr'actical vapor p re s  sure .  
Tests  to verify that cur ren t  production methods provide a d ry  
lubricant coating to all  s t rands of the s tee l  r i s e r  cables. 
Tes ts  to verify in- specification pyrotechnic function af ter  a 99-day 
thermal  /vacuum environment. 
Analysis and tests to define the vacuum stability of pyrotechnic 
sea ls  and components over an extended period of t ime,  
Investigation of methods to provide redundant sealing of pyrotechnic 
units. 
The analysis of the ability of the Apollo ELS to meet  the ELOR 90-day 
quiescent i s  based on a l imited amount of d i rec t  evidence and on extrapolation 
of these available data. To a s su re  a safe and successful extended lunar 
exploration program for  the 1975 period, fur ther  tes t s  and analyses should 
be conducted. Faci l i t ies  a r e  available whereby the entire ELS can be sub- 
jected to an extended thermal/vacuum environment. This testing should be 
accomplished; then followed immediately by tes t s  and evaluation of sys tem 
functionality. 
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4.2 SERVICE MODULE SYSTEMS" 
4. 2. 1 ,Elec t r ica l  Power Plant  (EPP) 
NOTE: Much of the data used herein was provided by 
P r a t t  and Whitney Aircraf t  ( P & W )  through 
Reference 4- 13, by Allis-Chalmers Division (AC) 
of General  Motors through Reference 4.17, o r  by 
General  Elec t r ic  Company through Reference 4. 18. 
Subsystem Description and Alternatives 
The  e lec t r ica l  power plant (EPP) for the Apollo Block I1 is composed 
of t h ree  P & W  PC3A-2 fuel-cell  modules (FCM) installed i n  the serv ice  module. 
They provide all the power requi red  for all but the ear th-en t ry  and recovery 
operations and a r e ,  therefore ,  c rew cr i t ical ,  contributing t o  Ps as well as 
P90* 
Because of the pecul iar  nature of the ELOR mission, power requi re -  
ments va ry  drast ical ly  between the manned and unmanned phases.  F o r  this 
reason, one of the factors  identified i n  the  SD study was the effectiveness of 
using a radioisotope thermoelec t r ic  generator (RTG) for  the EPP during the 
quiescent-state operations. 
one proposed by LMSC using three  fuel cells  and SD-proposed two fuel cells  
with the modified SNAP-27 RTG. 
this  study and the resu l t s  a r e  reflected in  the  following paragraphs.  
Two concepts become apparent for the EPP, the 
Both of these concepts were  analyzed i n  
Two sys tems a r e  under consideration by NASA for  use  in the post- 
Apollo miss ions ,  the 2.  5 kilowatt PC8B- 1 produced by Pratt and Whitney and 
the two-kilowatt capil lary matrix cell  produced by Allis-Chalmers.  F o r  the 
Block I1 Apollo system, the P & W  PC3A-2 will not sat isfy the ELOR mission 
requirements  because of its life limits and, therefore ,  is  rejected f rom 
fur ther  consideration. 
Although the P & W  FCM was used herein for  the analysis,  the Allis- 
Additional data on the P & W  cell  m a y  be found in  Appendix Y. 
Chalmers  sys tem will per form equally well as demonstrated by the data in  
Appendix K.  
The All is-Chalmers  fuel cell will requi re  some modification. 
The general  requirements  and assumptions considered i n  the evalua- 
tion of the fuel cell  sys tem (FCS) for the extended lunar  orbital  missions are 
as follows: 
1. Three-powerplant installation. 
2. Unattended lunar  orbi t  operation for  90 days. 
A foldout sheet listing abbreviations used in  Section 4.2 and their meanings is located a t  page 199. 
* 
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3. One powerplant operating during lunar  orbi t  phase ( F C  concept 
only). 
4. System power output (based on the LMSC study): 
a. 1200 watts base load with peak power capability t o  2400 watts 
g ross  power, 
b. 530 watts minimum gross  power. 
5. Voltage regulation: 27-31 volts. 
6. Powerplant endurance within voltage regulation: 2500 hours.  
7. Remote r e s t a r t  capability. 
8 .  Apollo Block I1 fuel-cell radiator ,  
9.  Present  CSM fuel-cell  envirionmental specifications. 
10. Normal Apollo mission to and f r o m  lunar a rea .  
11. Crew safety o r  Ps of about 0. 999 for  system. 
The power requirements  during lunar -orbit operation a s  provided by 
the LMSC study a r e  shown i n  F igure  4-16. 
fuel-cell  power-plant sys t em t o  provide this power, the limitation imposed 
on heat rejection by the present  40-square-foot Block I1 radiator configuration 
in  the environment of lunar orbit  has  been considered. 
In setting the configuration of the 
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Figure  4- 16. Est imated CSM Power Requirements i n  
Lunar Orbit (LMSC Est imates)  
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The proposed FCM is capable of handling the full 2400-watt peak load 
i f  the  coolant supplied to  it is within specified temperature  limits. 
load peaks a r e  of relatively shor t  duration as anticipated (15 minutes o r  l e s s ) ,  
the one EPP can accommodate the anticipated surges  in  coolant r e t u r n  tem- 
pera ture  f r o m  the Block I1 radiator .  
necessa ry  t o  supplement the fuel-cell  heat-rejection capacity with a small 
sublimator.  
If the 
F o r  peaks of longer duration, i t  is 
The proposed P & W  FCM design weighs 151 pounds; the Allis-Chalmers 
cell  weighs 1 0  pounds more.  
PC3A-2 components and offers a substantial  decrease in installed weight and 
a n  improvement in operating flexibility, endurance, and reliability over the 
Apollo Block I1 EPS. A schematic of the  P & W  power plant is shown in  F ig -  
u r e  4-17; the Allis-Chalmers cell  is more  complex. 
P & W  makes use of existing flight-qualified 
Both cells consists of four major  subsystems,  the power section, 
water  - removal  function, heat-removal  function, and reactant-control func- 
tion, The P & W  cell  i s  described in the following paragraphs.  
The power section consists of the required number of unitized e lec-  
t rodes and'accompanying cooling plates assembled consecutively to  f o r m  a 
single stack (F igure  4-18). The electrodes and adjacent cooling plates a r e  
held i n  position between end-plate assemblies  by tie rods.  
connected i n  se r i e s  e lectr ical ly  and a r e  supplied with reactants and liquid 
coolant through internal paral le l  manifolds, 
The cel ls  a r e  
The operating power plant is self-controlling. During this period, it 
appears  desirable  to monitor performance and to  have the capability of actuat- 
ing one of the standby units should the  operating unit malfunction. 
mended pa rame te r s  t o  be monitored a re-  
Recom- 
1. Power plant voltage. 
2. Power plant current .  
3. Power section tempera ture .  
4. Hydrogen condenser exit temperature .  
All of these  pa rame te r s  a r e  monitored in  the present  CSM fuel cell  
installation. 
below 27 volts,  the power section tempera ture  exceeds 250 F ,  o r  the con- 
denser  exit t empera ture  exceeds 180 F. 
Provision should be made for a n  a l a r m  in case  the voltage goes 
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TO FROM 
RADIATOR RAD I AT0  R 
Figure 4-17.  Electr ical  Power Plant System (EPP) Schematic 
With SM EPS Radiator Cooling 
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CATALYZED YLEc:3 
TRA 
Figure 4-18. PC8B-1 Cell Schematic 
t i p  PASSAGE 
-FRAM€ 
fOR UNITIZE0 
ELECTRODE 
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Actuation of a cold standby unit is a simple process  requiring no 
external power. The following s teps  a r e  involved: 
1. Turn  on pumps. 
2. A r m  in-line heater  circuit .  
3 .  Turn  on startup hea ters .  
4. Turn  off s tar tup hea ters  upon reaching operating temperature .  
The power plant i s  now ready to  be connected to the bus. During 
in-flight operation, a bootstrap o r  se l f - s ta r t  can be performed by energizing 
the pumps and the s tar tup heaters  direct ly  f r o m  the dormant power plant. 
Ei ther  the heatup can be completed p r io r  t o  placing the power plant on the 
bus ( a s  descr ibed above) o r ,  depending on the selection of heater  s ize ,  the 
main feed contactor can be closed af ter  par t ia l  heatup and the heaters  placed 
i n  para l le l  with the spacecraf t  load until the heating cycle i s  completed. The 
simplicity of the s t a r t  cycle makes remote activation easy  to  accomplish and 
requi res  no special  equipment beyond the four switching functions indicated. 
The P & W  water-removal  subsystem per forms a s  in  the Apollo 
PC3A-2 FCM; product water i s  removed f rom the cell  stack by the r e c i r -  
culation of hydrogen. During passage a c r o s s  the anode surface, a hydrogen 
flow i n  excess  of the consumption r a t e  i s  heated and acquires water vapor. 
The mixture  i s  transported to an  F C  75-cooled heat exchanger, where the 
vapor i s  condensed. The liquid water  i s  removed by a centrifugal separator  
and the remaining saturated hydrogen i s  pumped back to the cell stack a f te r  
being mixed with the supplemental hydrogen required to sustain cell  reaction. 
Because of advantages in  t e rms  of lower, greater  durability, and higher 
reliability, brushless  d-c  motors  a r e  recommended for use in  driving both 
the hydrogen pump and the coolant pump instead of the a -c  motors  now in  use 
i n  the PC3A-2. These motors  a r e  presently under development a t  P&WA. 
The P & W  heat-removal  subsystem removes the major portion of the 
waste heat generated within the cell  stack is  by circulation of a liquid coolant 
( F C  75)  through the cell  stack. The coolant i s  supplied to the stack at a con- 
t ro l led  tempera ture  level, heated during passage through the cel ls ,  cooled 
a t  a n  external heat sink, and pumped back to the cell stack i s  maintained by 
a control valve, which regulates the ra te  of heat-sink bypass flow, 
portion of the waste heat is a lso removed f r o m  the cells by the recirculated 
hydrogen flow i n  the water-removal  subsystem, but this heat is rejected to  
A l e s s e r  
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the FC 75 loop within the power plant. 
complex, using helium as a second heat t ransfer  medium. 
The Allis-Chalmers approach i s  m o r e  
The data indicate that FC 75 coolant i s  compatible with the serv ice  
Although module Block I1 radiator  i n  all operating thermal  environments, 
the specific heat of FC  75 i s  considerably l e s s  than that of aqueous ethylene 
glycol, the grea te r  F C  75 circulation ra te  required for proper  power-plant 
control resul ts  in a turbulent flow condition in  the radiator passages and a 
consequent increase  i n  heat t r ans fe r  above that obtained with the laminar  flow 
of water-glycol. 
pe ra tu re s ,  which i s  a favorable character is t ic  for operation at low radiator 
r e tu rn  tempera ture  condition experienced during the quiescent phase. 
Appendix X for a supplemental cooling sys tem used i f  batteries a r e  not used 
i n  the peak-load cycles of the CSM quiescent mode, 
In addition, FC 75 exhibits a low viscosity at reduced t em-  
See 
The reactant -control subsystem provides the power plant with reactant 
gases  conditioned to proper  tempera ture  and p r e s s u r e  levels. 
hydrogen gases a r e  supplied f rom an external supply to the power plant p r e -  
hea te r s ,  where they a r e  temperature-conditioned. In turn,  they pass  to  the 
cel ls  through demand-type regulators that maintain a fixed operating pres-  
sure .  The circulation sys t em ca r r i e s  the reactant hydrogen to  the hydrogen 
electrodes.  
Oxygen and 
Solenoid-operated vent valves a r e  provided for periodic venting of 
accumulated impurit ies in  the system. 
sat isfactory for the ELOR. 
during the quiescent mode, 
The present  Apollo purge schedule i s  
A t imer  circuit  will control automatic purging 
Operation, Monitoring, and Control 
During the unmanned period in  lunar orbit ,  two of the three  power 
plants a r e  shut down on a cold standby condition. 
ation involving only the  following steps : 
Shutdown is a simple oper-  
1. Open main feed contactor. 
2. D i s a r m  inline heater  circuit .  
3 .  Turn  off pumps. 
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These s teps  may be performed by the astronauts before they leave 
the command module, The units on cold standby require  no monitoring, 
environmental control,  o r  maintenance provided all water  i s  removed. 
Bootstrap, o r  se l f - s ta r t ,  capability has  been well established f r o m  
power -plant development t e s t  experience to date. 
reach operating tempera ture  is i n  the range of 10 t o  30  minutes depending on 
the heater  s ize .  
p e r f o r m  a rapid off-line s t a r t ,  but other operational considerations such a s  
environment t empera tu re  and the possibility of placing the heater  i n  paral le l  
with the bus load would affect the final selection. The total energy required 
f r o m  the fuel cell  during an  in-flight s t a r t  is l e s s  0 . 3  kilowatt-hours, 
typical s t a r t  accomplished during sea- level  testing of a P & W  PC8B- 1 
FCM i s  indicated i n  Figure 4-19. In this case,  the heatup phase was com- 
pleted pr ior  to placing the power plant on load. 
The t ime required to  
The desirable  approach is t o  use  a high-energy heater  t o  
A 
Weight and performance data for the  P & W  PC8B may be found i n  
Appendix Y; for the Allis-Chalmers cell ,  these data may be found i n  
Appendix K. 
EPP Systems Analysis 
Selection of an EPP for the ELOR mission depends on two factors ,  i ts  
ability to  (1)  meet  the manned-phase requirements (the Apollo mission)  and 
survive the dormant cycle and ( 2 )  provide the minimal power requirements  
for quiescent-phase operation. The Allis -Chalmers  or  P & W  fuel cel ls  will 
meet  the functional requirements  imposed by the manned phases of the mis- 
sion a s  well as  the reliability goals demonstrated for Apollo; therefore ,  no 
fur ther  consideration of these phases is required,  
The LMSC study indicated that about 1200 watts of average power and 
up to  2400 watts of peak power may be required for the CSM quiescent phase; 
however the resu l t s  of this  study indicate that these requirements may be 
much too pess imis t ic  and that the actual requirements could be reduced to 
124 watts average and 191 a t  the peak periods. 
requirements  is  given i n  Tables 3-1 and 3-2. Much of the saving comes f rom 
use  of waste heat for heating requirements ra ther  than electr ical  power. 
is recognized that a m o r e  detailed study is required to  ver i fythese est imates ,  
It is ,  however, evident that a decision cannot be made without resolving 
these differences. 
A breakdown of these 
It 
Since the re  is a wide divergence in  potential requirements ,  two sys -  
t e m  concepts a r e  presented herein for the quiescent phase: the single fuel 
cell  and the dual radioisotope thermoelectr ic  e lectr ic  (RTG) sys t em (2-SNAP- 
27 derivative). 
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0 COOLANY STACK INLET TEMP 
0 
'0 5 IO 15 20 25 30 36 40 
TIME FROM START- MINUTES 
Figure 4-19, Bootstrap Star t  Data for PC8B-1 
Power Plant 
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The Single FCM for the quiescent modes could use  either the P & W  o r  
All is-Chalmers  cell.  
Chalmers  cell  is  provided i n  depth along with i t s  differences f rom the P & W  
cell. 
A reliabil i ty and maintenance analysis of the Allis- 
When a fuel-cell  sys t em (FCS) i s  in  the standby mode, the thermal  
During hot standby all  the components of the thermal  
Except for extreme ambient 
loop must  be active. 
loop and the heating controller will be active. 
t empera ture  var ia t ions,  the heaters  will be cycling on and off to  maintain 
tempera ture ,  and the coolant valve will remain closed. When a fuel-cell 
module (FCM) i s  i n  the cold-standby mode (the recommended quiescent mode), 
the water/glycol solution i n  the thermal  loop must  be kept f r o m  freezing, 
This necessity may requi re  that the coolant pumps to be on and the coolant 
solenoid valve open. 
The coolant pump is the most  cr i t ical  component of the thermal  loop; 
therefore ,  each FCM has  two coolant pumps. 
capacity to  maintain the necessary  coolant flow for the desired standby and 
operational FCM tempera ture .  
Ei ther  pump has sufficient 
The remaining components i n  the thermal  loop plus the heating control 
electronics have a failure ra te  of about 6 . 4  failures p e r  million hours.  
es t imated fai lure  r a t e s  for the fuel-cell  systems a r e  presented in  Appendix L 
and f o r m  the basis of the subsequent analysis.  
The 
The 90-day Ps of the FCS with the present ly  configured FCM’s (redun- 
dant fans for the All is-Chalmers  sys tem and redundant coolant pumps) i s  
0.9994. 
will be operable at  the end of the 90-day lunar surface mission and will com- 
plete the return t r ip .  
made o r  provisions for a fourth or  return-home FCM should be made to  
enhance crew safety. The P & W  cell  i s  more  reliable, over ( 0 .  9996) 
because of the lack  of fans and the helium heat- t ransfer  medium. 
This figure i s  the probability that at  least  one of the three  FCM’s 
If two FCM failures should occur,  a repair  must be 
Since reliabil i ty of both systems exceeds the goal of 0. 999, it i s  not 
required that any spa re  pa r t s  be carr ied;  however, i t  i s  possible with some 
redesign to  provide the capability to  replace some components of the Allis- 
Chalmers  cell.  
three FCM’s for the r e tu rn  t r i p  to 0.99998 and decreases  the chances of 
abort .  
This added capability increases  the availability of one of the 
F o r  a lunar  orbit  FCS consisting of two FCM’s  ( a  total of th ree  
including a re turn  home FCM), configuration is the minimum requirement;  
i. e . ,  one operating FCM and one hot-standby FCM. The 90-day reliability 
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of this FCS with the presently configured FCM's is 0.994 for  the Allis- 
Chalmers cell. 
redundancy, the P, contribution increases  to about 0.999. 
assumed to occur should two FCM's fail. 
If the Allis-Chalmers FCM is redesigned to provide minimum 
Mission abort  i s  
To a s su re  the availability of a second FCM for the return trip, the 
cell control assembly (EMCA) could be redesigned for in-space maintenance, 
and a spare  should be car r ied  for replacement. The probability that a t  least  
one of the two FCM's,  l e s s  the EMCA, is  operable a t  the end of 90 days i s  
about 0. 999. 
This value means that the availability of a second FCM for the return 
t r ip  home is the same when either redundant redesigned EMCA's/FCM a r e  
employed or a spa re  redesigned EMCA is car r ied  for EVA maintenance. 
The advantage of the former  is  the increased probability of lunar orbit 
mission success. The advantage of the la t ter  is l e s s  electronics (three 
removable EMCA's versus  four built-in EMCA's) and probably less  redesign. 
. -  
The most  cr i t ical  components a r e  l isted in  order  of unreliability in 
Table 4-16. 
Table 4- 16. Fuel Cell Assembly Relative Unreliability 
(Allis-Chalmers Data) 
C ornpone nt 
Fans 
EMCA 
PC 
WCC 
Other s 
WRA 
WRV 
PT 
Others 
Coolant Pump 
Relative Unr eliabili ty 
30:g (Allis-Chalmers cell only) 
29 
15 
10 
4 
5. 5 
3 :!: 
2. 5 
~ 
:A redundant fan and a redundant coolant pump a r e  in the 
present Allis-Chalmers FCM, 
a r e  used; these a r e  redundant for fail-closed, but in 
sepies for fail-open having a failure rate approximately 
equal to a single valve. 
Two water-removal valves 
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The EMCA is the most  c r i t i ca l  component with a reliability of about 
0.94; however, it can be considered for ISM. The other components have 
been excluded from ISM because of their  relatively low failure ra te ,  the 
difficulty of ISM for fluid l ines,  and the extent of redesign required. One 
spa re  EMCA w i l l  provide a contribution to Ps of about 0. 998 for the FCM; 
one m o r e  (2  spa res )  increases  Ps t o  about 0. 99998. The spa res  a r e  only 
useful a f te r  the crew re turn  to the orbiting CSM, but they will  permit  com- 
promise of the Apollo abort  c r i te r ia .  
can fail  before abort  is  required.  
pletely s o  that there  i s  usually more  than ample t ime to take compensating 
action. 
Under these conditions, two fuel cells  
Actually, the FCM's seldom fail com- 
To determine FCS status,  cer ta in  data a r e  required by the MSFN so 
that a new module may be remotely s ta r ted  and the faulty one may be shut 
down. This action is repeated if other modules fail until only one module 
remains operable, and the mission i s  immediately aborted. Diagnostic 
procedures will then be undertaken af ter  the crew boards the CSM. 
It is required to remotely determine when the module has degraded 
or  is about to go beyond predetermined limits. 
be monitored remotely on the lunar surface:  
The following quantities will 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
module current.  
bus voltage. 
module temperature.  
reactants pres  sur  e. 
water  vapor pressure .  
:;c anis te r p re s  su r  e. 
:::reactants over pressure ,  
The following controls a r e  required to remotely s t a r t  up and shut 
down the modules: 
1. Standby module 'Ion" (1 per  module). 
2. Module "off1' (1  per  module). 
3. Purge (1). 
(?These are also required if the EMCA is designed for ISM. 
- 172 - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
The fuel-cell module elements w i l l  be energized by a switching device 
initiated by the "module on" command, which w i l l  be designed a s  a part  of 
the EMCA. 
The radioisotope thermoelectric generator,  a s  described in detail in 
Section 4. 4. 2, is a modified SNAP-27. 
0. 9999 and wi l l  not require  any maintenance. 
Apollo program, 
average power required,  together weigh only 85.4 pounds, about 1 / 2  the 
weight of one fuel-cell module, and this includes the fuel of the whole 
mission. When installed as recommended, adequate shielding exists to 
a s s u r e  no contamination of the crew. 
save over 6,000 pounds and reduce the SM modifications required by a 
substantial amount. 
the RTG's provide all CSM electr ical  power for the quiescent phase. 
Its reliability without repa i r  exceeds 
It is already qualified for the 
Two SNAP-27's, which wi l l  provide the SD-estimated 
Use of this concept is expected to 
Its reliability is the system contribution to P90 since 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Either fuel-cell system wi l l  meet the basic ELOR requirements;  
however, the data indicate that the P&W cel l  is somewhat more  reliable 
than the Allis-Chalmers version; about 0. 9996 ve r sus  0. 9994 for the system 
P S  
approach; however, it may be maintainable. It requi res  some modification, 
whereas  the PC8 does not, In any event, the Apollo I1 cells must be replaced 
with one o r  the other. 
The Allis-Chalmers cel l  is slightly more  complex in the heat t ransfer  
If the SD power profile estimates a r e  verified, i t  i s  recommended that 
one fuel-cell module be eliminated and a dual SNAP-27 designed with a heat 
exchanger s imilar  to that recommended fo r  the LM in Paragraph 4.4.2 be 
installed in  the CM. This approach virtually l imits  the CSM modifications 
to those required to instal l  the RTG system and actually reduces the CSM 
injected weight to l e s s  than that for Apollo 11. 
no l o s s  of power during CSM quiescence. 
Further ,  i t  virtually guarantees 
4. 2. 2 Reaction Control Subsystem (SM-RCS) 
NOTE: Much of the information used herein was provided by 
the Marquardt Corporation through Reference 4.19, 
4. 20, and 4. 21. 
The SM-RCS for ELOR i s  to be identical with that used i n  the Apollo 
Block 11, except for  the use of a n  aluminized bladder in  the positive expulsion 
tanks to prevent helium migration. 
NOTE: Addition of both fuel and pressurant  totaling about 
145 pounds in  required for the all fuel cell  concept. 
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The RCS hea ters  recommended by LMSC a r e  already a par t  of the 
Block I1 design. As for the engines themselves, there  a r e  four self-contained 
engine quads, each completely independent from the others.  A schematic of 
one quad i s  presented i n  Figure 4-20.  
The SM-RCS per forms severa l  functions for the ELOR mission, it 
must  provide attitude and stability control a s  for the Apollo mission; and, 
during the storage mode, they must  spin and despin the CSM around the 
roll  axis. In addition, it is required to damp out any axis wobble while 
maintaining the ro l l  axis perpendicular to the sun's rays ,  
The system operates the same  as for the Apollo mission, except for 
If they a r e  used, they would either be used continuously 
Marquardt and SD data indicate that 
the quad heaters.  
or be controlled by a thermostat. 
be turned on just  p r ior  to RCS usage. 
freezing wi l l  not occur i f  the vehicle and engines a r e  moving with respect 
to the sun such that all the engines a r e  warmed by the sun or by engine 
operation every few hours. 
As a third alternative,  they need only 
The aluminized bladder should prevent potential helium migration; 
however, Bell Aerosystem tes t s  have shown that the presence of helium in  
the fuel or oxidizer will not adversely affect engine operation ( see  
Reference 4 .22) .  
p ressurant  and to offset the effects of any potential leakage and/or migration 
particularly for  the a l l - F C  concept. 
Additional helium i s  recommended to a s su re  adequate 
System Analysis 
The SM-RCS may be analyzed in t e rms  of i ts  major  constituents. Each 
quad is made up of fuel supply, helium supply, engines, and management 
elements,  which a r e  analyzed separately in the following paragraphs,  
The fuel  tanks a r e  of the positive-expulsion design a s  shown in 
Figure 4-21. 
Figure 4-22. 
A functional diagram and description i s  presented in 
A s  presently configured, the positive-expulsion tank (bladder type) is 
Depending loaded and pressur ized  (suppression pressure)  pr ior  to launch. 
upon tank application the p re s su re  may be increased to its operating level 
either pr ior  to or subsequent to launch. 
remains constant, permitting positive propellant expulsion on demand. 
Pulse-type flow is the normal  requirement and is effected by operating a 
valve in the reaction-control thrust-chamber subsystem. 
From this point, the pressure  
Apollo mission 
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TRANSDUCERS 
1 HELIUM FILL I 
TEST POINTS (2) I 
FUEL OXIDtZER - 
TANKS (2) TO ENGINES TANKS !a 
Figure 4-20. Reaction Control System Schematic, 
Service Module (SM-RCS) 
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11 
23 22 I 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
1'9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
POSITIVE EXPULSION TANK ASSEMBLY 
Diffuser Assy. 
Fuel 8339-471053-3 *nut cut off 
Ox. 8339- 471 054- 3 predelivery 
Bolt 8271 - 47 1019- 1 
Washer AN 960-C416L 
Bladder 
Fuel 8339-471080-1 
OX. 8339- 47 1080- 3 
Ring 8271-471117-1 
Pad 8271-471249-1 
Bolt 8271 -471114-1 
Gasket 8271-471025-1 
Gasket 462-4 (Test Only) 
Gas Inlet Fitting (Test Only) 833 
Boss End of Tank Assy. 
Washer Assy. 8271-471144-1 
Nut 8271-471021-3 
Vent Line Assy. 
Fuel8339-471027-1 
OX. 8339-471027-3 
15. Eyelet 8271-471141-1 
16. Mounting Flange 
17. Bimetal Joint (6061 A1.Al. to 347 SLSt.) 
18. Tank Shell Assy. (T16AL-4V Titanium) 
Fuel 8339-471110-1 
OX. 8339- 47 11 10- 3 
19. Bleed T h e  Assy. 
Fuel 8339-471059-9 ,)ut cut off 
Ox. 8339-471059-11 prior to delivery 
20. Bleed Tube Spacer 
21. Nut 8271-471049-1 (Test Only) 
22. 
8339-471058-1 
Retainer End of Diffuser Assy. 
(Ret. Assy. 8339-471057-1) 
23. Retainer Cone 8339-471057-5 
24. "Outlet End" Cone 8339-471034-1 
25. 
26. 
471026- 
Diffuser Tube 8339-471036 (-1 Fuel: -3 Ox) 
Elbow (Outlet) Tube W/O Nut 81 Sleeve 8339-471031-7 
Figure 4 -2  1. Positive Expulsion Tank Assembly 
- 176 - 
SD 6 8 - 8 5 0 - 1  
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
B. Contains Expellable N204 
C. Contains Helium at 
Gas Side of Fuel 
Hydrazine/UDMH Fuel 
C.  Contains Helium at 
Approx 181 psia 
(Ope rating Pressure)  
Fuel Bleed Port 
Provides for Venting 
[ X i  Oxidizer 
-1 Fuel 
during Filling Operations 
and Access  during Drying 
and Flushing Operations 
Figure 4-22. Positive Expulsion Tankage Functional Block Diagram 
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requirements  include the tank assembly capability to perform satisfactorily 
for one cycle; i. e . ,  a propellant-loading ullage draining and complete 
expulsion to full bladder AP. 
different (slightly) configurations of the positive expulsion tank concept, 
their basic design i s  the same.  
Although the Apollo spacecraft  contains s ix  
A reliability analysis of the tank indicates that the bladder is the only 
component that has any significant effect on the estimated value. 
fa i lure  ra tes  for the tank and diffuser assembly fallout a r e  insignificant in 
arr iving at the tank assembly reliability; therefore,  tank assembly reliability 
i s  p r imar i ly  a function of the bladder failure hazard; and it has been 
demonstrated that, given a satisfactory leakage check and propellant loading, 
a successful full expulsion (pulsed or continuous) can be effected with a Ps 
of 0.998 at 90-percent confidence for  each tank. 
The 
Since the major  failure mode was  helium migration, and this has  been 
eliminated through use of the aluminized bladder, the reliability is known to 
be much higher, probably greater  than 0.99999. 
verifying this position. 
impract ical  and unnecessary for these tanks. 
replace the. quad as  a unit, which i s  considered unnecessary.  
Test  data s e e m  to be 
Maintenance or repair  of any kind i s  considered 
The only possibility i s  to 
The helium supply provides the pressurant  for  the fuel sys tem,  both 
The Apollo design wi l l  provide a subsystem of Ps better than 0. 9998 f o r  
fuel and oxidizer. 
ing. 
ELOR without any changes. 
A redundant tank and common manifold to a l l  quads would exceed 0. 99999. 
There a r e  two tanks fo r  RCS quad with redundant plumb- 
Details a r e  s imilar  to those for SM propulsion. 
The RCS engines, the R-4D a s  presently used for Apollo and other 
space programs,  a r e  considered adequate without change. NASA and 
Marquardt data indicate that the engine exceeds the life requirement  by a 
substantial margin. As indicated in Figure 4-23, actual test  data indicate 
that the reliability for the engine and resulting Ps wi l l  be between 0. 999 and 
0. 99999; therefore,  the probability of losing control of one axis is l e s s  
than 1 x l o m 6  because of the redundant quad design. 
F r o m  the referenced data, it i s  known that the burn-life and s t ructural  
capabilities of the R-4D Engine were  much greater  than the requirements for 
a given application; i. e. , large margins  of safety so that engine reliability 
i s  a function of the required number of ignitions. 
mode then becomes the failure of a valve to open or  close,  Fo r  the R-4D 
valve design, no assessable  fa i lures  have been experienced in the extremely 
large number of tes ts  encompassing more  than two million engine firings 
and m o r e  than 50 million valve cycles (Reference 4. 20). 
The predominant failure 
The resulting 
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Figure  4-23. Reaction Control 'Engine Reliability as a Function of Usage 
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engine reliability i s  presented in Figure 4-23 a s  a function of the required 
duty cycle and number of ignitions. 
valve cycle t e s t s  should m o r e  accurately predict  engine-reliability. 
unusual bumps r e su l t  f rom use of s ix  scale  changes on the reliability 
absc issa ;  one change was made f o r  each nine units to enhance the accuracy 
in reading the reliability numbers.  
bility is a s  expressed  in Table 4-17. 
The curve based on engine fir ings plus 
The 
F r o m  the upper curve,  the engine re l ia -  
Three  factors  affect engine life and the result ing mission reliability 
and safety; these a r e  burn-time, space s torage,  and number of ignitions. 
The predicted burn-time limit of the molybdenum/molybdenum disilicide- 
coated combustion chamber and the cr i t ical  burn-life-limiting component of 
the engine i s  a function of maximum chamber temperature .  
Engine operates  a t  a maximum chamber tempera ture  of 2,000 F. The p r e -  
dicted chamber life i s  in excess  of 1, 500 hours of cumulative usage; no 
application o r  margin  t e s t  proposed to date would utilize even a small  f r ac -  
tion of the engine's  lifetime capability. 
s t ra ted  by the supplier. 
The R-4D 
This capability has been demon- 
The number of ignitions can also have a deleterious effect on engine 
life; this i s  normally created by the occasional rough s ta r t ;  however, since 
the beginning of the development program,  t h e r e  has never been a failure of 
any type in 1. 5 million firings. This is not considered a failure hazard since 
the recorded number of successful f ir ings is fa r  in excess of any mission 
requirements.  
Table 4- 17. Engine Reliability for  Discrete Duty Cycles 
Required Duty Cycle 
o r  
Number of Ignitions 
Demonstrated o r  Achieved 
Engine Reliability 
(50-Percent Confidence) 
1,000 
5, 000 
1 0 , 0 0 0  
50,000 
100,000 
0. 99998 
0.9999 
0. 9998 
0 .999  
0. 998 
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Deep-space s torage capability was one of the important design c r i t e r i a  
for the engine. Materials and clamping loads in the hardware have a l l  been 
selected to provide no degradation f rom any known s t r e s s  over long periods 
of storage,  with o r  without engine firings. 
o rde r  of one year  has been demonstrated on the lunar orbi ter  flights, 
the pas t  program, the engines demonstrated ze ro  valve leakage in  extended 
space exposure, a s  well a s  no ill effects due to the complete space environ- 
ment  (hard vacuum, micrometeori tes ,  o r  solar  radiation). 
Space s torage capability on the 
During 
During long-duration missions with intermittent engine operation and 
long off-times, it is possible to f reeze  propellants in the lines leading to the 
engines. 
w i t h  respec t  to the sun so  that a l l  of the engines a r e  warmed by the sun, o r  
by intermittent engine operation every few hours. 
may be avoided by using an electr ical  heater that i s  mounted on the engine 
injector head. 
This condition may be prevented i f  the lines a r e  mounted in a plane 
Fuel freezing in the lines 
The hea ters  can be used a s  follows: 
1. During long engine-off periods,  the propellants can be allowed to 
f reeze  in the lines. The heater is then turned on pr ior  to engine 
use to thaw the propellant (applicable to LM engine only). 
2. The heater can be left on continuously. 
3. Thermostats  can regulate the head temperature.  
The ELOR concept for the CSM will preclude the need for quad heaters. 
Barbecuing the CSM wi l l  prevent the fuel lines f rom freezing because of the 
adsorbed heat (its outer coating adsorbs heat). The engines a r e  unaffected 
by the presence of dissolved helium pressurant  in the propellant. 
in propellant supply p r e s s u r e  and voltages have only a second-order effect 
on engine performance. 
Variations 
The high reliability of the engine plus the redundancy obtained f rom 
having a number of engines capable of performing the same control functions 
in the four engine quads eliminates the need for replacement par t s  o r  repair  
of an engine during a mission;  yet in-flight maintenance possibilities based 
on the mos t  likely failure modes a r e  considered possible for the engine alone. 
Calculating the reliability of an  RCS quad, using available tes t  data a s  
a lower boundary est imator  and the mathematical  model of Figure 4-24, the 
quad P, is expected to exceed 0. 9966 each. The probability of any three of 
the four working exceeds 0. 9999 and of any two of the four working exceeds 
0.999999. 
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4. 2. 3 Main ProDulsion Subsvstem 
NOTE: Much of the information used in this section was provided 
by the Aerojet  General  Corporation through References 4 .23  
and 4. 24. 
Func tiona 1 D e s c r ip tion 
The main CSM propulsion engine i s  to be the Apollo serv ice  module 
engine. The Block I1 sys tem will remain  unchanged, except for the fuel and 
oxidizer s torage tanks,  which may be increased in s ize  to accommodate the 
increased fuel/oxidizer s torage requirements  projected by LMSC. 
change involves the addition of 4. 7 inches in length and an elliptical head. 
The existing s t ruc ture  will support the tanks with little change (F igure  3-3 ) .  
This 
The main requirements  of the engine a r e  to provide the necessary  
thrust  for midcourse correction during the t ranslunar  phase, t ra jectory 
correction during the approach, lunar orbi t  capture,  t ransear th  injection, 
midcourse correct ion during the t ransear th  phase,  and retrofiring for ear th  
approach and reentry.  
mission is an average of nine cycles for  a maximum total duration of 
600 seconds,  slightly more  than that for Apollo, because of the la rger  
pay lo ad. 
The total engine firing required for the complete 
The subsystem schematic i s  given in Figure 4-25 along with a list of 
functioning components. 
Engine System Analysis 
Reliability logic diagrams a r e  presented in Figure 4-26 for engine 
s t a r t  and steady- s ta te  operations. Engine shutdown operations and coast  
periods a r e  given in Figure 4-27. Associated with each component o r  
assembly identified in Figures  4-26 and 4-27 a r e  a l l  of the various pa r t s  
associated with its construction. 
into four valve assembl ies ,  each consisting of an actuator and the associated 
pair  of bal l  valves (one for fuel and the other f o r  oxidizer), shafts, sea ls ,  
spr ings,  housing, and other related par ts .  The gimbal actuators for pitch 
and yaw a r e  considered separately. 
clutch assembl ies  a r e  individually identified. 
harne s s e s . 
The bipropellant valve has been separated 
In each actuator,  the redundant motor-  
There a r e  redundant e lectr ical  
The reliability logic diagrams shown in Figures 4-26 and 4-27 provide 
A m o r e  a reasonably rigorous basis  f o r  calculating the engine reliabilities. 
detailed se t  of logic diagrams for the lunar mission a r e  presented in 
Reference 4. 23. 
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Figure  4 - 25, Command/ Se rvice Module Propulsion Sys tem Schematic 
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The engine contribution to Ps should be a s ses sed  in both the active and 
passive phases,  since the engine wi l l  be dormant fo r  a major pa r t  of the 
mission. 
tion through the burn to the t ime p res su re  is relieved and the feed sys tem 
is purged. 
The active phases include the t ime f r o m  fuel sys tem p res su r i za -  
This phase is normally considered the most hazardous. 
Reliability es t imates  given in Reference 4. 23 for the lunar baseline 
missions a r e  presented in Table 4- 18. 
a bas is  for estimating reliabil i t ies for the baseline mission, which is related 
to the ratio of burn-time, 6 0 0  seconds for the ELOR mission versus  
546 seconds for the Apollo DRM. 
to compensate for the increase  in the projected CSM weight, l e s s  than half 
the difference is required with the RTG-EPS concept. 
These reliability es t imates  provide 
The slightly longer burn-time i s  required 
Table 4-18 .  Estimates  of Component Reliability for  All 
Per iods  of SPS Engine Fir ing 
Component 
Thrust  mount 
Nozzle extension 
Combustion chamber 
Injector 
Propellant l ines 
Gimbal actuator (each) 
Pneumatic actuation system::< 
Bipropellant valve 
ELOR Mission Ps 
0. 999052 
0.  998887 
0 .993596  
0 .998959  
0 . 9 9 6 6 3 4  
0. 998541 
0 .989623  
0. 9.99524 
>O. 996 I Single-Engine Total 
(*) The reliability figures given for the pneumatic actuation 
sys tem a r e  applicable to each of the two pneumatic sys -  
tems,  which a r e  functionally redundant; that is, failure 
\ to supply pneumatic actuation pressure .  
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The hot-fire engine reliability for  the baseline mission would be at 
l ea s t  0. 996 without changes. 
however, i f  it is deemed necessary  to increase  the engine hot-f i re  reliabil i ty,  
the combustion chamber reliability may have to be improved before a signifi- 
cant increase  in  engine reliability could be achieved. A review of the hot-f i re  
t e s t  history of engine combustion chambers  indicates only two failures.  In 
both cases ,  the chambers  were  tested to failure,  one for a duration of 
1 ,956.4 seconds, the other for 2,392.4 seconds. Both fai lures  were  of the 
wearout type, and a value of 0. 99999992 can be calculated a s  the estimated 
probability’ of no wearout for the ELOR mission. Twenty-five chambers  
were  tes ted for durations of a t  least  750 seconds without the occurrence of 
any random-type failures. 
for the MTTF of about 27, 000 seconds, which resu l t s  in a demonstrated 
random reliability of 0. 98 associated with the 600-second hot-fire duration 
specified for the proposed ELOR mission. 
adequate (perhaps overly conservative according to Reference 4. 24) design 
with respec t  to wearout. The demonstrated random reliability is quite low 
because of lack of data. The t rue  random reliability is known to be signifi- 
cantly higher, but cannot be demonstrated without accumulating m o r e  t e s t  
data. Since no random failures have occurred up to the present  t ime, there  
is no reason for recommending any change in design. 
This level of reliability i s  probably adequate; 
These data can be used to obtain a median value 
This t e s t  experience indicates an 
The passive engine phase of the proposed ELOR mission involves con- 
sideration of the effects of the prolonged coast period (about 90 days) on 
coast  reliability. 
with a qualitative appraisal  of the anticipated effects of the baseline mission, 
A s  an  aid in making the required qualitative judgments, i t  was found helpful 
to per form a failure-mode cause-and-effect analysis (FMEA) of each com- 
ponent. 
Reliability es t imates  a r e  given in Reference 4- 17 along 
The FMEA analysis i s  presented in Reference 4.24.  
There  i s  a definite controversy over the effects of long-term exposure 
The FMEA indi- 
to the space environment, and there  a r e  few data to verify any position. 
f a r ,  there  have been no failures attributable to this effect. 
cates  the potential effects; and, in each case ,  protective measures  can be 
taken to prevent the problem. 
requiring a full-scale t e s t  program. 
90-day quiescent phase should present  no deleterious effects to any of the 
engine components. 
So  
This question represents  one of the a r e a s  
The supplier has indicated that the 
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4. 2. 4 Main Propellant Tankage (Storage) Analysis 
NOTE: Some of the information used herein was  provided by 
the Allison Division of General Motors through 
Reference 4. 25. 
The main propellant tankage i s  required to s to re  both the fuel and 
Since the 
oxidizer in a liquid s ta te  for the full mission duration. 
is to be  accomplished during ear th  approach and retrograde. 
engine is p r e s s u r e  fed, helium will be used a s  a pressurant  to expel the 
liquids from the tanks af ter  ullage control. Two tanks for  oxidizer and two 
for fuel  a r e  provided in  Block 11; this redundancy i s  expected to be required 
in addition to two helium tanks. The operational concept involves re l ief  of 
the helium p r e s s u r e  during the long coast  periods and activation jus t  p r ior  
to igniting the engines. 
appropriate  reaction control engines jus t  p r io r  to main engine ignition. 
Final fuel  depletion 
Ullage control is accomplished through use of the 
The reliability study for  the Apollo tank program i s  summarized in the 
Allison final design report ,  Reference 4. 26. 
is estimated to  be 0. 9999998. The reliability estimate applies t o  the actual 
use phase of the tank life; that is, a propellant tank which has passed al.1 
inspections and acceptance tes ts  and has been checked out in the vehicle has 
a 0. 9999998 probability of going through preparation, countdown, ear th  
launch, t ransfer ,  lunar orbit ,  and lunar landing without malfunction. 
The Ps of the propellant tank 
The r e  liability es t imate  and failure - mode failure - effect analysis 
indicated that the probability of fa i lure  is nil for all  modes of failure,  with 
the exception of the burs t  mode of the tank p res su re  wall. This wall has 
a fai lure  probability of 0. 262 x (negligible). The failure probability of 
the tank wall was calculated by the method of interference,  using the proba- 
bil ist ic distributions of the tank s t r e s s  and mater ia l  strength. 
The reliability es t imates  for s torage tanks a r e  always suspect because 
they a r e  not amenable to calculation by the normally accepted methodology; 
i. e. , R f e -  k t  for s torage tanks. Rather,  for the longer mission i n  particu- 
l a r ,  this normal  method resul ts  in a very  pessimist ic  estimate,  and the t rue  
value (all the other factors  being considered) is always much higher. How- 
ever ,  to es tabl ish some boundary values,  the value has been calculated and 
found to be 0. 9994 for the ELOR mission. 
P, is between 0.9994 and 0. 9999997 and known to be near  the la t ter ,  s ince i t  
was calculated on the basis  of s t rength-s t ress  relationships. 
Therefore,  the expected value of 
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Qualification tes t s  and propellant s torage t e s t s  have established the 
To substantiate the suitability suitability of tanks for  the Apollo mission. 
of this tankage for the longer duration mission, i t  is recommended that the 
following testing be considered. 
1. Long-term creep  testing of titanium mater ia l  specimens,  including 
welded specimens. 
2. Long-term s t r e s s  corrosion testing of welded and nonwelded 
titanium specimens in each propellant. 
3. Long-term storage of propellants in tanks a t  design s t r e s s .  
tanks could be either ful l -scale  tanks o r  subscale tanks made by 
the same  fabrication methods a s  the Apollo tankage. 
These 
Propel lant  Gaging Function Analysis 
NOTE: Much of the information used herein was provided by 
Simmonds Prec is ion  Products,  Inc. , through 
Reference 4 .27 .  
The propellant gaging function (PUGS) i s  required to monitor fuel and 
In i t sp resen t  f o r m  it will meet  the func- oxidizer consumption and/or  loss. 
tional requirements  of the ELOR mission. 
dimensions of the selected fuel and oxidizer s torage tanks can influence the 
applicability of the sensor  assembly in particular.  
The potential variation in the 
The Apollo PUGS is comprised of two fuel probes,  two oxidizer probes, 
an  oxidizer control valve, a control unit, and a display gage. 
The PUGS function i s  cr i t ical  to crew safety because of the need for 
very  accurate  control of engine firing duration, which in turn,  establishes 
the resulting velocity-vector changes. Its functions a r e  therefore  twofold, 
monitoring fuel and oxidizer remaining and responding to the burn t ime con- 
t r o l  signals f rom the guidance functions. 
The Apollo DRM calls for an  on-time of 660 seconds, while the ELOR 
miss ion  on-time is expected to be somewhat higher because of the change in 
operational mode. Circuits not energized, will have negligible effect upon 
the components of the sys tem i f  they a r e  not in the environment of the pro- 
pellants. Reliability data supports this position; and a s  a resul t ,  reliability 
c r i t e r i a  have been met  with existing circuit  configuration. 
factor is the sensor  submerged in the propellant. The data indicate that the 
Ps of this function wi l l  be about 0. 9999, which is the probability of one of the 
two senso r s  in each tank functioning normally throughout the mission. 
The limiting 
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The only potential problem a r e a  wi l l  be in the use of servo motors ,  
motor genera tors ,  motor tachometers ,  potentiometers, and gear  t ra ins  
because of their  lubricated bearings. In addition to the mission t ime of 
95 days and s torage t ime p r io r  to launch of possibly two to three  yea r s ,  the 
bearing lubrication may migra te  out of the bearings to some extent, Selec- 
tion of the proper  bearing lubricant for the extended mission would be in 
o rde r ,  and does not pose a significant problem, 
A detailed fai lure  mode and effect analysis was performed and i s  
presented in Reference 4.28.  
The data indicate that the PUGS w i l l  produce satisfactory performance 
fo r  the ELOR mission. 
the sensors ,  wi l l  exceed 0. 9999. Because the environmental conditions of 
ELOR and Apollo a r e  essentially the same,  except for  mission duration, the 
principal concern is that of propellant exposure for the sensors  and valve. 
A review was made of t h e  Apollo qualification tes t  p rograms specifically to 
obtain propellant exposure information. 
been exposed to N2O4 for approximately 130 hours for  a total of 5,200 valve- 
unit hours without evidence of deterioration. Each of four oxidizers and 
four fuel sensors  was exposed for  approximately 2,800 hours in i ts  respect ive 
propellant for a total  of 11, 200 fuel- o r  oxidizer-sensor-unit  hours. 
Figure 4-28 indicates that the Ps of the weakest link, 
Each of four oxidizer valves has 
I Sec onda r y  Sensors r 0.088 x low5 
Valve 
1.8 x 10- 
Secondary 
Valve 
Assembly 
Figure 4-28. Reliability Logic, Propellant Gaging Function 
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Propel lant  Control Function Analysis 
The propellant control function provides the means of moving both 
fuels and oxidizer f rom the s torage tanks (passive o r  positive expulsion) to 
the engine proper.  
A study of the Apollo Block I1 configurations, as  applied to the ELOR 
mission,  indicates that the same configuration will be directly applicable to 
any of the potential missions and spacecraf t  configurations, with minor 
modifications to f i t  the specific application and selected operational concept. 
The helium-supply check-valve problem, the most  prominent failure 
mode, was relieved by a change in operational concept. By relieving the 
p r e s s u r e  in the sys tem during the long s torage phase,  the operational duty 
cycle was reduced to l e s s  than that of Apollo, and the probability of a failure 
(P,) was reduced to l e s s  than 1 x This change in operational concept 
is not expected to introduce any problems;  ra ther ,  it has  further decreased 
the probability of failure in other components of the function. 
The helium tank could fail in two modes by leakage and by burst .  The 
effect of leakage, again the most  prominent mode, i s  reduced to insignifi- 
cance through use  of a gate valve a t  the outlet and by including a redundant 
source  of helium. The probability of bursting a tank is very low. 
4.2. 5 Deep Space Antenna (DSA) Subsystem 
NOTE: Much of the information presented herein was provided 
by the Dalmo Victor Company through Reference 4. 29,  
Subsystem Functions 
The DSA i s  required to provide high-data-rate communications between 
the CSM and the MSFN for a l l  manned mission phases after translunar injec- 
tion and p r io r  to CM/SM separation for reentry.  The ELOR communication 
range will include distances up to that encountered on the Apollo DRM; and 
for that  reason,  the Apollo Block II DSA will per form the required functions. 
Since it mus t  be used in conjunction with the up-data link and it affects P,, 
s o  a l so  will the DSA, to a degree. 
28.6 db and a beamwidth of about six degrees.  
unsatisfactory f o r  the rolling s torage mode and, therefore,  have to be oper-  
a ted in a modified scanning mode i f  used throughout the quiescent mode. 
The DSA has a gain of approximately 
The beamwidth w i l l  be 
The scanning is accomplished through a two-axis gimbal that  requires  
no power during standby o r  launch and i s  locked in any position by removing 
the e lec t r ica l  power. The servo sys t em is a closed-loop sys tem that 
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positions the gimbal anywhere between the k6.6-degree limits when com- 
manded, 
programs. 
The system has been demonstrated to be reliable on several  
The recommended operational concept does not exclude use of the DSA 
during the dormant mode because of the potential unreliability and its 
inaccessibility for repa i rs  during that time; however, this alternative is 
analyzed to determine the r i sk ,  the problem, and the alternatives. It is 
recommended that the CM omnidirectional antennas be used and that a slower 
data ra te  be enforced for the transmission of status information during this 
period. Omnidirectional antennas seem to provide the required function so 
long a s  the t ime factor i s  not cri t ical  (See Section 4. 1. 5). 
The functions required of the ELOR a r e  identical with those of Apollo 
for a l l  mission phases, except during the dormant mode. 
a r e  covered in detail in Section 4. 1. 5. The system i s  not crew crit ical  and 
therefore only contribute to P90.  
These functions 
Sub system Analysis 
The DSA is made up of three components as  presented in the reliability 
The 
logic of Figure 4-29. 
storage phase of the ELOR mission while operating full t ime o r  stored. 
contribution to P 9 0  vE:ries radically for these two approaches: 
It may be used in the two different modes during the 
1 .  For  full t ime operations, P 9 0  = 0. 96 (2200 hours). 
2. For  stored mode, P 9 0  = 0.. 9991 (183 hours).  
Before a decision is made regarding selection of the desired operating 
mode, it is desirable to review the reliability of the DSA and determine if  
the potential weak links could be resolved. 
that the electronic assembly and the antenna assembly share  in the problem. 
Three of the five second-level functions a r e  approximately equal, and a l l  
th ree  would have to be considered to ra i se  Ro substantially above 0. 99 for 
the full-time operations mode. 
The logic of Figure 4-29 indicates 
In the stored state, the DSA w i l l  satisfy the mission cr i ter ia  f o r  safe 
re turn in that there i s  a negligible deleterious affect on P 9 0  during this 
period; and the contribution to P90 will be better than 0. 999, or l e s s  than 
chance in a thousand that the DSA will not operate when scheduled. 
No additional development tes ts  beyond the 2, 500-hour life tes t  a r e  
expected to be necessary. 
operated in the recommended mode, and no maintenance actions a r e  required 
o r  recommended under these conditions. 
is not considered catastrophic, since the omnidirectional antenna can be used. 
No modifications wi l l  be required i f  the DSA is 
Fai lure  to function when required 
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. .  
4. 2.6  Cryogenic Storage 
A cryogenic s torage (CS) function is required to provide the necessary  
reactants  for  fuel-cell  operation throughout the mission. 
facil i t ies a r e  provided for  liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. 
concept provided a separate  s torage facility for  the reactants to be used 
during the quiescent phase of the mission;  these were to be under subcri t ical  
(liquid) conditions. The s torage facil i t ies must  provide for  an additional 
fuel weight of about 2100 pounds, 250 pounds of which is liquid hydrogen. 
The subcrit ical  s torage concept was recommended because it minimizes the 
launch weight and keeps it within the uprated Saturn V capability. However, 
to  accommodate this volume of propellant, it is necessary  to modify the 
Apollo SM a s  depicted in F igure  3 - 3 .  
Sector I, and the oxygen tank occupies all the available space in Sector IV. 
Separate s torage 
The NAS8-21006 
The hydrogen storage is located in 
Use of the subcrit ical  Dewars are the limiting factor in the development 
of the ELOR concept. 
point where subcrit ical  s torage has  been demonstrated for extended missions.  
Feasibil i ty has  been demonstrated and the technique has  been used on the 
shor te r  Gemini missions.  It i s  anticipated, however, that it will take between 
two and three  yea r s  to  produce a qualified se t  of tanks. 
The s ta te  of the technology has  not developed to  the 
A reliabil i ty analysis of these tanks is  impract ical  at this time. 
Approximations made on the bas i s  of other tank performance indicate that 
the chances of fa i lure  wi l l  be between one and one hundred pe r  million, 
depending on the design margin applied. 
It should be noted that this problem will not exist i f  the SD proposed 
power source is acceptable. In that case,  the Apollo cryogenics wi l l  more  
than meet  the ELOR mission requirement,  and the injected weight of the 
cryogenic s torage sys tem will remain  unchanged and a s  safe a s  Apollo II. 
4.2. 7 Command and Service Module Structure  (CSMS) 
The CSMS remains virtually unchanged as a resu l t  of the recommended 
mission configuration. 
since the loads have not changed mater ia l ly ,  neither w i l l  the s t ruc tura l  
elements. 
The functional requirements remain the s a m e  and, 
There  a r e ,  however, two potential problems that would affect the CSMS, 
The CSM is normally designed they a re  the meteoroid and radiation problems. 
to a 0. 999 probability of no penetration o r  deleterious effects to the heat 
shield; however, this value is for the 14-day mission. 
a r e  t ime dependent, the ELOR mission must  be reexamined. 
Since these hazards  
In Section 2.8.2 
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the potential radiation problem was dealt with. The data presented therein 
plus the absence of the crew f rom the orbiting CSM render  this a safe r i sk .  
The meteoroid situation is quite another mat te r .  Table 4-19 presents  
a n  evaluation of the meteoroid hazard projected for  the ELOR CSM and the 
resulting compensating actions necessary  to increase  i t s  contributions to  
Ps to over 0. 995. (See Pa rag raph  2.  8. 3 .  ). Fai lure  modes that constitute a 
hazard  a r e  defined in Appendix M. 
left in lunar polar orbi t  for  90 days wi l l  sustain some meteoroid damage in 
at least one of ten a r e a s ,  which could preclude safe re turn  of the crew.  
required compensating actions (worst  case)  a r e  a l so  presented along with a 
conservative es t imate  of the potential weight penalty. 
The data indicate that the Apollo Block II 
The 
Maintenance or repa i r  action wi l l  resolve damage problems in a t  least  
th ree  of the ten a reas :  
1. A patching kit can be provided to repa i r  the heat shield pr ior  to 
injection f rom lunar orbit ,  a s  demonstrated by Reference 4. 30. 
The resu l t  would be to eliminate this failure mode a s  a significant 
h.az a r d. 
2. The s a m e  type of patching ki t  could be used to  repa i r  either the 
EPS or  ECS space radiators ;  however, some provision must  be 
made for replenishment of the lost  fluid. Fur ther ,  if the EPS 
rad ia tors  leaked, abort  f rom the lunar surface would probably be 
required a s  soon a s  possible. Thicker tubing is also proposed. 
Redundant design is already included in th ree  of the potential a r eas :  
1. The electr ical  buss  is completely redundant, and separate  paths 
a r e  used. 
harness  useless .  
Fur ther ,  a failure in one wi l l  not render  the ent i re  
No additional redundancy is  required. 
2. The propellant and RCS tankage a r e  redundant; however, a punc- 
tu re  would render  the SM useless  or compromise the P,. ' 
The remainder  of the components must  be protected by shielding a s  
indicated. 
500 pounds. 
The total result ing increase in weight is expected to be l e s s  than 
Details a r e  presented in Reference 4. 30. 
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Table 4-19. Meteoroid Shielding Analysis, 90-Day ELOR CSM 
CSM Component 
CM heat shield 
CM windows 
CM umbilical 
SM electr ical  buss 
SPS tankage 
SPS propellant l ines 
RCS tankage 
RCS plumbing 
EPS radiators  
ECS radiator s 
A l l  other components 
Totals 
p : 
S 
0.996 
-0 
0. 98 
0.95 
0. 96 
0. 99 
0. 94 
0.993 
0. 92 
0. 43 
'0.999 
Correct ive Action 
Repair with patching kit 
20-mil plug-in shield 
Fiberglass  shield 
Redundant buss  (Block II) 
Aluminum shielding 
Aluminum shielding 
Shielding and redundancy 
Shielding 
Increase  tube thickness 
(0. 12 inch) and/or  repa i r  
Increase  tube thickness 
(0. 3 inch) and/or  repa i r  
No action required 
Weight 
(Pounds) 
2. 5 
0. 8 
10. 0 
0. 0 
335.0 
15. 0 
56. 0 
5. 0 
12.0 
61. 0 
0 . 0  
497.3 
:::Expresses the probability that the meteoroid would not c r ea t e  a 
situation that would compromise the abort  c r i t e r i a  as reflected in 
Appendix M. (Note that, without the cor rec t ive  actions, the risk 
is very high.) 
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SM-E'DP 
FC-75 
RTG 
FCM 
EMCA 
FCS 
P C  
WCC 
WRA 
WRV 
P T  
TCA 
PUGS 
SM-RCS 
SPS 
ADSA 
cs 
CSMS 
4 . 2  THE SERVICE MODULE SYSTEMS 
LJST O F  ABBREVIATIONS 
Electrical Power Plant  
Fuel Cell Coblant 
Radioisotope ' Thermoelectric Generator 
Fuel  Cell Mddule 
Electrical Monitoring and Control Assembly 
Fuel Cell Sydtern 
Purge  Contrdller 
W a t e r  Cavity Control 
W a t e r  Remodal Assembly 
W a t e r  Removal V a l v e  
Pressure T r  nsducer 
Reaction Coqtrol System 
Thrust  Chadber  Assembly 
Service Modjle Propulsion System 
Propellant Utilization Gaging Subsystem 
Apollo Deep-Space Antenna 
Croygenic Stbrage (system) 
Command anh Service Module Structure 
B 
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4 . 3  LUNAR MODULE ASCENT STAGE SYSTEMS': 
NOTE: Some of the information used in  this section 
was provided by the Grumman Aircraf t  
Engineering Corporation through 
Reference 3 . 2  and 4 . 3 7 .  
This section presents  the LM ascent  stage subsystems analysis,  
Details a r e  presented only where changes are projected beyond that for the 
lunar  mission,  The baseline design i s  a s  described in Reference 3 - 2 .  
4. 3 .  1 Electr ical  Power (AEP) 
The electr ical  power source for the ascent  stage (AEP)is provided 
entirely by two silver-zinc batteries,  which provided adequate life and 
reliability for the ascent  phase of the LOR mission, but have a marginal  
life expectancy for the 90-day quiescent phase, even though little to no 
drain-charge cycles will be imposed on them. A s  a resul t ,  it is recom- 
mended that they be replaced with the longer life si lver-oxide-zinc (AgOZn) 
bat ter ies  where P, = 0.999 each (Reference 4 - 3 ) .  
The AgOZn 90-day wet-life bat ter ies  would increase weight by 
16. 5 pounds. 
not included herein; however, the battery manufacturers s e e m  to prefer  
the silver-oxide-zinc because of i t s  simplicity, Furthermore,  the 
90-day wet-life concept provides a backup to the descent stage EPS. 
Selection depends on other factors,  such a s  abort  c r i te r ia ,  
4. 3 .2  Environmental Control (LM ECS) and Thermal  Design 
NOTE: Some of the information used here in  was pro-  
vided by Hamilton Standard through 
Reference 4 . 3 2 .  
Functional Description 
The LM ECS functions for ELOR can be subdivided into two c lasses ,  
those associated with the taxi phase and those associated with the quiescent 
phase. 
fo r  Apollo. 
has  been added for this  mission. 
situation in which minimum control is required. 
Each imposes a need for modification of the basic LM ECS designed 
The taxi phase requi res  provisions t o  support a third man which 
The quiescent phase presents  a unique 
The p res su re  suit circuit  
*A foldout sheet listing abbreviations used in Section 4 . 3  and their meanings is located at page 251. 
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i s  held at  about 0. 5 psia,  although there  is some question a s  to  whether it 
is required. 
the 0.5-psia p r e s s u r e  level) ,  The wall temperature  is held between about 
t40 and -100 F. 
which require  any modification f o r  the ELOR mission. 
The cabin can be allowed t o  leak without makeup (or maintain 
The LM ECS consists of four subsystems, only two of 
These are-  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The atmosphere-  revitalization section (ARS) is to  continuously 
supply oxygen t o  the astronauts,  provide oxygen cooling, remove 
products of metabolism f r o m  the air, and r e tu rn  reconditioned 
a i r  to the astronauts  fo r  breathing and cooling, 
operations, the ARS operates a s  a closed-loop system; otherwise, 
it operates  a s  an  open-loop system supplying oxygen t o  the cabin 
and reclaiming cabin a i r  for removal of metabolic wastes and 
heat. (Modifications may be required to  facilitate higher flow 
ra t e s ;  some tes t  data a r e  required in  this a rea .  ) 
During suited 
The heat- t ransport  section (HTS) circulates ethylene glycol and 
water a s  a coolant for electronic equipment, batteries,  cabin a i r ,  
and suit  oxygen. The excess heat in this coolant loop i s  rejected 
by means  of a porous-plate sublimator into space. 
for 90-day operation a r e  required. 
Provisions 
The water -management section (WMS) consists of three water 
tanks, a distribution manifold, and valves. This is the only water 
supply aboard the LM and is used f o r  drinking, food preparation, 
portable life support system water supply, and supply fluid for  
the porous-plate sublimators of the HTS. 
supplies the needs during the descent and lunar stay-periods. 
Two smaller  tanks a r e  used only during the ascent phase. 
The la rges t  tank 
The oxygen-supply and cabin-pressure -control section (OSS) 
controls the cabin oxygen p r e s  sur  e and supply, maintaining the 
p r e s s u r e  at 4.8 
for u se  during suited operations. 
su re  control functions required by metabolic consumption and 
vehicle leakage losses .  Another function of this section i s  to 
supply oxygen fo r  recharging the oxygen tank of the PLSS. 
visions for  the third man a r e  to be added to this function. 
e t e r s  used in  the design of the LM ECS for  the ELOR mission a r e  
as follows: 
0 . 2  psia  for u se  in  the cabin o r  3.8 0 .2  psia  
This section includes all p r e s -  
P.ro- 
P a r a m -  
Cabin temper  atur e - 
Cabin relative humidity - 
Cabin p r e s s u r e  - 
55 to 80 F manual operation 
(manned ops) 
40 to 80 percent 
4.8 t 0. 2 p s i a  
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Suit c i rcu i t  p r e s s u r e  
GO2 par t ia l  p r e s s u r e  
Gas compo sition 
Suited heat  loads 
(maximum) 
Suited heat  load (average) 
Voltage supply available 
- 4.8 t 0. 2 psia,  normal  
3.8 t 0. 2 psia ,  preparation 
for  EVA 
- 7.6 mm Hg. maximum 
- P u r e  oxygen 
- 295 Btu/man-hr ,  sensible 
- 220 Btu/man-hr ,  latent 
- 515 Btu/man-hr,  total 
(714 possible) 
- 396 Btu/man-hr  
(51 5 possible) 
- 25 to 31.5 vdc 
Systems Analysis, The Three  -Man Requirement 
The ELOR miss ion  makes  it necessary  to provide for a third astronaut 
Several  considerations indicate that no design effort m a y  in the LM vehicle. 
be required to improve system performance. A comparison of the Apollo 
mission ve r sus  the ELOR mission requirements  for the LM ECS indicates 
th ree  p r imary  differences: provisions for  a third astronaut, 90 -day 
quiescent phase,  and shor te r  period in which astronauts  will actually be  
depending on the LM vehicle. An est imate  of LM vehicle manned operation 
during the ELOR mission indicates a total operating t ime of about 30 hours,  
including descent, t r ans fe r  to and re turn  f rom the lunar shel ter ,  and ascent 
for  the Apollo mission,  this  operating t ime is 48 hours  o r  60 percent longer,  
Given equal metabolic heat loads for  each man, t he re  a r e  fewer man-hours 
in the ELOR mission: i. e. , 90 versus  96. The shor te r  mission also 
decreases  the overal l  requirements for  heat rejection f rom the vehicle 
electronics and batteries.  
by supplying water to a porous plate sublimator, which allows ice  to b e  
sublimated to space vacuum. 
the extended rendezvous period may require  additional water (about 5. 3 pounds), 
but m o r e  detailed metabolic profile data a r e  required for final determination. 
This heat is removed during manned operations 
F o r  the ELOR miss ion  with three astronauts, 
Other expendable supplies should be satisfactory, 
board of vehicle atmosphere would be for a shor te r  period, and the number 
of PLSS miss ions  (i. e. , required PLSS refil ls)  may  be less ,  depending on 
the lunar base  concept. The analysis indicates that the capacity of LM 
expendables will be  sufficient for  the ELOR mission. 
include oxygen, food, water,  lithium hydroxide (for  carbon dioxide removal) , 
and activated charcoal. 
Normal leakage over  - 
These expendables 
Physically, the third astronaut will require  umbilical connections to 
his  p r e s s u r e  suit. This  requirement involves the addition of one o r  two 
Item-138 flow-reversing and shut-off valves, depending on the integration 
concept. This valve requi res  33. 5 watts peak power and weighs 3. 51 pounds. 
- 203 - 
SD 68 -850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
The WMS and OSS subsystems a r e  completely suitable for  th ree-man 
The ma jo r  question remaining i s  the capacity of the ARS and HTS 
operation, 
in suits, 
subsystems to handle the equipment and metabolic cooling requirements  of 
three-man operation in a satisfactory manner ,  
ditions indicated that the three-man-sui ted mode would be the most  severe ;  
therefore,  this mode was selected for  study, If the ARS and HTS could 
satisfactorily support this mission mode, then all other l e s s  s eve re  modes 
also could b e  m e t  satisfactorily. 
The addition of one valve makes it possible to support t h ree  m e n  
A review of miss ion  con- 
P r i m a r y  considerations a r e  the flow to each suit and cabin humidity, 
Evaluations were  made by using the Apollo LM computer program with the 
ELOR metabolic data. 
duced schematically in F igure  4-30. . The ma jo r  p r e s s u r e  drop in  the ARS 
circui t  i s  found in  the suits and the accompanying crossover  valves. With 
three  suits in paral le l ,  the p r e s s u r e  drop ac ross  each suit and accompany- 
ing valve is  decreased slightly, 
m o r e  volume flow than with the two suit configuration. 
suited and connected, each suit would receive 9. 5 cfm at about 54 F. 
flow is equivalent to that which the present  command module ECS supplies 
to each suit during the basic  Apollo mission; however it i s  lower than.the 
present  LM system capability. In addition, the existing ARS has  the capa- 
bility to handle over  1, 500 Btu /hr  of total metabolic load. If the individual 
maximum metabolic load of 515 Btu/hr  is reached, the total metabolic 
rejection f o r  the ARS would be 1, 545 Btu/hr .  At these conditions, a cabin 
dew point in the range of 60 to 65 F is expected, There is also a capability 
of the LM system to allow for brief metabolic loads of 600 to 650 Btu /man-  
hour,  
prematurely exhausted and a refi l l  charge wi l l  be required. ear l ie r  than 
normal. These higher metabolic loads a r e  possible, but not expected, With 
th ree  suited astronauts,  periods of high work loads should be  l imited to one 
man. 
The resu l t s  of the computations have been r ep ro -  
In this condition, the fan passes  slightly 
With th ree  men  
This 
Under these higher metabolic loads, the lithium hydroxide would be  
In any event the th i rd  m a n  is  in no position to work. 
Although m e n  using the present  space suits have had metabolic r a t e s  
of 1 , 0 0 0  Btu/man-hour,  significantly better suits a r e  already available than 
those used in  the present  Apollo program; and it is expected that, by- the 
1975 ELOR mission,  a metabolic r a t e  of 500 Btulman-hour will represent  a 
very  high activity r a t e  for  zero-g o r  lunar -g suited operations. 
ment  is also possible in  the design of suits to allow increased removal of 
latent heat f rom the astronaut 's  skin surface,  By 1975, these suit design 
improvements coupled with the capacity of the present  LM ECS should 
minimize res t r ic t ions  on work activity with three  suited astronauts. 
tional study in th'is a r e a  is  desirable  after some data a r e  available f rom 
LM flights. 
Improve- 
Addi - 
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To a s s u r e  adequate c rew comfort  during the hot-cabin ascent phase 
with the recommended suit flows, an oxygen suit inlet t empera ture  of about 
50 F is desirable. 
rejection capacity m a y  be required. 
mentary  heat rejection have been considered: 
To maintain this tempera ture  limit, increased heat-  
Three  methods for providing supple- 
1. Addition of a second water sublimator to the p r i m a r y  heat 
t ranspor t  section. 
2. Use of the 20-square-foot radiator,  which is added for  
temperature  control sur ing lunar  staytime. 
3. Use of the existing emergency water boiler in the ARS. 
The additional sublimator i s  recommended since i t  provides maximum 
flexibility in t e r m s  of thermal  load contingencies; however, it imposes a 
weight penalty of approximately 15 pounds. The 20 -square-foot radiator  i s  
effective only when i t  experiences a restr ic t ively low thermal  environment. 
Such cannot be maintained for  typical lunar  ascent conditions, 
of the ARS emergency water boiler to provide the required supplementary 
heat rejection is marginal  and may require  the addition of a suit-heat-  
exchanger bypass valve (F igure  4-31). 
heated in the suit heat exchanger. 
The capability 
The oxygen flow would otherwise be 
The cabin C 0 2  concentration can be  contained within present  l imits  
without hardware  modifications. 
capacity of 40 man-hours  and has  sufficient volume and surface contact a r e a  
to absorb the C 0 2  produced by the three-man crew. Three cabin car t r idges 
a r e  recommended for  the ELOR LM: two for  the descent postlanding check- 
out, prelaunch activation, and prelaunch checkout phases and one for  the 
ascent phase, including orbital  contingency. 
The existing cabin LiOH car t r idge has  a 
The incorporation of the third suit connector in the loop may be  
accomplished either by integrating it directly into the loop o r  by. using a 
portable manifold attached to one of the existing connections (Figure 4-31), 
Integration directly into the loop wi l l  involve modification of the plumbing and 
packaging of the ARS. The use  of a portable manifold, while not requiring an 
ARS modification, will impose a grea te r  fan power requirement by v i r ture  of 
an  increased  p r e s s u r e  drop created by the addition of balancing orifices 
into the loop, 
Appendix Q includes a power and weight summary for the expected ECS 
sys tem,  
(depending on concept) to allow suited operation for the third astronaut. 
Added to  the weight of each of the th ree  sublimators (Items 107, 209 and 
224) is  0. 1 pound for porous plate covers  to be installed during the 90-day 
s torage period, 
Added t o  the present  LM ECS a r e  one o r  two Item-138 suit valves 
Total sys tem weight excluding expendables i s  215.87 pounds. 
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Systems Analysis, Quiescent Mode 
During the 90-day period, the LM vehicle mus t  remain a reliable 
means of returning the astronauts  to  the CSM on demand. The applicable 
environmental factors  a r e  t ime, temperature ,  and pressure .  F o r  the ECS, 
other factors ,  such a s  lunar  dust, radiation, and meteor i te  activity, m a y  
turn  out to be significant problems, 
On the lunar  surface,  continuous tempera ture  control is  required fo r  
those i tems of equipment that support the s to rage  phase and/or the sub- 
sequent ascent phase of the mission. Table 4-20 presents  the allowable 
limits fo r  those equipments which have been identified a s  requiring the 
closest  temperature  control, 
Table 4-20. LM Quiescent-Phase Temperature-  
Cont r ol Requirement s 
Component 
Temperature  Limits 
(Degrees F) 
Batteries (ascent  and descent) 
P y r o t e chni c ba  tt e ri e s 
Water tanks 
Propellants 
Abort s enso r  assembly (ASA) 
Inertial  measuring unit (IMU) 
0 to 80 
40  to  160 
40 to 100 
-10 to 105 
he at e r s :! 
135 
(:::)These may not be required,  Tes t  p rograms are  required to  
ver i fy  the acceptability of operating components a t  lower 
temperatures .  
To  maintain allowable tempera ture  l imits ,  a combination of passive 
the rma l  design modifications and semiactive temperature  control a r e  
recommended by Grumann. The modifications include: 
1. Change aS/'c ratio of the top ascent  stage surface thermal  
shield to  0.2.  
2. Reduce insulation thickness of the top ascent  stage surface 
to  10 l aye r s  of NRC-2. 
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3. Add a deployable thermal  cover to the top docking tunnel. 
4. Add 25 layers  of NRC-2 insulation to the descent stage com- 
par tments  containing the batteries and water tank. 
5. Cover ascent  engine a r e a  with one layer  of mylar  ( 0 . 2  mil thick) 
to minimize heat  leak, 
Analysis of the vehicle thermal  balance has  been performed assuming 
these  modifications for both lunar day and night conditions, 
conditions, intermittent active tempera ture  control is required. 
F o r  both 
During the night s torage phase,  approximately 500 Btu/hr can be  
supplied to the vehicle by the waste heat of the electr ical  power generator,  
whether fuel cel ls  o r  a radiosotope thermoelectr ic  generator (RTG) is used, 
Since the RTG is recommended, it was used in  this analysis,  
i s  a schematic of a heat-pipe sys tem that is  to t ransport  waste heat f rom an  
RTG to selected positions on the vehicle. The heat i s  t ransfer red  by radia-  
tion f r o m  the RTG to a heat exchanger, o r  boiler, containing a volatile 
liquid. The heat vaporizes the liquid, which r i s e s  in  a pipe to a condensing 
section. 
and re turns  by gravity to  the boiler, The cold-condensing surface consists 
of tubes i n  good thermal  contact with the cabin wall, 
recommended for the liquid. 
Figure 4-32, 
The vapor condenses on the cold surface giving up i t s  latent heat 
Distilled water is  
Control of the sys tem is provided by a valve that res t r ic t s  the con- 
densate flow; the fluid i s  trapped i n  the heating panel and the boiler runs dry 
except for the amount of condensate returned by the control. 
tion 4.4. 2 for details  on the SNAP-27 RTG. The electr ical  performance and 
the l i fe  of the generator i s  affected by the tempera ture  of the unit. 
addition of the heat-pipe boiler changes the external environment for which 
the SNAP-27 i s  designed; therefore ,  the heat rejection fins of the RTG may 
r equi r e s ome mo di fic ation. 
See Sec- 
The 
During the daytime portion of the quiescent phase, active heat rejection 
is  required on an  intermittent basis,  to dissipate s t ructural  heat load inputs 
f r o m  the external environment and electr ical  heat loads generated during 
vehicle status monitoring, Since the vehicle has  no active cabin atmosphere 
tempera ture  control during this phase,  the main portion of the ascent stage 
the rma l  load is radiated to the .aft equipment bay, Figure 4-33 i s  a typical 
tempera ture  and load profile of the s tored vehicle for both day and night 
cycles based on Surveyor VI data, 
The ascent  stage and descent stage s t ruc tura l  temperatures  a r e  shown 
for worst-case decoupled locations, The cr i t ical  elements,  such as water 
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Condensers 
1I 
Component Design 
Condensers 
Four condensers mechanically 
attached inboard of thermal 
ahield to pressure shell webs, 
k - 1  
.Pi 
Sensors 1 
I 
0. Radiation heat transfer from 
localizd, area to remaining cabin. I 
--To coolant Pump 
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and propellant tanks,  a r e  coupled to  the temperature  control sys tems s o  
that the i r  t empera ture  l imits  a r e  maintained, 
r a t e  of 500 Btu /hr  i s  required during the daylight phase. 
A maximum heat rejection 
The use  of either radiators  o r  w a t e r  sublimation has  been considered 
a s  the means of heat rejection. Using water sublimation, approximately 
300 pounds of water is  required during the lunar surface s torage phase, not 
including post-landing and prelaunch activities. An additional consideration 
is the inability of the water sublimator to  operate below 1, 000 Btu/hr.  
Since the nominal heat rejection requirement i s  expected to be  500 Btu/hr ,  
use of the sublimator i s  not the mos t  attractive approach. As a resu l t  
of the potential complexity and associate  water weight penalty, the use  
of radiators  is  recommended. 
into the existing LM heat  t ranspor t  loop i s  capable of providing the heat 
rejection required.  
Figure 3 - 4 .  
radiator  controls a r e  required,  since,  during minimum-load cold-case 
conditions, heat  provided by the RTG will maintain the radiator  above i t s  
freezing point. 
A 20-square-foot radiator  integrated directly 
The s t ruc tura l  integration of the radiator i s  shown in  
It i s  rigidly attached to the top of the ascent  stage. No 
The requirements  and procedure associated with establishing the 
LM ECS quiescent state and the reactivation procedure recommended by 
Hamilton Standard i s  presented i n  Appendix R. 
Reliability and Maintenance Consider ations 
In assess ing  the reliability of the LM ECS and i t s  contribution to  
the mission Ps, the hardware and i t s  reliability can b e  considered i n  two 
categories:  those used during the manned mission and those operated during 
the quiescent phase; however, these a r e  not mutually exclusive categories;  
and, i n  fact, many of the components of the heat loop are included i n  both 
categories.  In any event, their  probabilities can be multiplied to estimate 
Ps i f  they a r e  estimated separately with regard  to mission phase. 
During the manned phases,  the sys tem reliability and, therefore ,  i t s  
contribution to Ps wi l l  remain  virtually unchanged f rom that of the Apollo 
mission. Given a reasonably controlled quiescent state,  the contributor 
to  Ps should be somewhat better because of the 25-percent lower duty 
cycles on much of the equipment on the lunar surface,  
Reliability calculations f rom the present  Apollo program indicate 
that the LM ECS will have a reliability of 0, 998 based on the manned 
miss ion  profile. 
16 hours  of c rew operations on the lunar surface a s  a safety margin.  
calculations are based upon failure effects analyses of each component and 
a r e  supported by limited-endurance testing and tes t  data. 
Crew safety i s  0. 9996, which includes an additional 
These 
Since the 
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LM ELOR operating t ime is to be only 30 hours  for the manned phase versus  
48 hours  (maximum) for Apollo LM, the result ing LM ECS contribution to 
PS for the ELOR miss ion  is expected to  be higher than for Apollo in spite of 
the third crewman, Ps fo r  manned phases is therefore  es t imated to be over 
0. 999 without any provision for maintenance. 
The unmanned quiescent phase requires  some functions to operate 
throughout the mission, 
Figure 4-34. They a r e ,  for the most  par t ,  associated with the heat- t ransport  
loop. 
operating electronic equipment and the power source,  i f  required.  This 
concept requires  the use  of i n  I tem 290,pump during the 90-day s torage 
period, which will add about 540 operating hours ,  
150-hour l i fe ,  but t e s t s  have been run for 2, 000 hours  without failure. The 
pump package includes an al ternate  pump and an  emergency pump ( a  three-  
unit package); thus a failure due to wear requires only a pump switchover. 
The reliability data indicate that the pump package still may be the weakest 
link i n  spite of the internal  redundancy and only a 25-percent duty cycle 
during quiescence on the lunar surface.  
followed by continuous operation for the lunar descent, ascent,  and docking 
phases.  
exceeds the life requirement to which the assembly is presently qualified, 
the assembly would require  requalification and/or  provisions incorporated 
to  permi t  replacement on the lunar  surface,  Replacement may require  
(1) additional flexible l ines and disconnects on the fluid connections, ( 2 )  the 
addition of an electr ical  disconnect replacing pressure-sensing pigtails, 
and (3 )  the use  of a specialized tool for removal of partially inaccessible 
mounting bolts. 
package will increase  the Ps to 0. 9999 f o r  this function, 
These a r e  presented i n  reliability logic fo rm in 
These components operate  to  distribute the heat within the LM, cool 
It is  only qualified for 
This duty cycle i s  preceded and 
Because the cumulative operating t ime based on this duty cycle 
Provisions for replacement of the pump motor  or  the 
The coolant accumulator i n  the heat- t ransport  section accommodates 
volumetr ic  changes caused by tempera ture  variations in the heat- t ransport  
section, maintains a head on the coolant fluid to prevent pump cavitation, 
and provides a small makeup supply. 
over the long-duration s torage phase may impose a requirement for additional 
accumulators  for fluid makeup. 
to extending the operational requirements  of the accumulator a r e  diaphragm 
life,  leakage ra tes ,  fatigue, permeabili ty variations, and effects of the 
water/glycol solution on the diaphragm. The accumulator i s  located in  the 
aft equipment bay a r e a  of the ascent  stage and is  not considered a candidate 
for  maintenance. 
r a i s e  its contribution to P90 and Ps to well over 0.99999 and eliminate any 
fur ther  concern,, 
The nominal allowable leakage r a t e  
Areas  requiring additional study related 
Provis ions fo r  a refill o r  a redundant accumulator will 
Other components that may  exer t  some influence on the LM ECS effects 
on Ps involve the LiOH car t r idges  and the fans. System life t e s t s  a r e  required, 
- 213 - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
I 
I- 
I
--I 
k 
A. 
c, 
k 
I 
- 2 1 4  - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
Two types of LiOH car t r idges a r e  used i n  LM: one is used in  the LM 
ECS and the other is  used i n  the portable life support  sys tem (PLSS). 
. only chemical change anticipated i n  the car t r idges  during long-duration 
s torage i s  the eventual decomposition of LiOH to Liz0 and H20.  
i n  turn,  vaporizes,  leaving a completely dehydrated canister.  The r a t e  at 
which this activity occurs  i s  a function of tempera ture  and pressure .  
Generally, this dehydration is not considered to  be a problem, because L i z 0  
can be s tored indefinitely and i n  itself can be used to absorb COz. 
cation, the Liz0 in the ECS will be rehydrated to LiOH by the metabolic 
water vapor produced by the crew; therefore  no degradation i n  P90 o r  Ps 
i s  expected. 
The 
The water,  
In  appli- 
The suitability of allowing PLSS car t r idges  to become dehydrated i s  
questionable. 
of C02 produced for a three-hour EVA, they a r e  limited to the ra te  a t  which 
they can absorb it because of the very  small quantity of LiOH present and 
the equally small oxygen flow ra t e  that the PLSS delivers to the cartridge.  
The car t r idges must ,  therefore,  be hydrated sufficiently to yield optimum 
absorption capability. 
ve ry  low level by the liquid-cooled garment;  therefore ,  the metabolic load 
cannot be considered a s  a source of water and the car t r idge must  be 
sufficiently hydrated p r io r  to use. A solution is  to s tore  the car t r idges i n  
hermetical ly  sealed containers and eliminate any effects on Ps. 
While the car t r idges  a r e  la rge  enough to absorb the quantity 
During EVA, the latent metabolic load i s  kept to a 
The cabin and suit fans will not be operated during the quiescent- 
s torage phase; consequently, there  is no requirement f o r  increasing their  
operating life requirement.  The fans are current ly  designed with double- 
sealed bearings to minimize the possibility of lubricant loss  and/or  
contamination, Tests  must  verify their  effects on P,. 
The remaining components a r e  not expected to exer t  significant 
influence on Ps. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The LM ECS will per form the ELOR mission with a Ps of about 
Some of the 0.999 if an RTG is used as the electr ical  power source,  
modifications required i n  the Apollo design include the addition of a space 
radiator ,  one o r  two No, 138 valves, an  additional sublimator, a heat-pipe 
system, and an accumulator,  Fur ther ,  provisions for the replacement of 
a pump o r  motor  a r e  required,  
To verify the  assumptions made, a life test is required on the modified 
and, in par t icular ,  th,e quiescent control functions. 
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4.3. 3 Guidance and Navigation Function, P / o  Primary Guidance, Navigation 
and Control System 
NOTE: Much of the information used here in  was 
provided by AC Electronics through 
Reference 4 .7 .  
System Description 
The LM G&N sys tem function remains unchanged for the ELOR; the 
The only change in  Apollo I1 sys tem will  provide the required functions. 
operational requirement i s  the extended quiescent period. 
the sys t em will be completely off, and even the tempera ture  control for the 
IMU and ASA wi l l  be provided by power-system parasi t ic  heat a s  required.  
During this period 
Quiescent-state control is  discussed under Paragraph  4. 1. 3 for the 
The argument developed for CM G&N applies to  the LM G&N a s  well, CM. 
since the same  sys tems and components a r e  used, 
The LM G&N i s  composed of severa l  subfunctions in  addition to  those 
function s imilar  to the CM. 
i n  functional block form in  Figure 4-35. 
the landing radar .  
These functions and their  interfaces a r e  presented 
Included a r e  a rendezvous r ada r  and 
The landing r ada r  per forms its functions pr ior  to the extended lunar 
phase,  i t s  ELOR function is identical i n  every way with that of the Apollo 
LOR mission and, therefore ,  requires  no modifications o r  life extension 
to meet  the intent of the ELOR mission (See Reference 4. 3 2 ) .  
The rendezvous radar  a lso per forms identical functions on ELOR and 
Apollo; however, for ELOR it must  first survive the 90-day quiescent phase 
since it i s  used only on the re turn  leg .  During the quiescent phase, the 
sys tems wi l l  be off; and the antenna, which i s  a lso its heat sink, wi l l  be 
pointed directly into deep space and held there  by i t s  own brake. 
should it be pointed toward any p a r t  of the lunar surface since the acc-umulated 
heat could have a detrimental  effect on the electronics. 
In no case, 
System Analysis (G&N) 
Since the functional requirements  for the LM G&N a r e  satisfied by 
the Apollo I1 system, the subsequent analysis centers  around meeting the 
rel iabi l i ty/safe  re turn  and quiescent life objectives. 
operational concept, redundancy, and sparing concept were considered in  
attempting to maximize Ps and achieve at leas t  0. 999 for the sys tem (this 
value is  much higher than for Apollo). 
c r i t e r i a  a r e  much the same as used under Paragraph  4.1.3 for the CM system. 
Variations in both 
The considerations and selection 
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Detailed duty cycle data was required to make a meaningful analysis 
for  this system. The data f rom Section 2.4 of this r epor t  were,  therefore ,  
extended to provide the necessary detail,  These data appear i n  Table 4-21’. 
Minor modifications of the input data include reducing the prelaunch ins t ru-  
ment heating t ime, adding instrument heater time during ascent  and ea r th  
orbit ,  and adding computer t ime in  the separate  phase (6.4) when an iner t ia l  
reference is desired.  
The LM G&N sys tem mechanization differs f rom that of the CM 
sys tem i n  that the computer is not normally on when the iner t ia l  subsystem 
is in  standby. 
not energize the 3,200-cycle power supplies for iner t ia l  instrument suspen- 
sion, 
The ISS standby mode only supplies heater power, but does 
All  other equipment: is turned on at the same t ime in  lunar orbit. 
Table 4-21. LM G&N System Equipment Usage Times Based on 
ELOR Functional Requirements 
Duration 
LM Phase  I (Hours) 
1.0 
2 . 0  
3.0 
5.0 
6. 0 
6. 1 
6. 3 
6.4 
6. 5 
6.7 
6.9 
6.10A 
6.10B 
6 ,  13 
6. I 4  
6. 15 
6, 16 
6.20 
Prelaunch 
Ascent 
Ear th  orbi t  
Translunar  
Lunar a r e a  
Adjust o r  bi t  
P r e p a r e  LM 
Separate 
Station keeping 
Descent 
Landing 
Storage preparations 
Storage operations 
Depart  Preparat ions 
Launch operations 
Ascent 
Rendezvous 
Deactivate 
100 
0.2 
1.5 
61.7 
2, 208. 8 
2.2 
3.5 
0.2 
1.4 
1 . 2  
0.1 
1 . 0  
2, 187.5 
4.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.0 
4.6 
Totals 
ISS Standby 
Equipment 
4 
0.2 
1.5 
61.7 
2.2 
3.5 
0 . 2  
1.4 
1.2 
0.1 
1.0 
2, 187.5 
4 .0  
1.0 
1 * 1  
0. 5 
0 
2, 271. 1 
Al l  Other 
G& N Equipment 
0.2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.5 
0.2 
1.4 
1.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
0 . 5  
0 
8.4 
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The LM G&N sys tem operating and standby failure rates were  obtained 
f rom the MIT repor t  of Reference 4.8, a summary  of which appears  i n  
Table 4-22. The effects of the quiescent state on failure rate i s  discussed 
i n  Section 2.5 Fa i lures  during these nonoperating periods are considered 
to present  a ve ry  low probability and are inconsequential to this study. 
The reliability and result ing P, of the sys tem was first computed 
using the Apollo miss ion  ground ru les ,  where the computer clock operates  
throughout the miss ion  and the ISS is i n  standby, 
i n  Table 4-23, where the result ing P, is  shown to be near ly  0.990 (some- 
what shor t  of the des i red  objective). 
attempting to  maintain the DRM standby s ta te ,  an  unnecessary operation for  
the ELOR Mission. 
period, the P, i s  est imated to  be 0. 993, which is better than the Apollo 
est imate ,  
The resu l t s  are reflected 
The weaknesses are created by 
However, with all equipments off during the quiescent 
There  a r e  six subassemblies  with reliabil i t ies of approximately 
0.999; and i f  an overal l  sys t em P, of 0.999 i s  required,  at l ea s t  five of 
these would have to  be improved. 
obtained by eliminating the standby tempera ture  control, five spa re  sub- 
as s emblie s were  considered. 
F o r  the sake of comparison with resul ts  
The resulting overall  LM G&N function P, = 0.999, the desired goal. 
Since the ISS PSA and the DSKY have the s a m e  reliability, ei ther could be 
chosen for  sparing. Table 4-24 a rb i t r a r i l y  shows the PSA spared,  but this 
decision would have to  be based on relative ease  of replacement of the two 
subassemblies  e 
R ec ommendatio ns  and Conclusions 
The LM G&N sys tem will per form the ELOR mission at the Apollo Ps 
without any significant changes. 
conditions a r e  mos t  desirable ,  par t icular ly  for the IMU; however, i t  seemed 
desirable  to raise its contribution to Ps to nearly that of the other subsystem 
and reduce the need for MSFN backup. 
a r e  l is ted in Table 4-25. 
Tests  on the sys tem under simulated 
Some of the potential alternatives 
As a minimum, the change i n  operational concept is recommended 
since it will increase  the sys tem P, to 0. 993 without modifications. 
function (G&N) P, i s  still well over  0.999 because of the MSFN backup 
capability. 
al ternative,  particularly,  since they can a l so  be used as backup spa res  for 
the CSM. 
The 
The low weight penalty of using spa res  may make it an  attractive 
However, the logistics aspect  of the problem is yet to be resolved. 
Only a 90-day cold-soak, heat-soak cycle t e s t  is required for the 
rendezvous radar  sys tem,  
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Table 4-22. LM G & N  System Fai lure  Rates 
Ope rating 
Ax 
Standby 
Ax 10-6 Subassembly 
IMU and P I P A  
e 1 e c t r oni c 
a s  s embly 
PSA 
CDU 
D&C group 
129 
110 
155  
1 . 2  
Iner t ia l  395.2 
Optical assembly 
PSA 
38  
1 . 3 3  I 3 9 e 3 3  I - 
235 
110 
345 LM guidance 
DSKY 
CDU 
computer - LGC 
112 Rendezvous 
r a d a r  coupling 
Table 4-23. LM G & N  ELOR Mission Probability of Success,  
Normal Apollo Operational Concepts 
T 
(Hours) Ax l o m 6  LM Subsystem AT P S  
ISS - Operating - Standby 
css 
oss 
RR coupling 
395.2 
1. 6 
345 
39 .33  
112 
8.4 
2262.7 
8 .4  
8 .4  
8.4 
0. 003320 
0. 003620 
0. 002898 
0. 000330 
0. 000941 
0.997 
0 .996  
0.997 
0.9997 
0.999 
Total 0.011109 0.99 
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Table 4-25. Summary of LM C&N System Reliability 
LM G&N Function Ps 
0.99 
0.993 
0.999 
0.999 
~ ~~~ 
Configuration and Operational Concept 
Apollo LM G&N sys tem and operational con- 
cepts (no changes). 
All equipment off during standby periods 
(operational change). 
One spa re  of each of the ISS subassemblies,  
the computer,  and the R R  CDU's. 
One spa re  of each of the ISS subassemblies ,  
the computer,  and the RR CDU's. All 
equipment off during standby. 
4. 3.4 Stability Control Function, P a r t  of the P r i m a r y  Guidance, Navigation 
and Control Svstem 
Functional Description 
The LM SCS is divided functionally into two major  sections,  both of 
which a r e  required throughout the manned phases,  and must  survive the 
90-day ELOR quiescent phase. 
section (CES) and the abort  guidance section (AGC). 
These sections a r e  the control electronics 
The CES consists of seven separate  subfunctions, three of which a r e  
redundant i n  the Apollo configuration. The functions of this sys tem remain  
unchanged for  the ELOR mission;  however, the sys tem must  survive the 
quiescent phase without i r reparable  damage. The CES provides the signals 
to fire any combination of the sixteen thrus te rs  of the reaction control sub- 
system. Its function is to maintain vehicle stability throughout the manned 
mission and facilitate attitude changes when required,  
off during the quiescent phase. 
I t  is to be completely 
The AGS provides two subfunctions, which a r e  available throughout the 
mission, but are used  only in event of fa i lure  in the G&N function o r  a sub-  
function thereof, thereby providing an emergency abort capability, It p r o  - 
vides an  attitude reference for vehicle stability control and a backup stability 
control o r  guidance i n  the event of pr imary  sys tem failure. 
Systems Analysis and Conclusions 
As is  the c a s e  with other LM sys tems which operate only during the 
manned phases ,  the reliability of these functions and, therefore,  the 
- 223 - 
SD 68-850-1 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
contribution to PS should exceed the Apollo miss ion  estimate.  
ment  is a resu l t  of the reduced duty cycle, about 30 hours  ve r sus  48 hours. 
Ps, therefore ,  is about 0. 993. 
This improve- 
No maintenance should be  required,  although it would increase  the 
probability of a successful  rendezvous i f  box replacement was planned, 
is not recommended. Additional tes t s ,  beyond that for  Apollo are con- 
s idered unnecessary i f  the Apollo miss ions  do not encounter fa i lure  i n  these 
sys  terns. 
I t  
4.3. 5 Reaction Control  System (LM-RCS) 
The LM RCS is essentially the same a s  the SM RCS in  its design, 
performance, and reliability. F o r  details on both function and reliability 
data, s ee  Section 4. 2. 2. 
es t imated to be grea te r  than 0. 99997 for each engine. 
sys tem fai lure  is  negligible, less than 1 i n  a million because of the redun - 
dancy within and between the RCS quads, 
The ELOR Ps contribution by the LM RCS is 
The chance of a 
Compared to the Apollo LM, it i s  estimated that 50 pounds of additional 
RCS propellant is required for the ELOR mission, 
based on a proportioning of the vehicle weights and inertias.  
is  current ly  scheduled to be launched with full RCS propellant tanks; and, 
based on anticipated maximum RCS usage for  a nominal lunar mission, 
there  is a marg in  of 125 pounds remaining a t  the completion of the rendezvous 
and docking phase. RCS fuel augmentation, therefore,  is not considered 
necessary.  
This requirement is 
The Apollo LM 
During the lunar night, it is possible fo r  fuel to f reeze  i n  the LM RCS 
engine l ines;  however, during this period, they a r e  not used, 
it is not pract ical  to maintain their  temperature  by means of the LM RCS 
engine hea ters  because of the la rge  electr ical  energy requirement,  I t  is 
recommended that the present  LM hea ters  be turned off after landing and 
that the th rus t e r s  be allowed to cool to equilibrium temperature  (approxi- 
mately 0 to -20 F), 
propellant feed l ines during the prelaunch checkout to bring the thrus te rs  up 
to operational tempera tures  (approximately one hour would be required f o r  
this operation). Freezing of the fue l  is possible during this period, and 
some separation of fuel constituents could occur. Discussions with the 
engine manufacturer (Marquardt)  have indicated that the thrus te rs  should 
operate  satisfactorily under these conditions. 
Fur ther ,  
La rge r  hea te r s  (250-watt) have been added to thaw 
(Reference 4-15) 
All  RCS sys tem components a r e  exposed to propellants f rom the time 
These components a r e  qualified for 44 days,  and require  of init ial  loading. 
t e s t s  for  the longer exposure time. The RCS p r e s s u r e  regulator would 
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operate i n  the lock-up position throughout the lunar  stay period, 
through the valve exceeds the specification value, the pressure- re l ie f  valve 
could possibly actuate,  result ing in  loss  of helium. 
shutoff valves is  a potential means  of minimizing this leakage, 
If leakage 
The addition of regulator 
In  summary ,  no additions o r  modifications are projected for this 
system. 
ment  for  its contribution to Ps. 
Fur ther ,  i t  is  expected to exceed by far any reasonable require-  
4, 3.6 Communications (LM-CS) and Status System 
NOTE: Some of the information used herein was 
pro.vided by RCA through Reference 4-34. 
Functional Requirements 
The LM CS is one of the m o r e  mission-sensit ive subsystems of LM, 
since many of i t s  functions a r e  required to operate  periodically throughout 
the 90-day quiescent period, 
abort  (Pa )  and P90. 
during the pertinent mission phases a r e  summarized in Table 4-26 and 
i l lustrated in F igure  4-36. 
However, failure does not affect Ps, only 
The LM communication functions and links required 
During the separate ,  station-keeping, and descent phases a require-  
ment  exis ts  for continual communications with both the CSM and ear th  MSFN. 
A CSM status reception mode will enable the astronauts in the LM to de te r -  
mine the existence of any abnormal CSM conditions which could resul t  in a 
decision to abort  the mission. 
employed to help execute this s ta tus  check and, i f  necessary,  reactivate the 
CSM to  the degree of operational readiness appropriate for rendezvous in 
case  of abort. 
The command link to the CSM would be 
The remaining VHF to and f rom the CSM and S-band to and f rom MSFN 
during these phases and landing are the standard LM requirements associated 
with the Apollo mission, 
During the s torage preparat ion phase, the command and status 
reception links to and f r o m  the CSM will be maintained i f  the CSM is within 
line-of-sight (LOS) communication range, Normal  LM S-band communica- 
tions with 'ear th  will  be  required during this phase, except that there is no 
need for the ranging operation af ter  the LM has landed, 
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LM 
Coiniiiunication 
Function a n d l o r  Link 
Table 4-26.  LM Communication Funct ions 
P e r  Mission Phase 
1 . 0  6.3 
P r e p a r e  
Pre launch  LM 
X(1) X(1) 
Applicability of communication Function P e r  P h a s e  
:heckout 
'HF link with CSM 
Command t ransmiss ion  
CSM s ta tus  r e c o p i t i o n  
Ranging back-up 
PCM data t ransmiss ion  
;-band link with e a r t h  
Data t ransmiss ion  
Voice t ransmiss ion  
P R N  range  code Xpond 
Receive voice 
Receive PRN range  
C O d C  
Receive U D L  
conuuands 
rHF (EVA) +S-band (ear th)  
6 .4  
Separate 
6. 5 
stationkeeping 
X 
X 
X(Z) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
6 .  7 
Jescent  
6 .9  
,anding 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
__ 
6 .  10A 
itorage 
P r e p  
6. 15 
~ 
Lscent 
X 
X 
X(2) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
S 
JOTES: 
I )  
2) 
Checkout to be per formed for all LM comniunications functions prelaunch and those feasible during pr'cpare-LX1 and depart p r c p a r a t i ~ n .  
Rangina via VHF is a proposed backup to the rendezvous radar and would presumably be employed only i L  the radar  ,,raIioncti~lnrd. 
3 )  PCM data t ransmiss ion  would be  t ime-shared  with ranginglconimands (which can  be  t ransmi t ted  simnltaneously) and \vtml#l  i lcci ir  *mly d > r v  ilir 
LM i s  behind the moon, thus permitt ing communication with ear th .  
to ear th  upon MSFN interrogation v ia  up-data link to the CSM. 
The CSM would receive and s torc  these data IC,,- 5ubsequrnt tr.Ln-it 
4) During the quiescent phase,  th ree  a l te rna te  S-band communication provisions are considercd. ( S e e  teat  ior description (!(. : \ I l ~ ~ - m t c - ~  A, I:. ,,m! 1 . I 
51 Checkcd-out to  extent possible.  
6) 
7) 
Links to CSM operated if the CSM is within line O L  sight. 
EVAILMIEVA links (using EVCS equipment) are established when the as t ronauts  leave L A ?  lor lhc  she l te r  ant1 upon rc l i i rn  l u  l l i c  1.11. 
Alternates under consideration include R. F. v e r s u s  cable for th i s  link between LM and the sheller. 
sections o f  this report .  
T h o s o  a l i c r n a l e s  i i r ~  , l is<t ts -c , r !  i n  >\:I>-< 
HI This remote  cont ro l  capability is not a requirement,  but i s  a possible alternate to niamial mtcrventirm lor MLR; 1 1  \ \ c n 1 1 < 1  d ~ n A . ~ l c  I h v  1 1 1  
1,u:rrding the  LM by as t ronauts  until departure.  
type o u t p t  from LM s ta lus lmoni tor  unit. 
VHF reception capability (aboard the Lhll for  s u c h  r u m m i l n d s  ~ o u l d  b r  . t c . t l x - a l c . l  lb.tsc.! 
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During the period when the astronauts proceed f r o m  the LM to the 
shel ter ,  i t  i s  expected that a requirement exists for  continued voice com- 
munications between the astronauts  and earth. This communication could 
be  accomplished per  the following procedure. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Two astronauts  leave the LM equipped with EVC-1 and EVC-2 
communications gear. This equipment would permi t  the two 
astronauts  to talk to each other and to ea r th  v ia  the LM on a 
VHF/S-band relay. The third astronaut would remain  in the LM 
to operate  the LM CSS as  required to maintain this relay link. 
The two astronauts would activate the shel ter  CSS, which would 
have communications capabilities a t  l eas t  the equivalent of an  LM 
CSS. 
the astronauts  and ear th  via the shelter.  
This  approach would establish communications between 
The third astronaut would then complete deactivation of LM to the 
extent des i red  and depart  for  the shelter.  
This third astronaut would a l so  be equipped with EVC-1 gear ,  and 
the other as t ronaut  s imilar ly  equipped (and a t  the shel ter)  would 
deactivate his  EVC-1 gear. 
communicate with the second (equipped with the EVC-2 unit) while 
proceeding to the shelter.  
Thus, the third astronaut would 
This procedure would essentially be reversed  upon completion of the 
90-day period when the astronauts re turn  to the LM for departure.  
Three  al ternate  operational concepts a r e  possible for activation of the 
LM CSS for t ransmiss ion  of data to ear th  during the quiescent phase. 
Alternate A requi res  t ransmiss ion  of LM status data to ear th  for  a 
3 -  to 10-minute period every two hours. 
initiated automatically by an on-board programming capability. 
quent t ransmission r a t e  appears  excessive and resu l t s  in  a significant 
increase  i n  the probability of fa i lure  of one o r  m o r e  components of the CSS. 
In addition, the environmental control sys tem will  have high heat loads to 
dissipate to maintain the low fa i lure  r a t e  thermal  l imits during the lunar 
The t ransmiss ion  would be 
This f r e -  
days. 
Alternate B is similar to A, but requires  just  one 10- to 15-minute 
period of t ransmiss ion  of LM status  data to ear th  each day. 
the on-off cycling of c r i t i ca l  CSS units by a 12-to-1 ratio with respect  to 
Alternate A. 
This lessens  
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Alternate C consists of checkout of the overal l  LM (most  subsystems)  
approximately once every two weeks. 
would be accomplished as required using s p a r e s  f rom the shelter.  
astronauts would board the LM to accomplish this check-out, and it is 
estimated that the LM CSS would be operated a maximum of four hours  each 
t ime for  a total of six t imes,  This sys tem resu l t s  in 24 hours  of operations 
as contrasted with 182 hours for  Alternate A. 
comprehensive evaluation of the ability of LM to per form the r e t u r n  mission. 
If this mode is  selected,  i t  is recommended that the check-out operations 
be accomplished during lunar day-night transit ion periods when the thermal  
environment would provide the leas t  hazard  to the LM CSS. 
Replacement and/or  repa i r  of LM units 
Two 
Fur ther ,  i t  provides a 
F o r  any one of the three a l te rna tes ,  the low data ra te  of 1. 6 kbps 
provided by the LM should be sufficient for LM-Earth data t ransmission.  
This mode minimizes  use of the S-band power amplifiers.  
Lunar -sur face  exploratory missions will  presumably be made by the 
astronauts  f r o m  the shel ter  during the lunar stay,  and a requirement  wi l l  
exist  for maintaining voice communications and monitoring the condition 
of the space suits.  
units and companion V H F  t ransce ivers  in the shel ter .  
This communication can be accomplished with the E V C S  
A requirement  may exist  for  monitoring the LM periodically f rom the 
shel ter  during the quiescent phase. 
astronaut boarding of LM if the monitoring indicated a need fo r  same.  The 
LM/ shel ter  status-monitoring communication requirement can be satisfied 
by either R F  o r  a cabling arrangement  utilizing the RCA sys t em presented 
in Reference 4. 35. 
Control could be accomplished by 
Appendix T summar izes  the anticipated information bandwidth and 
communication range requirements  for  the different portions of the ELOR 
mission. 
Functional Description and Alternatives 
The prel iminary configuration proposed for  the LM CSS (communication 
subsystem) for  the ELOR mission is given in  Figure 4-37. 
essentially that provided for  the LM for the basic  Apollo mission functions, 
except a s  follows: 
This CSS is 
Intercom for Third Man. Since all three  astronauts will be i n  the LM 
for  the descent,  landing, s torage preparation, and depart  preparat ion phases,  
the signal p rocesso r  assembly (SPA) provisions should be expanded to permi t  
the third ast ronaut  to participate in intercommunications and possibly voice 
t ransmiss ion/  reception. The la t te r ,  i f  provided, could be t ime-shared 
between the commander  and the pilot. 
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Command Message Generator ,  A command message  generator (new 
component) would be required for  derivation of the commands to be sent to  
the CSM. 
DRG (Digital Ranging Generator).  A DRG would be  desirable  to 
provide ranging (CSM LM) capability as a back-up to the LM rendezvous 
radar .  
CSM for  the basic  Apollo mission. 
a companion transponder unit called the RTTA (Ranging Tone Transfer  
As sembly). 
This demand involves two minor  modifications to a unit now i n  the 
The LM CSS for this mission contains 
Since the CSM will be unmanned during the rendezvous period, the LM 
would have to contain the DRG f o r  this ELOR mission, and the RTTA would 
be  included as part of the CSM CSS. 
to be added to the LM. 
of CSM and LM would be interchanged for this ELOR mission. 
necessary  that the computer associated with the navigation and guidance 
subsystem within LM be  modified to accommodate the additional computa- 
tions required to a s s i s t  in  the overal l  rendezvous operation based on the 
ranging data input. 
A companion ranging display would have 
The ranging equipment exis ts ,  but the components 
It is also 
Status Monitor and Checkout, While on the lunar surface,  the LM 
will  be periodically monitored to determine i t s  status,  Because of the 
nature of the mission and the extended stay-time on the lunar surface,  two 
types of checkout should be performed on the vehicle. 
detailed, extended monitor of the vehicle conducted by the c rew af ter  the 
lunar landing and pr ior  to ascent. The second type of checkout is a m o r e  
cu r so ry  monitor of the vehicle during the quiescent phase of the mission. 
This function is new and requi res  m o r e  attention herein. 
The f i r s t  is  a 
The checkout conducted during the quiescent phase is designed 
pr imar i ly  to ascer ta in  the status of the vehicle, These interrogations a r e  
l imited to an  examination of vehicle expendables and temperatures  and 
pertinent pa rame te r s  of assemblies  active during the s torage phase; e. g . ,  
hea te rs ,  ba t te r ies ,  RTG, coolant pumps, and instrumentation and communi- 
cation subsystems. Since all LM electronic assemblies  a r e  designed for a 
five-year shelf -life, the ninety-day dormancy will not have any appreciable 
effect on the performance,  provided the specified tempera tures  a r e  
maintained. F o r  this reason,  assemblies  not required for the processing 
and transmitt ing of the data, will  not be activated during these checkouts. 
The performance of the nonactive assemblies  will be  determined during 
the detailed checkout performed p r io r  to ascent. 
P a r a m e t e r s  selected to be monitored during these interrogations 
( l is ted inTable  4-27) provide for a g ross  status evaluation of the vehicle 
and expendables but do not contain data  for trouble-shooting. In the event 
SD 68-850-1 
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Table 4-27. Quiescent-State Monitoring Points,  Bit 
Requirements,  LM Vehicle 
Subsystem 
CN&C 
Comm. 
EPS 
ECS 
P r o  pulsion 
P a r  arne t e r 
IMU heater  on 
IMU temperature  
ASA temperature  
RR tempera ture  
PIPA temperature  
Transce iver  power output 
Antenna electronics 
Receiver ACC 
temperature  
Battery voltage 
temperature  
cu r ren t  
R T G  voltage 
temperature  
cur ren t  
Bus voltage 
Coolant ternperatur e 
Pump delta-P 
Valve position indicator 
H 2 0  quantity 
Oxygen temperature  
Glycol quantity 
p r e s  sur e 
Oxidizer p r e s s u r e  
temperature  1 
quantity 
tempe r a tur  e 
quantity 
Fuel p r e s  sur  e 
He tempera ture  
p re s  sur  e 
Number of 
M ea s ur  eme nt s 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
9 
9 
9 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
1 
3 
3 
Bits 
1 
8 
8 
8 
8 
16 
8 
16 
72 
72 
72 
8 
16 
8 
16 
16 
16 
4 
16 
16 
16 
a 
24 
24 
8 
24 
24 
8 
24 
24 
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Table 4-27. Quiescent-State Monitoring Points ,  Bit 
Requirements,  LM Vehicle (Cont) 
P a r a m e t e r  
Heaters  
Oxidizer p re s su re  
temperature  
quantity 
temperature  
quantity 
temperature  
Fue l  p r e s s u r e  
He p res su re  
Number of 
Measurements  
93 Analog 
5 Discrete  
Bits 
3 2  
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
744 
5 
749 
-
a n  anomaly-is  detected, a worker  would re turn  to the vehicle; activate the 
affected assembly;  switch the PCM to the hi-bit ra te ;  and in conjunction with 
MSFN, conduct an  in-depth assessment  of that area.  
analyses of these data, a decision can  be made on what, if any, alterations 
to the mission plan a r e  required. 
Based upon the 
A schematic diagram of the configuration required for the quiescent- 
phase checkout is shown in F igure  4-38. These checkouts will be performed 
automatically upon command; and unless a malfunction or  abnormal condition 
is  detected, the ast ronauts  will not participate. A command receiver ,  
which has  been added to provide for the automatic checkout, remains active 
during the ent i re  quiescent phase. It is used pr imar i ly  to activate the 
assembl ies  required for the checkout. 
(CRA) is completely compatible with the up-data link (UDL)  (Section 4. 1. 7) 
operating with a similar command format ,  
the CRA, the UDL assumes  control of the checkout sequences, activating 
and deactivating t ransducers  and assemblies  upon command f rom MSFN. 
After completion of the checkout, all conditioning, encoding, and transmitting, 
assemblies  are deactivated, and only the CRA remains active. 
The command receiver  assembly 
After activation of the UDL by 
A CRA was selected in  l ieu of a t imer  and sequencer assembly because 
it provides m o r e  flexibility to MSFN. 
MSFN has the capability of extending a checkout or  changing the frequency or 
interval  between checkouts - a very  important consideration in the event 
an impending malfunction i s  detected. 
By including a CRA on the vehicle, 
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The signal-conditioning assemblies  a r e  to  be modified s o  that only one 
assembly requi res  ac t iva t iw  during checkout. 
blies associated with the pa rame te r s  monitored during the checkout will be 
located in  one assembly. 
PCM (1. 6 kbps) will be adequate for  these checkouts. By using the low ra te  
and the erectable  S-band antenna, the S-band power amplif iers  will not have 
to reposition the erectable antenna every few days to ensure communication 
lockup. 
The conditioning subassem-  
Table 4-28 demonstrates  that the low-bit-rate 
Table 4 28. PCM Low-Bit Rate 
S apacity 
LM taxi utilization 
Identification synchronization and t ime 
Calibration and oscillation fai lure  detection 
Redundancy 
Quie scent s torage monitoring 
Total  
Available for  growth 
Analog 
Signals 
154 
4 
37 
93 
134 
20 
Disc re te  
Signals 
368 
72 
1 
120 
5 
198 
170 
Total 
Bits 
1600 
72 
33 
416 
749 
1270 
3 3 0  
Data Rate: 1 .6  kbps 
Code: Phase  - shift keyed 
A / D  Conversion: 8 bits 
Resolution: 0.40 percent 
Direct  cabling between LM and the shel ter  may be considered rather  
than an R F  link for increased reliability. (The cabling would presumably be 
included a s  pa r t  of the shel ter  payload equipment landed on the moon pr ior  
to the LM landing. ) Pre l iminary  study indicates that the VHF link should be 
utilized ra ther  than the cabling provisions,  a s  it eliminates the space and 
weight penalty of 1,000 feet  of cable for the shelter payload. If however, 
other considerations and a detailed reliability analysis keep the cabling 
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al ternate  in  contention, the RCA concept described in Reference 4-35 
should be considered. The approach utilizes one coaxial cable between 
te rmina ls ,  and the data is t ransfer red  via subca r r i e r s  in an  frequency- 
division modulator, time-division modulator, o r  Combination system. 
Command Module Remote Control, A remote-control command/data 
link with the CM has  been included in the LM ELOR configuration to provide - 
1. Control of the operational mode of the CSM while in the quiescent 
state (may not be required). 
2. Changes i n  attitude-control mode for  final rendezvous and docking. 
3. Initiating the quiescent-state control mode af ter  LM departure. 
Implementation of the command/data link requires  the addition of a 
command generator and processor ,  a data processor ,  and a display console 
i n  the LM and the addition of a receiver /UDL interface assembly and 
command distribution assembly in the CM. 
generated commands, i t  is anticipated that the LM/CM command/data link 
will not use  the S-band te lemetry link. 
recommended mode, a schematic diagram of the configuration is shown in 
F igure  4-39 .  
To avoid conflict with ground 
The VHF t ransce ivers  a r e  the 
An al ternate  approach would be to employ a UHF command data link. 
This configuration would requi re  the addition of a UHF transceiver  on the 
LM taxi and the CM, replacement of the in-flight VHF antenna with com- 
bination VHF/UHF antennas o r  addition of simple UHF antennas, and modi- 
fication of the CM UDL to accept commands f rom the UHF receiver.  In any 
of these configurations, i t  is anticipated that the UDL in  its present format  
will be retained because of i t s  low probability of accepting a wrong command. 
Commands a r e  t ransmit ted to the CM on the VHF baseband utilizing a 
command format  identical  to that presently used on the LM. 
is a two-tone composite modulating signal; command information is con- 
tained on a 2-kJ3z tone and timing and synchronization is provided by a 
1-kHz tone. 
This format  
CM status data will  be t ransmit ted to  the LM taxi on the VHF link 
Since the LM VHF transmit ter  has  
All the displays and controls 
using the low-bit-rate PCM format. 
the capability of transmitt ing low-bit-rate PCM data, the CM may require  
modification to include a LM transmit ter ,  
required for s ta tus  monitoring and docking of the CM must  be added to the 
LM display console, 
i n  the display console into a format  suitable for transmission. 
The command processor  converts commands generated 
Signal 
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conditioning subassemblies,  analog-to-digital converters ,  and command 
addres s  and word generators  convert  display panel switch c losures  into 
voltage pulses,  convert  analog input signals to the c o r r e c t  voltage range, 
and provide for  ground isolation between assemblies .  The analog multi-  
plexer converts analog input signals into 8-bit digital words. 
generator  supplies vehicle and subsystem addresses  and converts  the input 
signals into the proper  sequence of one and ze ro  sub-bits for use  by the 
UDL. 
and out-of-phase 2-kHz waveform. The programmer  provides timing 
pulses to sequence the commands through the assembly. 
delay i n  the t ransmiss ion  of a command, the programmer init iates its 
sequences upon receipt of a command. 
The command 
The oscil lator generates the 1-kHz reference tone and an in-phase 
To preclude any 
The PCM data processor  converts the 1.6-kbps PSK data t ra in  into 
d iscre te  and analog signals. 
those pa rame te r s  selected for display. 
(D /A) reconsti tutes the analog signals,  while the signal conditioner provides 
for ground isolation and impedance matching. 
The decommutator culls bits  constituting 
The digital-to-analog converter 
The VHF/UDL interface assembly, located on the CM, shapes the 
composite modulated signal received by the VHF receiver  into a format  
compatible with the encoder section of the UDL. 
the incoming signal and provides for  ground isolation and impedance 
matching. 
The assembly amplifies 
This configuration is adequate for  the LM mission if  the LM-CM 
command/data link is l imited to attitude control commands and a limited 
monitor of CM subsystems, 
the link, such as providing for control and monitor of all subsystems and 
the ability to command and guide the CM to a lower orbit ,  would require  
redesign of many areas of the system, 
Any significant expansion of the capability of 
Specifically, i f  complete monitoring of the CM by the LM is desired,  
the high bit  r a t e  (51. 2 kbps) will be required. This approach will eliminate 
the possibility of using the V H F  t r ansmi t t e r s ,  since these assemblies  cannot 
handle the high bit rate. 
t r ansmi t t e r s ,  modified to pe rmi t  simultaneous t ransmission of commands 
to the CM and voice and data to MSFN o r  develop new wide-band UHF 
t ransmi t te rs  and receivers .  
The link would then have to use the S-band 
Subsystem performance f igures  and duty-cycle es t imates  a r e  presented 
in  Appendix U. 
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In surnmary, the LM-VHF equipment would be  used as follows: 
1. During in-flight phases - 
a. Simultaneous t ransmission of commands /ranging (VHFA) and 
reception (VHFB) of CSM status / ranging. 
communications of two types of information each way would be 
accomplished by the same  technique used for  simultaneous 
voice/ranging for  the basic Apollo mission. ) 
(Simultaneous 
~ 
b. Transmiss ion  (VHF B )  of PCM split-phase data to the CSM 
pe r  operation in  a basic Apollo mission. 
would have to be t ime-shared,  however, with the command/ 
ranging transmission. ) 
(This t ransmission 
2. During lunar-stay phases - 
a. Transmiss ion  of commands to the CSM and CSM status  
reception during the quiescent preparat ion and depart  
preparat ion phases. 
b. Relay t ransmission (VHF A) of voice (received via S-band 
f r o m  MSFN) to the astronauts  while they a r e  proceeding to 
o r  f r o m  the she l te r ,  and reception (VHF B) of voice and EMU 
(extravehicular mobility unit) data f r o m  the astronauts  for  
re lay via S-band to MSFN. 
fl ict  with the foregoing as they occur a t  different times. ) 
(This requirement  does not con- 
c. Per iodic  t ransmission (VHF A) of LM status data to the shelter 
o r  an  a l a r m  whenever c r i t i ca l  parameter  l imits  a r e  exceeded. 
(Remote control could be provided, by use  of a VHF B link 
she l te r /LM and a demodulator/decoder that could interface 
with the UDL. ) 
The 5-watt average output level for  the VHF t ransmi t te r  i s  far in 
excess  of the power level required for narrow-band data  communications 
to the she l te r ,  which is expected to be no m o r e  than 1,000 feet  f rom the LM, 
The companion VHF t ransce ivers  would be required i n  the shelter 
for  communication with the astronauts  (using EVCS) during lunar sur face  
exploration periods; therefore,  the VHF link LM/shel ter  does not impose 
an  additional equipment requirement  upon the shelter. 
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Systems Analysis 
The c r i te r ion  used for  determining redundancy, failure detection, 
and spa res  provisions for  the LM CSS proposed herein was that the probability 
of survival of the communications capability for the ELOR mission should 
be a t  l eas t  equal to that provided for the basic  Apollo mission, 
Since the operation of the communications subsystems is essentially 
identical during in-flight periods for  the two missions,  the reliability and 
maintainability analyses  focused on the operational differences brought 
about by the extended lunar stay period, which affects the probability of 
abort  (Pa) and P90. 
The Apollo DRM called for nearly continuous LM communication for 
the 35-hour stay on the lunar surface. 
mission will require  these same sys tems to operate  for only a few hours  
while manned. Were i t  not for the requirement to a s s e s s  LM status,  the 
reliability and, therefore ,  P 9 0  would be much higher for ELOR than for the 
Apollo mission; therefore  i t  i s  obvious thatPgO is  limited by the sys tems 
involved in quiescent-state monitoring. Since the sys tem does not affect 
c rew safety, it will  have negligible effect on P,. 
By way of contrast ,  the ELOR 
Table 4-29 identifies possible losses  of capability that could be 
c r i t i ca l  (i. e . ,  causing mission abort  o r  otherwise hazardous) o r  cause 
reduction in mission effectiveness, 
efforts should be such as to prevent such situations by ear ly  detection and 
replacement with a spa re  or  to minimize their  consequences, 
a lso identifies the fai lures  that mus t  be detected (1) immediately; ( 2 )  within 
some period, such a s  a week; o r  (3)  before the end of lunar stay to permi t  
repair  p r io r  to departure ,  In addition, the maintenance t ime constraints 
a r e  given to a s s i s t  i n  the identification of maintenance and rep,air procedures ,  
sensors ,  alarms, etc. ,  needed during lunar stay. 
Lunar -s tay maintenance and repa i r  
The table 
Fa i lure  probabilities are summarized i n  Appendix V for the individual 
subsystem components, electronic r ack  assembl ies ,  and complete LM 
communications subsystem for  both the basic Apollo and ELOR missions. 
Included on the three  different concepts, corresponding to the A, B, and C 
al ternates  for  operation of the CSS during the quiescent phase described 
previously, a summary  of the resu l t s  is presented in Table 4-30. F r o m  
these data, Alternative B seems to be the most  appropriate because i t  
requi res  only two potential maintenance actions and provides the highest 
probability of no abor t  and (P90 = 0.998) for the leas t  weight on the lunar 
surface.  
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A It e r nat ive s 
A 
B 
C 
a 
AT Reliability Spares  P 
0.0171 0.98 3 0.998 
0. 0137 0.99 2 0,998 
0.0147 0.98 2 0.997 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Based on fai lure  probability analysis,  s p a r e s  recommended for the 
ELOR mission, Alternates A, B,  and C a r e  as follows: 
Alternate A: EVC-1, EVC-2, SPA 
Alternate B: EVC-1, EVC-2 (the recommended concept) 
Alternate C: EVC-1, EVC-2 
A space s torage moni tor /a la rm and programmer  unit (SMAP) may also 
be required because of its c r i t i ca l  function of monitoring LM status. 
failure must  be detected quickly and cor rec ted  s o  that LM status monitoring 
can be restored,  
I ts  
The VHF ERA command message  generator and DRG appear to be 
reliable and dormant  during lunar stay; therefore ,  they need not be spared. 
S-band capability is essential ,  but the existing redundancy appears  
adequate for the ELOR mission. 
Packaging of shel ter  CSS units should be identical with that of the LM 
CSS units whenever possible so they can s e r v e  a s  spa res  for the LM i f .  
needed at the t ime of departure.  
Fu r the r  reliability and maintainability studies a r e  recommended to 
consider detailed overal l  mission and CSM. LM, shel ter  operations in  m o r e  
detail; to define the needed maintenance support equipment, procedure,  
s enso r s  alarms; and to establish the validity of, o r  necessary modifications 
to, the assumptions and ground ru les  used in  the analyses, In par t icular ,  
the fa i lure-rate  es t imates  must  be confirmed on the bas i s  of tes t  data 
derived under similar o r  actual conditions conducted for  a s imi la r  period, 
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Most of the components of the proposed LM communications subsystem 
a r e  e i ther  space-qualified or  in  the process  of being space-qualified, as in 
the c a s e  of the DRG. Exceptions a r e  new units, which include: 
1. Command message  generator 
2. CSM, status  monitor 
3. Storage monitor /alarm and p rogrammer  unit 
4.3. 7 Ascent Propulsion System 
System Analysis 
The addition of a third crewman to the vehicle requi res  ascent  
propulsion augmentation to maintain existing Apollo re turn  payload and 
rendezvous orbit  requirements.  
can be s tored  in  modified tanks which will extend the ascent engine burn-  
t ime f rom 460 to 510 seconds. 
the engine to mee t  the extended burn-time indicates that i t  can do s o  without 
modification. 
t imes well in  excess  of the expected 510-second ELOR burn-time. 
Up to 750 pounds of additional propellant 
Pre l iminary  investigation of the ability of 
Severa l  LM development ascent  engines have had total  burn-  
The increased  pressurant  for the l a rge r  ascent  tanks, i f  required, 
could be  provided by adding one RCS He tank to each ascent He pressurant  
leg. 
The ascent  pressurizat ion section is protected f rom propellant vapors 
by squib-actuated valves located just  downstream of the helium check valves. 
These valves protect  all pressurizat ion components until the ascent engine 
is fired. 
liquids, o r  react ion products) is not expected to exer t  a deleterious effect  on 
the engine o r  its life. 
After ignition, exposure of these components to propellants (vapors,  
A recommended approach for increasing the capacity of the ascent  
A 
propellant tanks i s  to convert the 49. 5-inch, diameter  hemispherical  heads 
into ellipsoidal shaped heads with a minimum-weight 1.414 a / b  ratio. 
cylindrical  seqment,  49. 5 inches in  diameter  by 14. 5 inches long, can  be 
inser ted  between the heads to maintain existing tank pickup locations. 
tanks (fuel and oxidizer) a r e  capable of carryingup to 750 pounds of ex t r a  
propellant, all of which may not be required for  ELOR. 
this approach is  that no major  vehicle s t ruc tura l  reconfiguration is required. 
These 
The advantage of 
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The use  of large-diameter  tanks i s  considered impract ical ,  since the 
present  oxidizer tank is within 3/4 inch of existing s t ruc ture ,  and any 
increase  i n  the diameter  of the tank requires  relocating i t  outboard to c lear  
this structure.  To maintain vehicle m a s s  balance, a shift in  the oxidizer 
tank dictates a corresponding shift of the fuel tank. The  resulting growth 
and outboard shift of the tanks would require  significant s t ruc tura l  
modifications. 
The ascent  engine would be enclosed with one layer  of mylar  (0. 2 mil 
This covering would thick) to minimize cabin heat leak through the engine. 
be either removed pr ior  to ascent  or  vaporized upon engine ignition. The 
propellants,  components, and engine would be maintained at their  normal  
LM tempera tures  through general  spacecraf t  thermal  control. 
Sys tem Reliability and Qualification Status 
The proposed inc rease  in  engine burn-time is less than 10 percent. 
This increase  and other changes a r e  not expected to impose any significant 
detrimental  effects on the sys t em contribution to Ps, which should be in 
excess  of 0. 995 without any f o r m  of maintenance. (Reference 4-31) 
Some components such as the p re s su re  relief valves,  engine valves,  
sensors ,  and plumbing, are exposed to propellants at a l l  t imes;  consequently, 
the increase  in mission exposure t ime will require  requalification to extend 
the a s su red  exposure life limits. 
4. 3. 8 Structure  and Crew Systems 
Micrometeoroid and Thermal  Shields 
The LM ascent  stage has  an  outer aluminum alloy shield with a mini- 
mum thickness of 4 mils for  micrometeoroid protection. 
a l so  used as the outer thermal  shield and operates  in  conjunction with a 
multiple radiation-foil insulation blanket. 
of 1 1/2-mil aluminized mylar  with two external  l aye r s  of aluminized H-film, 
one on each side, for handling purposes. 
micrometeoroid shielding is supported f rom the base s t ruc ture  by a s e r i e s  
of f iberglass  standoffs as shown i n  Figure 4-40. 
of aluminized mylar  thermal  shielding and thickening of the existing 4-mil 
outer thermal/micrometeoroid shield is desirable  to reduce the probability 
of a meteroid function to below the Apollo c r i t e r i a  and to decrease  the heat 
loss  through the thermal shield and, thereby, the electr ical  power requi re -  
ments. These  modifications have ve ry  minor impact on cost  and schedule. 
This shield is 
The blanket consis ts  of 25 layers  
This assembly of thermal/  
Addition of ex t ra  layers  
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Radiator Support 
Active thermal  control for  the daytime periods of the 90-day s torage 
phase is accomplished by the addition of a 20-square-foot horizontal radiator  
(Figure 3-4). 
replaces  the existing outer micrometeoroid shield. 
provide micrometeoroid protection as well a s  thermal  control. 
contamination-protection sheet installed on the radiator must  be removed 
pr ior  to activation of the radiator.  A 32-inch-diameter hole in  the center  
of the radiator  permi ts  the docking tunnel s t ruc ture  to protrude above the 
radiator level. 
tunnel s t ruc ture  and the upper ascent  stage beams,  
effect on the s t ruc tura l  reliability. 
This radiator  is located at  the top of the ascent  stage and 
The radiator would 
A 
A rigid support for the radiator is provided by the docking 
This support has  no 
Cabin Seals  
The existing LM rivet ,  window, and hatch sea ls  a r e  capable of withstanding 
temperature  variations grea te r  than 0 to 200 F; and since the cabin tempera-  
t u re  m u s t  be held between 40 and 100 F f o r  other components (40 F for  water 
and 100 F for  ba t te r ies ) ,  the cabin sea ls  a r e  not considered to be a problem 
a r e a  even for the extended exposure time. Reliability i s  also unaffected. 
Crew Provis ions 
Figure 3 - 5  is an  inboard profile of the three-man augmented LM and 
shows the position of the third crewman. Structural  changes for the new 
crew station include the addition of a seat on the ascent  engine cover,  side 
cabin s t ruc ture  supports for  res t ra in t  system tiedowns, and a protective 
cushion in  the a r e a  of the upper docking tunnel. 
also provided for  stowing an  additional PLSS back-pack i n  the forward 
cabin a rea ,  
by the presence of the third crewman. 
expected to be such that the additional weight will have no measurable effect 
on the assessment  of Ps for  the ELOR mission. 
New support s t ructure  is 
Again, no degradation in s t ruc tura l  reliability will be created 
The s t ruc tura l  design margins  a r e  
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A E P  
LM-ECS 
ARS 
HTS 
WMS 
PLSS 
oss 
ASA 
LM-G&N 
IGA 
MGA 
OGA 
CGC 
RR 
LR 
CES 
AGS 
LM-SCS 
LM-RCS 
LM-CSS 
LOS 
PRN 
EMU 
RTTA 
R / T  
EVCS 
EVC 
DRG 
D/A 
A/D 
SPA 
CRA 
SMAP 
APS 
4.3 THE LUNAR MODULE ASCENT STAGE SYSTEMS 
I LIST O F  ABBREVIATIONS 
Ascent Electrical  Power 
Environmental Control System 
Atmosphere Revitalization Section 
Heat Tr'ansport Section 
W a t e r  dtanagement Section 
Portablk Life Support System 
Oxygen Supply Section 
Abort Sensor Assembly 
Guidance and Navigation System 
Inner Gimbal Angle 
Middle birnbal Angle 
Outer G'rnbal Angle 
Comma d Guidance Computer 
Rendez d ous Radar 
Landing Radar  
Stability Control System 
Control Electronics Section 
Abort Guidance Section 
Reaction Control System 
Commupcations and Status Systems 
Pseudo Line O f r g h t  andom N o i s e  
Extravehicular Mobility Unit  
Ranging Tone Transfer Assembly 
Receiver and Transmit ter  
Extravehicular Communications System 
Extravehicular Communications 
Digital t anging  Generator 
Digital 40 Analog 
Analog ti0 Digital 
Signal P rocesso r  Assembly 
Command Receiver Assembly 
Storage \Monitor /A la rm and P r o g r a m m e r  
A scent Propulsion Sy s tern 
I 
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4 . 4  LUNAR MODULE DESCENT STAGE SYSTEMS':' 
NOTE: Some of the information used here in  was provided 
by Grumman Aircraf t  Engineering Corporation 
through References 3 . 3  and 4. 37. 
This section i s  an analysis of the lunar module descent stage (LM DS) 
The aspects  associated 
sys tems a s  they a r e  affected by the extended mission requirements.  
a r e  presented only where changes were  projected. 
with sys tems integration a r e  presented in Section 3. 5. 
Details 
4.4. 1 Quiescent Elec t r ica l  Power 
NOTE: Much of the information used here in  was provided 
by contributing subcontractors:  
1. General Elec t r ic  Co. through Reference 4 . 1 8  
2.  P r a t t  and Whitney through Reference 4 .16  
3 .  Allis-Chalmers  through References 4 .17  and 4 .36 .  
Requirements 
The LM electr ical  power requirements f rom ear th  launch to pre-ascent  
preparat ion are supplied by the descent stage section of the EPS, and the 
lunar  -ascent power requirements  a r e  supplied by the ascent  stage section. 
Thus,  the modifications to the standard LM EPS configuration required #to 
implement a three-man 90-day LM, for the most  par t ,  affect the descent 
stage EPS. The electr ical  power required by the ascent  stage for ascent 
f r o m  the lunar surface,  rendezvous, and docking a r e  provided by bat ter ies  
and is discussed in Section 4. 3. 1. 
The electr ical  energy requirements  for the descent stage power supply 
a r e  given in Table 4-31. 
descent,  and pre-ascent  preparat ion a r e  supplied by the descent bat ter ies .  
A minimum of three descent bat ter ies  a r e  ca r r i ed  to supply the peak power 
requi red  to  support the lunar descent phase. The electr ical  power require-  
ments for the quiescent phase a r e  given in Table 4-32. F o r  purposes 
of this analysis,  the w o r s t  c a s e  for this phase is assumed to cover 
th ree  lunar days (42 ea r th  days),  three lunar nights (42 e a r t h  days),  and s ix  
additional ea r th  days of lunar nights, totaling 90 ear th  days, The electr ical  
energy requirement for the 90-day quiescent phase is approximately 336 kw-hr. 
I 
The 12.8 kw-hr required for  the ear th  launch, lunar 
*A foldout sheet listing abbreviations used in Section 4.4 and their meanings is located a t  page 275. 
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Table 4-31. Electr ical  Energy Requirements,  
Descent Stage, LM 
Mission Phase 
Energy 
(Kilowatt-Hours) 
Ea r th  launch to transposit ion I 
Lunar  descent and checkout 
Lunar quiescent s torage 
P r e  -ascent  preparation 
RTG o r  solar  cell  a r r a y  setup 
Sub total 
(Excluding quiescent s torage)  
Total 
0. 68 
8. 34 
2.00 
336.24 
1. 80 
12. 82 
349. 06 
The average power required i s  expected to be  between 75 and 114 watts depend- 
ing on whether o r  not some or  a l l  of the projected hea ters  a r e  actually 
required.  
The weight of an EPS configuration composed entirely of descent 
bat ter ies  to  provide this energy is  approximately 4580 pounds. 
sys t em weight is prohibitively high, the following alternative configurations 
we r e  considered: 
Since such a 
1. Radioisotope thermoelectr ic  generator (RTG)(SNAP-27) and 
descent bat ter ies  
2. Solar ce l l  a r r a y  and descent bat ter ies  
3 .  Fuel  ce l l ( s )  and descent bat ter ies  
Since ba t te r ies  will satisfy the LM descent stage requirements for  all 
phases  except quiescence,  the remainder  of this analysis is devoted t o  the 
quiescent lower function, which contributes to mission probability of abort ,  
Pa, not safety Ps. 
System Alternatives 
The RTG Configuration. The RTG configuration consists of one SNAP-27 
RTG plus eight LM descent bat ter ies  modified t o  provide 90-day wet-life 
operation and a l imited number of recharge  cycles.  As shown in Table 4-32, 
the average power for the RTG configuration is substantially lower during the 
lunar night than that fo r  the solar  a r r a y  and fuel-cell configurations, because 
the R T G  waste heat  ( see  Section 4.3.2) provides the 500-Btu/hr (148-watt) 
cabin-heat requirement ,  In the so la r  a r r a y  and fuel cell  configurations, this 
heat  m u s t  be provided by electr ical  hea te rs .  
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. 
Components 
RTG 
Descent bat ter ies  
Power control unit 
Total 
Figure 4-41 shows the electr ical  power profile for a typical 28-day 
l ight-dark lunar cycle during the quiescent phase. 
ment  is above the output power level of the RTG, the bat ter ies  supply the 
difference in power; and when the power requirement  is below the output 
power level of the RTG, the bat ter ies  a r e  recharged by the RTG. 
shows the total s tored  energy requirement  a s  a function of RTG output power 
levels f r o m  65 watts to 90 watts. 
When the power requi re -  
Figure4-42 
Weight Weight 
Number (Pounds ) Number (Pounds ) 
1 65 2 130 
8 1, 264 3 524 
1 30 1 30 
10 1 ,359  9 684 
The output power of a standard SNAP-27 RTG i s  67 to 71 watts. F r o m  
Figure 4-42, a 67-watt RTG requi res  seven descent bat ter ies  to supply the 
required peaking power. 
Another alternative is to use two SNAP-27's,  which m a y  reduce the required 
weight on the moon by m o r e  than 500 pounds. 
RTG configurations are  given in Table 4-33. 
Another bat tery has been added for redundancy. 
The weight of the alternate 
Table 4-33. Alternate RTG LM EPS Weight Est imates  
The SNAP-27 Radioisotope Thermoelectr ic  Generator (RTG) (Fig-  
ure  4-43) was developed for  the Apollo lunar-surface experiment package 
(ALSEP). Each generator output over the 90-day mission will be 70 watts, 
with a growth potential to over 100 watts. Actual tes t s  have demonstrated 
stable operation in a simulated lunar environment for periods greater  than 
one yea r ,  and the predicted reliabil i ty for the 90-day mission i s  in excess  of 
0. 9999 ( see  Appendix N) .  The heat-rejection temperature  of 490 F permits  
simple integration with thermal-energy distribution sys tems within the LM. 
The sys t em i s  light and compact and has  been qualified f o r  the Apollo mission 
e nvi r onme nt s . 
Regarding the operational concept, two approaches can be used t o  adapt 
the cur ren t  SNAP-27 sys tem to the ELOR mission. 
be t ransported to the lunar surface in a separate  container in the manner 
planned for the ALSEP mission,  o r  the generator could be fueled before 
launch. 
the radioisotope fuel capsule to a s s u r e  fuel containment in the event of a power 
The fuel capsule could 
In this configuration, r een t ry  protection must  be located directly on 
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sys tem reentry.  The flexibility of the SNAP-27 RTG sys tem permits  use of 
severa l  integral  fuel capsule/reentry sys tem combinations. Adequate space 
is available within the dimensions of the present ,  proven thermopile; there-  
fore ,  no thermopile design changes and requalification a r e  required to adapt 
the SNAP-27 RTG sys t em for this approach. 
The fueled launch approach eliminates the astronaut operations asso-  
ciated with generator fueling and effects a weight savings associated with the 
ground launch graphite fuel cask and i ts  support s t ruc ture  (approximately 
15 to 20 pounds). 
control problem with respec t  to both the generator and the LM during the 
t rans i t  phase. In par t icu lar ,  during the ascent  and ear th-orbi ta l  portions 
of the mission,  when the LM is inclosed by the SLA, the high effective sink 
tempera tures  will requi re  special  precautions to prevent overheating of the 
thermopile and consequent damage to the elements. These precautions 
could include modification of the fin sys tem to increase  the heat-rejection 
capability and/or  shorting the generator to increase the Pe l t ie r  cooling and, 
hence, lower the hot-junction temperature .  
Offsetting these advantages i s  the more  difficult thermal  
While this approach could be adopted without significant changes in the 
generator ,  the fuel capsule assembly would require  redesign and requalifica- 
tion to incorporate and verify the reentry protection system. Thermal  balance 
calculations involving the t rans i t  phase would require  updating, and the gen- 
e ra tor  qualification p rogram would require  repeating to  verify the fueled 
hot-launch capability of the SNAP- 27 s t ructure .  
The cur ren t  separate-  shipment concept eliminates the need for  any 
changes, since all qualified equipment in the cu r ren t  sys t em i s  applicable. 
The ground-launch graphite fuel cask mounting location and arrangement  i s  
retained so LM conditions a r e  unchanged. 
a r e  required to fuel the generator is not considered detrimental ,  particularly,  
in view of the fact  that such operations will have been previously performed 
a s  pa r t  of the ALSEP program.  F o r  the ELOR mission,  therefore ,  the cur-  
rent  separately launched concept i s  recommended. 
The fact that astronaut operations 
The unfueled generator could be placed in severa l  positions for t rans-  
port;  however, it is believed that minimum perturbation to the cur ren t  LM 
design will resu l t  f rom placing it in the scientific equipment bay. 
location has  been assumed in the thermal  and mechanical integration studies. ) 
If required,  generator deployment can be accomplished by the astronaut after 
a r r iva l  on the lunar  surface.  
(This 
A s  a final operational point, the generator will continue to deliver 
power long af ter  the 90-day mission, and some consideration might be given 
for uses  of this power; for  example, storage power for the shelter to allow 
la te r  use o r  power for  an ALSEP-type package deployed by the astronauts 
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pr ior  to departure .  These possibilities a r e  enhanced by the removable-fuel- 
capsule feature ,  At the completion of the stay-period, the fuel capsule 
assembly  could be removed f rom the generator ,  permitting the la t ter  to cool 
down. 
ported to another location, connected to the new load, and refueled. As 
mentioned ea r l i e r ,  such a cycle wlll not affect the performance of the 
generator.  
The generator  could then be readily disconnected f r o m  the LM, t r ans -  
In i t s  Apollo LM configuration, the SNAP-27 generator is mounted with 
an  unobstructed view of space,  except for the base ,  which i s  blocked by the 
lunar surface,  This configuration could also be used for the ELOR mission 
by removing the generator  f r o m  the scientific equipment bay and placing it 
some distance away. 
waste heat  during lunar  night, since close proximity between the generator 
and the LM is required.  Thus, thermal  integration of the unit mus t  consider 
the result ing radiator  blockage by the spacecraf t  and the heat receiver .  The 
effect of such blockage will be either to r a i se  the unit operating temperature  
o r  to requi re  modification of the radiator to increase i ts  heat rejection cap- 
ability. Since the fo rmer  would increase  the thermoelectr ic  element degra-  
dation ra te ,  the l a t t e r  represents  the desired approach, although a balanced 
design will probably requi re  both. 
This approach, however, would preclude the use of 
Ei ther  conduction or  radiation m a y  be used to couple the generator to 
the thermal  energy rece iver  (boiler) .  
in F igure  4-44. Advantages and disadvantages of each a r e  presented and 
analyzed in Appendix X under "Heat Transfer  Techniques. " Methods for  
assembly of the generator  and mounting i t  to LM s t ruc ture  a r e  a l so  presented 
in  the referenced appendix and i l lustrated a t  the vehicle level in F igure  3-4. 
Potential configurations a r e  i l lustrated 
An important aspect  associated with integration of an isotope EPS into 
a manual sys tem is the expected radiation level, 
plutonium 238, and the measured  t issue dose rates a r e  expected to be 
acceptable for both LM and CSM, not exceeding: 
The fuel to be used is 
Neutrons 70 m r e m / h r  
Gamma 2 mr/hr ( l -day  aging t ime) 
These data were  taken a t  one-meter separation without special  shielding 
in addition to the inherent shielding affects of the fuel capsule and the 
generator.  
Solar Cell A r r a y  Configuration. The solar  a r r a y  configuration would 
consist  of a so la r  a r r a y  plus eight LM descent bat ter ies ,  again modified to 
provide 90-day wet-life operation and a l imited number of recharge cycles. 
During the lunar day, the solar  a r r a y  supplies the electr ical  power requi re -  
ments  of the vehicle and recharges  the bat ter ies .  During the lunar night, the 
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bat ter ies  supply the full e lectr ical  power requirements  and a l l  heat energy. 
The energy required during the lunar night is 230 watts for 336 hours ,  o r  
approximately 77 kw-hr.  Seven descent bat ter ies  a r e  required to provide 
this energy; another bat tery should be added for redundancy., 
The solar  a r r a y  mus t  be capable of supplying the daylight load of 
70 watts average plus recharging the bat ter ies .  Assuming a bat tery charging 
efficiency of 75 percent,  the solar  a r r a y  output must  be 377 watts;  moreover ,  
the 377 watts m u s t  be available immediately a t  the beginning of, and through- 
out the entire,  lunar  day. 
A fixed so lar  a r r a y  mounted flat on the lunar surface has  an output 
power charac te r i s t ic  which var ies  essentially a s  the cosine of the solar angle 
of incidence. 
solar  a r r a y  mus t  either be continuously oriented normal  to the sun o r  have a 
m o r e  complex geometr ical  shape, 
To provide the flat output power character is t ic  required,  the 
The so la r - a r r ay  a r e a  required for an  oriented a r r a y  i s  70 square feet. 
The solar  array area required for  a fixed a r r a y  depends on the geometrical  
shape used. F igure  4-45 shows a representative geometrical  shape and the 
relative output power charac te r i s t ic  a s  a function of the sun angle during the 
lunar day. The design consis ts  of two flat solar  a r r a y s  mounted in the shape 
of an A f r ame  with a 60-degree included angle. 
the two sides of the f r a m e  are  normal  to the east-west  path of the sun ac ross  
the moon. 
The a r r a y  is  deployed s o  that 
The a r e a  required to provide 377 watts is 161 square feet. 
The fixed a r r a y  was selected in preference to the oriented a r r a y  for 
reasons  of reliability. 
is 214 pounds. 
At 1. 33 lb / sq  ft,  the total  weight of the solar a r r a y  
The weight of the total solar a r r a y  configuration is- 
1 solar  cell  a r r a y  
8 descent bat ter ies  1 ,264  
1 power control unit 30 
214 lb 
Total  1, 508 lb 
The Fuel-Cel l  Concept. The fuel cell  concept can be satisfied by either 
the P r a t t  & Whitney PC 10 o r  the Allis-Chalmers orbital  fuel cell  developed 
for the Air Fo rce  and reported in Reference 4-36. 
The fuel-cell  configuration would probably consist  of three 200-watt 
fuel cel ls  plus two AAP CGSS (cryogenic gas storage system) tanks for the 
reactants .  In addition, th ree  descent batteries would be required to supply 
the power during the lunar descent phase. As a resu l t  of the boil-off char -  
ac te r i s t ics  of the AAP CGSS tanks, i t  is necessary  to s tore  665 pounds of 0 2  
and 47 pounds of H2 at the beginning of the mission to supply the required 
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Function 
3 fuel cel ls  
2 CGSS tanks 
H2 
0 2  
Coolant loop 
Totals 
reactants .  
genic tanks. 
H2 tank was completely unsuitable for  the mission requirement,  since al l  of 
the H2 would boil off after approximately 30 days. 
Some consideration was given to the use of the Block-I1 CSM cryo-  
It was found that the 0 2  tank was bare ly  suitable and that the 
Upper Boundary Lower Boundary 
Weigh t  Weight 
(Pounds) (Pounds ) 
90 140 
56 0 80 
66 5 120 
47 60 
56 20  
1 ,418 42 0 
The proposed P & W  fuel-cell  concept i s  presented in Appendix 0. The 
proposed Allis-Chalmers concept is presented in Appendix P. 
The weight of the fuel-cell  configuration as it impacts the LM is  directly 
dependent on the anticipated load profile. 
profiles projected in  Reference 1-2  and those estimated by the SD team, a 
specific weight is impract ical  a t  this t ime. 
Table 4-34 are considered the upper and lower boundaries of the actual 
weights. 
Because of the differences in the 
However, those projected in 
Table 4-34. Weight Es t imates  for the Fuel-Cell  System 
To these weights m u s t  be added that of the bat ter ies  required for descent 
operations,  unless the F C ' s  a r e  used in  flight. 
about 474 pounds, the total FC EPS weight is probably between 894 and 
1, 892 pounds. 
Since three bat ter ies  weigh 
Conclusions and Recomrnenda tions 
An analysis of the potential LM EPS configuration and the associated 
unknowns a s  reflected in Table 4-35, leaves l i t t le doubt as to the most  desirable 
EPS for the LM quiescentphase power, 
growth capability with respec t  to cabin heat requirements ,  whereas  the solar  
a r r a y  and fuel cells  have no growth margins  at all and are very  sensitive to e r r o r s  
in estimating load profile. 
tage in that the sys t em weight is strongly dependent on both the cabin heat 
The RTG is the lightest and has high 
The fuel- cell  configuration has  a further disadvan- 
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leak  and the cryogenic tank boiloff ra tes .  
the sys tem weight must  be increased to compensate for  the change. 
the reliability (P90 and Pa) of the fuel-cell  concept a r e  leas t  desirable  of all 
and perhaps marginal.  
promise safe re turn ,  but will necessitate ear ly  abort ,  
If ei ther of these factors  i nc reases ,  
Fu r the r ,  
In any event, failure of this sys tem will not com- 
Table 4-35. Alternative LM Quiescent Electr ical  Power Tradeoff Data 
System Concept 
1. Fuel  cel ls  
2. RTG* 
3. Solar ce l l s  
4. Bat ter ies  (all)  
Weight Range 
(Pounds ) 
400 to 1, 900 
700  to 1,300 
1, 000 to 1,  500 
about 4,600 
(::)Recommended concept 
Reliability P 9 0  
and Pa 
= o .  995 
>o.  9999 
3-0.9999 
s o .  9999 
Error  
S e ns i ti vi ty 
Very high 
Very low 
High 
Very high 
Based on the foregoing data, i t  is recommended that the RTG concept, 
in the fo rm of a SNAP-27 modified to provide ascent  stage heating, be used 
for  the LM descent stage EPS and that studies be initiated to complete the 
modifications and integration into the LM. 
tenance o r  r epa i r  to achieve the projected P,; however, if i t  i s  desired o r  
required,  some maintenance can be accomplished, even in i ts  present form. 
This sys tem will require no main-  
4. 4 .2  Descent Propulsion System 
System Description 
The descent propulsion sys tem consists of a single thrust  chamber,  
two fuel tanks, and two oxidizer tanks with the associated propellant p re s -  
sur izat ion and feed control components. The engine i s  a deep-throttling 
rocket with an ablatively cooled combustion chamber and a radiation-cooled 
nozzle, 
between 0 and 60  percent of full power. I ts  functional diagram would appear 
much the same a s  the CSM propulsion sys tem of F igure  4-25, except that the 
LM engine is gimbaled to provide *6" of pitch or  rol l  control during descent. 
I t  develops a maximum thrust  of 10 ,  500 pounds and is throttleable 
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The following modifications to the Apollo LM configuration a r e  required 
to compensate for  the increased landed weight: 
1. Additional propellant tankage is required for the increased 
propellant quantity. 
2.  Additional helium pressurant  must  be provided for the added 
propellant. 
3 .  The burn-t ime at maximum thrus t  and the thrust  level  during the 
throttleable phases must  be increased for the descent engine. 
4. Structural  beef-up of the descent stage and landing gear a r e  
required.  
In o rde r  t o  establish descent propulsion design requirements,  the LM 
has been assumed to have a separation weight of approximately 4 0 , 0 0 0  pounds 
and a propellant s torage capacity of 21, 500 pounds. 
Systems Analysis 
The descent propulsion i s  not used af ter  touchdown; consequently, the 
basic concern is associated with the need to  provide additional propellant 
and engine burn- t ime. 
Descent Propellant Tank Modifications. Two methods considered for 
providing the increased  descent propellant quantity for the Augmented L M  
taxi miss ion  a re -  
1. Retain the four existing LM descent propellant tanks without modi- 
fications, and add two new cylindrical  tanks mounted in two 
descent-stage corner  quadrants. 
2. Modify the existing descent tanks by changing the hemispherical  
end-domes to ellipsoidal ends and increasing the length and the 
diameter  of the cylindrical section. 
The six-tank configuration requi res  modifications to the feed sys tem 
to balance the propellant flow throughout the system, provide the engine with 
the c o r r e c t  mixture  ra t io ,  and minimize propellant residuals.  A simple 
or i f ice  m a y  not adequately balance the sys tem,  in  which case an active 
propellant utilization/propellant management sys t em may be required. 
Other considerations are  that the two additional tanks require  installation in 
the vehicle a t  distances f rom the c. g. proportional to their weight in order  
to minimize m a s s  unbalance, and that the new propellant tanks will subtract  
f r o m  the usable payload volume, F o r  these reasons ,  the modified four-tank 
configuration has  been recommended for  the augmented vehicle. 
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Grumman studies of tank designs for the four-tank configuration indi- 
cate that the l ightest  tank design capable of satisfying the requirements  of 
the augmented miss ion  i s  a 52. O-inch-diameter, toroidal-head titanium tank. 
This tank, although the l ightest ,  i s  m o r e  complicated than other tanks con- 
s idered,  because i t  requi res  a cylindrical tension s t ru t  located a t  the center 
of the tank (see F igure  4-46). To maintain the required accessibil i ty through 
the bottom of the tank, the tension s t ru t  mus t  be capable of being easily 
removed, 
with a threaded sleeve a t  the top a s  par t  of the cover plate. 
This capability can be accomplished by incorporating the s t ru t  
An ellipsoidal-head titanium tank is competitive with the toroidal- 
head titanium tank up to the point where the major /minor  diameter  (a /b)  ratio 
of the head is 1.414. 
an elliptical head whose geometry introduces compressive hoop loads,  and 
the tank weight increases  rapidly. 
Beyond this point, further increase  in volume requires  
A study was conducted to determine if  a 52-inch-diameter ellipsoidal 
head titanium tank ( a /b  = 1.414) could be designed to yield a payload weight 
equal to the toroidal-head tank. 
LM tank length of 70.270 inches (effective length) mus t  be increased to 
73. 3 inches. By incorporating a machined feed-line elbow a t  the bottom of 
the propellant tank and maintaining the existing elbow center line elevation, 
the tank can be lowered 1.184 inches (see Figure 4-47). 
1.846 inches required to provide a tank length of 73. 3 inches i s  obtained by 
extending the tank above the upper shear  deck, which requires  introduction 
of a 22-inch-diameter hole in the upper shear  deck. The existing slope of the 
helium pressurizat ion line is maintained by relocating the helium pressuriza-  
tion inlet port  below the top center  of the tank (see  Figure 4-48). 
To accomplish this design, the present 
The remaining 
Descent Engine. To determine the ability of the LM descent engine to 
mee t  the requirements  of a propulsion augmented mission,  a preliminary 
composite thrust  profile was developed. This profile w a s  established to 
define the maximum firing t ime at the fixed thrust  point in conjunction with 
the maximum total  f i r ing time. 
requirement ,  the thrust  profile included an  abort  condition, which occurs a t  
a point la te  in the nonthrotteable portion of the braking phase. 
requi res  a n  inc rease  in  the duration of the maximum-thrust  phase during 
braking by approximately 100 seconds over the LM profile and provides higher 
t h rus t  levels during final approach and landing. 
To define a worst-case descent engine 
This profile 
Calculated data based on this new thrust  profile indicate that the engine 
case  tempera ture  will increase  in the combustion chamber and nozzle a rea  
over that result ing f r o m  a nominal LM profile. 
pera tures  a r e  still below the specified temperature l imits .  
s ame  margins  a s  the present  LM, some ablative ma te r i a l  mus t  be added. 
P re l imina ry  analysis  of the throat  indicates that no additional ablative mater ia l  
is required in this a r ea .  
The result ing increased tem- 
To maintain the 
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An additional consideration in determining the ability of the LM descent 
engine to per form an  augmented mission i s  the s ta t ic  stability of the vehicle 
while the engine is firing. 
required to cause the thrus t  vector to pass  through the center of gravity of 
the spacecraft .  
accounting for bearing alignment, th rus t  vector alignment, and rigging e r r o r  
i s  5.33 degrees.  
required to null the effects of center-of-gravity offset. 
mus t  be performed to determine if the remaining 3 .6  degrees  of gimbal angle 
will adequately satisfy requirements  for correct ing descent - engine -mount 
deflection, aiding in maneuvers ,  and in general ,  satisfying the dynamic 
requirements  of the vehicle when the engine i s  firing. 
The parameter  of in te res t  i s  the gimbal angle 
The maximum gimbal angle available for control a f te r  
Of this e r r o r ,  a s ta t ic  offset angle of 1. 73 degrees  i s  
Fur ther  analysis 
Descent Propellant Tank Pressurizat ion.  The following ground ru les  
were  used for determining helium requirements:  
1. An ambient s t a r t  bottle is not used. 
2. 27, 500 pounds of propellant mus t  be expelled, which is approxi- 
mately 700 pounds above the minimum guaranteed usable quantity. 
3. Blowdown of the propellant tanks is not considered. 
4. A maximum anticipated standby time of 131 hours  i s  used to estab- 
l i sh  initial He loading. 
5. He tank heat leak is  7. 5 Btu/hour. 
Based on these ground rules ,  55.6 pounds of He is  sufficient to expel 
the  21, 500 pounds of propellant, 
that corresponds to this initial loading is 1 ,614 psia and occurs  a t  engine firing. 
With a He tank having an allowable operating p r e s s u r e  of 1, 710 psia, an 
appreciable margin  exists for design uncertainties,  such a s  loading tolerances 
and heat-leak variations.  A detailed study was conducted to determine the 
effects of sys tem tolerances.  
cient to expel the total propellant load required for the augmented mission 
with all tolerances considered; however, the standby t ime must  be reduced 
to 101 hours ,  which i s  considered acceptable. 
The maximum nominal He tank p res su re  
The He tank could be loaded to a density suffi- 
After landing, p re s su re  in the descent tanks will slowly r i s e  because 
It is estimated that the tank p res su re  of heating of the cold He pressurant .  
will increase  to the level of the relief valve p re s su re  setting within 24 hours.  
To prevent actuation of the relief valve, and uncontrolled tank venting, the 
LM has  solenoid valves in se r i e s  with squib valves to manually vent the tanks 
By venting to approximately 40  psi  internal p re s su re ,  the danger of catas-  
trophic failure due to micrometeoroid penetration is eliminated. Based on 
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the tank geometry and mater ia l ,  40 psi  is a conservative estimate of the 
p r e s s u r e  level a t  which no c rack  propagation will occur if the tank is 
punctured. 
The reliability of the descent propulsion sys tem and, therefore ,  its 
contribution to Ps will remain unchanged f r o m  that estimated for Apollo 
Ps = 0. 998 (Reference 4-37). Since i t  will not function af ter  touchdown, 
maintenance wi l l  not be required.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The descent propulsion sys t em wi l l  requi re  some modifications in  
t e r m s  of propellant storage.  
requirements  of the mission. 
and placement. 
Beyond those,  it wi l l  meet  the functional 
Work i s  required in  the a r e a  of tank redesign 
These a r e  not considered one of the spacing problems, 
4.4. 3 Descent Stage Structure  
The modifications required to the DSS a r e  created by- 
1. The increased weight of the overall  LM. 
2. The additional fuel tankage. 
3 .  The addition of the electr ical  power source.  
To s t ructural ly  accommodate the new propellant tanks, a 22 -inch- 
diameter  hole i s  provided in the upper shear  deck of the descent stage. 
provision will necessi ta te  redesign of this a r ea .  
will a l so  require  strengthening because of the heavier loads imposed. 
This 
The vertical  shear  webs 
The higher loads imposed because of the increased vehicle weight will 
requi re  beef-up of the cross-sect ional  a r e a s  of the machined par ts ,  such as 
apex fittings, t ru s s  supports,  corner  posts,  capstr ips  and top/bottom center  
f rames .  
The descent stage should be near ly  unaffected by  the meteoroid hazard  
since i t  is protected by the ascent  stage. 
Studies have indicated that the present  LM landing gear configuration 
with a modera te  amount of redesign can be used for  a n  augmented vehicle. 
In general ,  these modifications include the following: (1) increased density 
of crushable  core ,  (2) increased thicknesses of s t ru ts  and members ,  and 
(3 )  strengthening of selected joints. In defining these modifications, the 
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present  LM tempera ture  profile a t  landing was applied, 
based on Surveyor VI data that there  may be a reduction in the maximum 
s t ruc tura l  temperatures  of the landing gear for  the Apollo mission. This 
reduction could minimize the number of changes required.  
There  a r e  indications 
These modifications, a f te r  qualification, a r e  not expected to  measurably 
affect the reliabil i ty of any s t ruc tura l  member  o r  i t s  contribution to Ps. 
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4 . 4  THE L U ~ A R  MODULE DESCENT STAGE SYSTEMS 
i LIST O F  ABBREVIATIONS 
LM-QEP 
ALSEP 
S L A  
AAP - CGSS 
DPS 
PU/PM 
F T P  
DSS 
Q u k  s c ent Electr ical  Power 
Ap 110 Lunar  Surface Experiment Package 
Apdllo Applications Program 
Cryogenic Gas Storage Subsystem 
Descent Propulsion System 
Propellant Utilization/Propellant Management 
Fixed Thrust  Point 
Descent Stage Structure 
Space i c raft Lunar Module Adapt e r 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 ELOR MISSION CAPABILITY 
5. 1. 1 Estimating Reliability - The Baysian Approach 
Estimating reliability in  the classical  sense has  depended on the con- 
ventional statist ician who requi res  much tes t  data on the specific system, 
This i s  an  expensive and impract ical  means of assessing modern space sys -  
t em r eli  ability status . 
Recently there  has  emerged a new and more  pract ical  approach to 
reliabil i ty estimation based on the logical application of all available appli- 
cable data; i t  i s  called Baysian statist ics.  Briefly, it accepts all available 
tes t  data, including those accumulated on pr ior  systems,  and takes into 
account the effects of modifications. 
been eliminated by design actions a r e  no longer included in  the system 
reliability estimate, 
systems reliability and subsequent safety. 
of the 1968 Annual Symposium on Reliability,) 
As  a result ,  fa i lure  modes that have 
The end resu l t  is  a more  real is t ic  estimate of mission 
(See the Minutes of Session 7A 
This  approachis used by SD in estimating space system reliability and 
safety because of i ts  conformance to practical  engineering principles and 
economic constraints. The implications on the ELOR Mission a r e  self evi- 
dent; the data derived f rom the Apollo program se rves  a s  an a p r io r i  index 
a s  to the potential success  of the ELOR, provided the aforementioned con- 
ditions a r e  met ,  
5. 1. 2 Evaluating ELOR Mission Effectiveness 
Effectiveness has  been used as a measure  of accomplishment; but i t  
mus t  be related to some tangible objectives o r  another system. 
achieves maximum effectiveness when it permits  accomplishment of the 
objective and all subobjectives within the allotted time. 
craf t  (CSM/LM personnel delivery system) must  therefore  permit  the full 
9O-day stay on the lunar surface and return the three-man party safely to 
the appointed spot on the ear th ' s  surface to achieve maximum effectiveness. 
A mission 
The ELOR space- 
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Applying this definition to  the ELOR mission,  the measure  of effectiveness 
has  two factors:  
1. Stay t ime, expressed as: the probability of completing the 90 days 
without a CSM o r  LM fai lure  requiring abort (P90). 
2. Crew safety, expressed a s  the pro.bability of c rew safe 
r e tu rn  (Ps). 
F r o m  these  the probability of having to abort  o r  leaving before the end of 
the 90 days (Pa) is: 
P = 1 - P  
. a  90 
Ps is not dependent on stay t ime because abort  can be initiated at  any 
t ime deemed necessary  to a s su re  crew safe  return,  constrained only by 
rendezvous/departure  windows, 
longer the stay time, the grea te r  the possibility of a crew-sensit ive failure,  
I t  is dependent on t ime in  the sense  that the 
5. 1. 3 Command and Service Module Effectiveness 
The CM sys tems were evaluated in  Section 4. 1 of this report ,  the 
resu l t s  a r e  summarized in Table 5-1. 
and summarized i n  Table 5-2. 
tions and the result ing mission potential i s  expressed a s  a function of t ime 
in  Part A of F igure  5-1. 
The SM was evaluated in Section 4. 2 
The cumulative resu l t s  of these recommenda- 
The recommended design improvements r a i se s  the Block I1 CSM P 9 0  
to about 0 .65 .  
along with a minimum provision for maintenance would ra i se  the CSM ELOR 
contribution to P 9 0  to greater  than 0. 99 for  the 90-day mission. 
remaining weakness i n  the CSM i s  the stability control function for the 
quiescent state. 
the 0 .  993, but bet ter  data a r e  required to make a final judgment. 
event, a fai lure  will only affect the requirement  to abort. 
The addition of some switchable and automatic redundancy 
The one 
It was found that even this a r e a  could be improved over 
In any 
The result ing probability of having to abort  (Pa) before the 90 days 
because of a command or  service module fai lure  i s  expected to be l e s s  than 
0. 01, o r  no  grea te r  than one chance i n  100 of having to abort  an ELOR 
miss ion  due to a CSM failure with the recommended configuration and support. 
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5. 1.4 Lunar Module Effectiveness 
The LM ascent  and descent systems were  evaluated in  Sections 4. 3 
and 4.4, respectively,  and a r e  summarized in  Tables 5-3 and 5-4, respec-  
tively. The cumulative resu l t s  of these recommendations a r e  presented i n  
Figure 5-1, P a r t  By where the various potential LM concepts a r e  related 
to stay-time and P90.  The unmodified Apollo LM i s  very limited because 
of the battery life and is, therefore,  not a ser ious contender, Using the 
SNAP-27 provided an  EPS P 9 0  of near ly  1.0. Beyond that, as indicated in  
Table 5-3, the one remaining weakness i s  i n  the environmental control and, 
more  specifically, the heat t ransport  loop, the only operating function during 
the dormant mode. In that system, provisions f o r  module replacement will 
resolve any other potential weaknesses. 
The LM as recommended herein will meet  the 90-day ELOR require-  
ment with a P 9 0  probability grea te r  than 0 .99 .  The probability of having to  
abort  because of a LM sys tem fai lure  i s  expected to be l e s s  than f o r  the CSM 
because of the l e s s  complex quiescent mode control; i t  should not exceed 
Pa = 0.003. 
of having to abort  because of a LM sys tem failure. 
par t  of the communications system, the environmental control and electr ical  
power systems must  operate. I ts  contribution to Ps may be somewhat lower 
than the DRM because of increased sys tem complexity for the third man; 
however, planned maintenance can offset this. 
That implies that there  a r e  only three chances i n  one thousand 
This is  because only a 
5. 1. 5 Assessing Crew Safe Return 
Since with the ELOR mission, as with the Apollo mission, abort can be 
initiated at nearly any t ime, being constrained only by the LM rendezvous 
window and the t ransear th  departure window, The probability of safe  re turn  
(P,) should approach or exceed the value extablished f o r  Apollo; i. e . ,  0 .999.  
It approaches that value based on the premise  the systems supporting the 
manned phases,  for  the most pa r t ,  operate about 25 percent l e s s ,  and no 
deleterious effects  a r e  expected from the quiescent phase, 
actual value because of planned maintenance for  potential system weaknesses, 
It may exceed the 
The situation can best be understood through analysis of the data a s  
presented in  Figure 5-2.  Note that the LM has only four functions which 
contribute to the probability of completing the 90 days without an uncom- 
pensated failure,  two of which contribute some degradation to P,. 
remaining LM functions a r e  not operated until departure.  
The 
The CSM has  one more  function and some additional complexity i n  the 
others ;  all of which add up to a slightly higher chance of abort  (Pa = 0.01) .  
Again, two of the five functions contribute some degradation to P,. 
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Regarding the functions affecting safe  r e tu rn  (Ps), as previously 
indicated, the combinations of the three modules without the effects of the 
quiescent state use  must  be Ps = 0. 999, the Apollo I1 objective. 
the total Ps is the product of the two, o r  about Ps = 0.992 without provisions 
for  additional maintenance. The repair  kit for meteroid damage will r a i s e  
the Ps back up to, o r  over,  Ps = 0. 999. Additional maintenance provisioning 
could possibly real ize  additional improvements.  
Therefore,  
The one constraining factor associated with the foregoing i s  the launch 
To approach the Apollo DRM safety, i t  may window f r o m  the lunar surface.  
be necessary  to rendezvous with the orbiting CSM within a two-hour t ime 
f r a m e ;  and with the CSM i n  a lunar polar orbit, this m a y  be impract ical  for 
some s i tes  on the surface.  However, he re  again, provisions for planned 
maintenance will permi t  much longer delays, the amount depending on the 
failur e m e  chani sm.  
In summary,  there  a r e  reasonably good data to support the estimate 
that sa fe  re turn  of the ELOR c rew can be accomplished with a risk that is 
the same,  or  better than that associated with the Apollo DRM. 
5.2 MISSION SYSTEM WEIGHT INFERENCES 
The ELOR miss ion  sys tem imposes a requirement for  an  increase  in  
the weight of the spacecraf t  as it is  injected into t ranslunar  trajectory.  
comparison of the potential alternatives a s  referenced to the Spacecraft 107 
lunar mission spacecraf t  is  given in Table 5-5. 
A 
The recommended concept, involving the two SNAP-27's and two full 
ce l l  concepts for the serv ice  module, presents  the l ightest  and the safest  
alternative. It is expected to weigh only 106, 112 pounds, as injected, on the 
way to the moon. 
Saturn V booster capability and represents  a modest  uprating. 
This weight is  only about 4, 000 pounds over the present  
The all-fuel-cell concept weights 111,400; over 5,000 pounds m o r e  
than the recommended concept and 9,000 m o r e  than the Saturn V capability. 
5 .3  MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (M&R) REQUIREMENTS AND 
RAMIFICATIONS 
5.3. 1 M&R fo r  the CSM 
Since the CSM i s  in  lunar  polar  orbit  unattended, maintenance is not 
possible during the long quiescent phase. 
phase as fa r  as Ps is concerned, since it l a s t s  for about 2,200 hours. 
This, however, is the m o r e  cr i t ical  
It i s  
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during this period that 'failures in  operating systems can most  likely occur. 
In contrast ,  mos t  of the CSM functions a r e  not required to operate during 
the quiescent phase; fa i lures  which occur i n  the nonoperating functions can 
be repaired after c rew re turn  and pr ior  to  the t ransear th  injection, provided 
they a r e  planned for.  
functions were compensated for  by either providing redundant elements o r  
switchable spares .  Fur ther ,  crew safe re turn  can be assured  through use 
of a backup function that is activated from the ear th  MSFN o r  a lunar surface 
control function, 
orbiting CSM to make a repa i r  and/or  re turn  to earth.  
Potential fa i lures  in  the remaining quiescent-cri t ical  
In these cases ,  the lunar par ty  may have to abort  to the 
In the example used, the ELOR stability sys tem (ESS) establishes and 
maintains the slow ro l l  and dampens out wobble. 
switchable spa res  (c7 chances in  1, 000) ,  the CSM can be returned to the 
normal  mode (Block 11) and abort  initiated a s  soon as possible without a 
ser ious detriment to Ps. 
If i t  fails after using the 
The most  pronounced weakness was found to be created by the meteoroid 
hazard,  
It was compensated for through some shielding (a form of redundancy) and 
planned repa i r .  A patching kit is  recommended for repair  of the CM heat 
shield in  par t icular ,  which will easily compensate for any real is t ic  r i s k  level. 
There was a very high probability (0. 8) of some form of penetration. 
The resu l t  of the analysis for  the CSM indicated that even though some 
fo rm of maintenance i s  not practical  for the longest mission phase, the com- 
bination of switchable redundancy, abort  capability and 6 to 8 spares  plus a 
repa i r  kit  amounting to l e s s  than 200 pounds, to be used after crew return,  
will provide a Ps of 0. 99. Some of the spares  could be eliminated through pro-  
visions to cannibalize the LM. 
CSM-ELOR could be safer  missions than Apollo. 
(See Tables 4-1 and 4-2). Theoretically, 
5. 3. 2 M&R for the LM Vehicle 
The LM vehicle i s  i n  a quiescent state either i n  t ransi t  to the moon o r  
while on the lunar surface,  the combination of which makes up most  of the 
ELOR mission. The time on the lunar surface,  some 2, 200 hours,  presents  
the grea tes t  fa i lure  hazard period, A s  indicated in  Tables 4-3 and 4-4, only 
8 spa res  were  required to r a i se  the P 9 0  f rom 0. 7 to over 0 .99  for the full 
90 days. These spa res  weigh l e s s  than 200 pounds. Further ,  five of these 
a r e  required for the G&N system, to be used just  pr ior  to launch. These 
same units could be used as spares  for the CSM G & N  system, eliminating 
about 140 pounds between the two vehicles, if the logistic problems could be 
worked out. 
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The LM, although not specifically designed for maintenance, i s  avail-  
able to the lunar par ty  a t  any t ime and i s ,  therefore,  accessible for  some 
fo rm of maintenance action. 
should c rea te  an abort  situation. 
alternative to make a repa i r .  
SNAP-27, which is an improbable situation. 
involves replacement a t  the box level, which i s  presently possible with little 
to no design changes. 
For  that reason, no LM sys tem emergency 
In most  ca ses  i t  is expected to be a sa fer  
The only possible exception i s  with the 
Recommended maintenance 
5.4 DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
The ELOR mission does not cal l  for a completely new development 
program and, in  fact, i s  not a very  extensive departure  f rom the Apollo 
design reference mission (DRM-2A). 
decreased by about 15 percent fo r  the CSM and 3 3  percent for  the LM. 
major  differences a r e  c rea ted  by the need to maintain optimum storage 
conditions. Fur ther ,  the ramifications of the third man on the LM vehicle 
has  created the most  extensive changes and, therefore,  the pacing factors 
for the ELOR development program. 
The overall  manned operations have 
The 
The projected development program for the ELOR vehicles a r e  pre-  
sented in  Figure 5 - 3 .  The LM vehicle i s  expected to take about s ix  months 
more  than the CSM because of the more  extensive modifications required to 
both the ascelit and descent s tages ,  
The major  problem a r e a  i n  the development cycle i s  that introduced by 
the subcrit ical  cryogenic s torage systems.  If these a r e  considered to be a 
requirement (not recommended by NR/SD), a two-year subsystem develop- 
ment program i s  required to prepare  them for vehicle integration. The 
resu l t  i s  that the ELOR development program would be stretched from a 
Conservative 3-  1 /2-year cycle to near ly  4-1 /2.  
Some of the major  development i tems  to be considered include- 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
Qualification of operating subsystems for the 90 days. 
Manned rendezvous and docking of the LM to an unmanned CSM. 
LM ascent  and descent propellant tanks. 
LM and CSM thermal  control for  the dormant phases,  
LM and CSM environmental control modification. 
New and modified subsystem fit and compatibility verification. 
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7. 
8. 
9. 
New electr ical  power source for both LM and CSM. 
Status monitor for LM and CSM. 
ELOR stability control for CSM. 
10. CSM command demodulator /decoder. 
The study identified the development of the Command Link for the 
manned rendezvous and dock of the LM to an  unmanned command module as 
a long-lead- time i tern. 
will allow man-rating to be accomplished as a n  additional task on one of the 
la t ter  Apollo flights. 
to the proposed estimated program plan, 
Ea r ly  implementation of command link development 
This would minimize cost  and schedule implications 
5 .5  CONCLUSIONS 
I 
The study of the application of the data derived from a study of mission 
duration extension problems to  the ELOR mission has  shown that contemporary 
space sys tems can be used to meet  the needs of some of the more  conserva- 
tive extended missions.  The extended lunar-orbital  rendezvous mission i s  
brought well  within the r ea lm of possibility through natural  extensions of 
contemporary subsystems capability by application of recognized sys tems 
engineering processes  such as operational control; fail-safe design; redundant 
functions; and, most  effective of all, planned maintenance and repair .  
Perhaps  the most  profound resul t  of the study w a s  associated with the 
fac t  that provisions for  as few as 15 repair  o r  replacement actions could 
r a i se  the probability of completing the 90 days on the lunar surface without 
an abort to over  0.99 f rom about 0. 5. 
been specifically identified and a r e  known to be feasible with l i t t le to no modi- 
fications to Block I1 configurations ( s e e  Tables 5-1 through 5-4). 
the probability of safe re turn  is expected to exceed that for Apollo 11. 
These maintenance actions have 
Fur ther ,  
The ability to specifically identify required maintenance action before 
the miss ion  and during the development phases is paramount to this mission 
concept. To this end, previous studies have contributed greatly, specifically, 
the baseline study, Reference 1-1. Further,  Reference 5-1 is  a summary  of 
the resu l t s  as they concern specific identification and location of potential 
maintenance actions;  i t  develops the logic associated with the process  and 
demonstrates  its applications. 
The development requirements associated with the ELOR mission, as 
recommended by the Grumman/SD team involves a very modest program 
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when related to the contemporary program. 
C and D) should not exceed 3 -1 / 2  years ,  and the pacing components vary 
with the selected concept, the LM stages requiring the mos t  extensive 
modifications. 
The development cycle (Phase  
In conclusion, the miss ion  is a s  safe as Apollo; it is the most  con- 
servative approach to extended lunar  exploration; it can be implemented 
within the 1970-1975 t ime f rame,  and it demonstrates the effectiveness of 
even the crudest  form of maintenance planning on extended-mission safety, 
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